Return to Aristotle, On Interpretation
1. But whether is affirmation contrary to negation, or affirmation to affirmation? And is the sentence which says “Every man is just.”, contrary to the sentence, “No man is just.”? Or is this sentence, “Every man is just.” contrary to the sentence “Every man is unjust.”? For instance, Callias is just. Callias is not just. Callias is unjust. Which of these is contrary?
2. For if those things which are in voice follow those which are in the dianoetic power, but there the opinion of a contrary is contrary, as, for instance, that every man is just, is contrary to the opinion that every man is unjust;–if this be the case, in the affirmations also enunciated by the voice, it is necessary that the like should take place. But if there, the opinion of a contrary is not contrary, neither will affirmation be contrary to affirmation, but the above-mentioned negation.
3. Hence, it must be considered which false opinion is contrary to the true opinion, whether that of negation, or that which opines it to be the contrary.
4. But I say as follows: There is a certain true opinion of good, that it is good; there is another false opinion that it is not good; and there is another opinion, that it is evil. Which, therefore, of these is contrary to the true opinion? And if there is one [contrary] according to which is it contrary?
5. If then any one should fancy that contrary opinions are defined by this, that they are of contraries, [his opinion will be] false. For of good that it is good, and of evil, that it is evil, there is perhaps the same opinion, and it is true whether [you should say that this is] one opinion, or many. And these [i. e. good and evil] are contraries. They are not, however, contraries, because they are of contraries, but rather because they have a contrary mode of subsistence.
6. If, therefore, there is an opinion of good that it is good, but another opinion that it is not good; and there is also something else, which is neither inherent, nor can be inherent in good;–if this be the case, no one [contrary] of other things is to be admitted, nor such opinions as fancy that to be inherent which is not, nor that not to be inherent which is. For both the former and the latter of these are infinite.
7. But in those things in which there is deception [contraries are to be admitted]; and these are things from which there are generations. Generations, however, are from opposites; and, therefore, deceptions also.
8. If, therefore, good is good and not evil, and the one is essential, but the other accidental; (for it happens to it not to be evil) but of every thing, the opinion which is essential is more true, and [also the opinion which is essential is more] false since the [more true] is thus assumed;–if this be the case, the opinion that good is not good, is false of what which is essentially inherent; but the opinion that it is evil [is false] of that which is from accident. Hence, the opinion of the negation of good is more false than the opinion of the contrary. But he is especially deceived about every thing, who has a contrary opinion; for contraries pertain to things which very much differ about the same thing. If, therefore, one of these is contrary, but the opinion of negation is more contary, it is evident that this will be [truly] contrary. But the opinion that evil is good is complex; for, perhaps, it is necessary that the same person [who entertains this opinion] should conceive [that good] is not good.
9. Farther still, if it is requisite that the like should take place in other things, here also it may appear to have been well said. For [the opinion] of negation is either every where, or no where [contrary]. But of those things to which there are not contraries, of these, [the opinion] also is false which is opposed to the true opinion. Thus he who fancies that man is not man is deceived. If, therefore, these negations are contrary, the other [opinions] also of negation [are contrary].
10. Again, the opinion of good that it is good, and the opinion of that which is not good, that it is not good, have a similar subsistence; and besides these, the opinion of good that it is not good, and the opinion of that which is not good that it is good. To the true opinion, therefore, that what is not good is not good, what opinion will be contrary? For it will not be the opinion which says that it is evil, since it may at one and the same time be true. But truth is never contrary to truth. For something which is not good is evil; so that it will happen that these opinions are at one and the same time true. Nor again, will [the opinion] that [what is not good] is not evil be [the contrary to the opinion that what is not good is not good], for at one and the same time these may be true. It remains, therefore, that the contrary to the opinion that what is not good is not good, is the opinion of what is not good that it is good; for this is false. Hence the opinion of good that it is not good, will be contrary to the opinion of good that it is good.
11. But it is evident that it makes no difference though we should propose universal affirmation; for universal negation will be the contrary. Thus, for instance, to the opinion which opines that whatever is good is good, the opinion that nothing among the number of good things is good, [will be contrary]. For the opinion of good that it is good, if good is universally [assumed], is the same with the opinion that what is good is good. And this differs in no respect from the opinion that every thing which is good is good. The like also takes place in that which is not good.
12. Hence, if this is the case in opinion, and the affirmations and negations in voice are the symbols of [conceptions] in the soul, it is evident that the universal negation which is about the same thing, is contrary to affirmation. Thus, for instance, to the affirmation that every thing good is good, or that every man is good, this negation is contrary, no good is good, or no man is good. But this assertion that not every thing good is good, or that not every man is good, is opposed contradictorily.
13. It is evident, however, that neither true opinion can be contrary to true opinion, nor true negation to true negation. For those are contraries which are about opposites; and about these it happens that the same thing is verified. But it cannot happen that contraries can at one and the same time be inherent in the same thing.
Return to Aristotle, On Interpretation
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