Return to Aristotle, On Interpretation
1. To affirm and deny, however, one thing of many things, or many things of one thing, unless that is one certain thing which is manifested from the many, is not one affirmation, nor one negation. But I say one, not if one name is given to many things, nor if one thing is produced from them. Thus, for instance, man is perhaps an animal, a biped, and mild; but one thing is produced from these. But from white, man, and to walk, one thing is not produced. Hence, neither if any one affirms one certain thing of these, is there one affirmation; but there is one articulate sound, indeed, and many affirmations: nor if [he should affirm] these of one thing, [is there one affirmation] but there are similarly many [affirmations].
2. If, therefore, dialectic interrogation, is the request of an answer, either of a proposition, or of the other part of a contradiction; but a proposition is a part of one contradiction; there will not be to these things one answer, for neither is there one interrogation, not even if it is true. About these things, however, we have spoken in the Topics.
3. But it is at the same time evident, that the question what is it, is not a dialectic interrogation. For it is necessary that a choice should be given from the interrogation of enunciating this or that part of the contradiction; but it is requisite that the interrogation should first define whether this particular thing is a man, or not this particular thing.
4. Since, however, of things which are separately predicated, some are predicated as composites, so that the whole that is predicated becomes one thing, but others are not, what is the difference? For of man it is true to assert separately animal, and separately biped; and these as one thing: and also man and white, and these as one thing. But if he is a shoemaker and a good man, he is not also a good shoemaker.
5. For if, because each of them [separately] is true, it is also necessary that both should be at the same time true, many absurdities will follow. For of a man, man and white are truly asserted, so that the whole also is truly asserted. Again, if the same thing is white, the whole also is white; so that it will be a man white white, and this to infinity. And again, a musician white walking; and these frequently conjoined to infinity. Farther still, if Socrates is Socrates and man; Socrates also is Socrates man. And if he is man and biped, he is also man biped. It is evident, therefore, that if any one says conjunctions are simply produced, many absurdities must be said to happen.
6. Let us, however, now show how they are to be placed. Of things, therefore, which are predicated, and of those things to which it happens to be predicated, such things are said from accident, either of the same, or the one of the other, these will not be one; as, for instance, man is white, and a musician. But whiteness and music are not the same thing; for both are accidents to the same thing. Nor though it should be true to say that what is white is a musician, yet at the same time, musical white will not be one thing; for that which is white is a musician from accident; so that white musical will not be one thing. Hence neither [if a man is a shoemaker and a good man] is he simply a good shoemaker; but [if he is an animal and a biped, he is rightly called] a biped animal, because [these] are not [predicated] from accident.
7. Again, neither are such things as are inherent in another [to be added]; and hence neither is whiteness to be frequently [adduced]. Nor is a man a man animal, or [a man] biped; for animal and biped are inherent in man.
8. It may, however, but truly asserted and simply of some one; as, for instance, that a certain man is a man; or that a certain white man is a white man; but this cannot always be asserted.
9. But when in the adjunct, something of opposites is inherent, from which contradiction follows, then it is not true but false; as if, for instance, a dead man should be said to be a man. When, however, [something repugnant] is inherent, it is always not true?
10. But when it is not inherent, it is not always true? As Homer is something, for instance, a poet, but is not predicated per se, or essentially.
11. Hence in those categories in which contrariety is not inherent, if definitions are asserted instead of nouns, and are predicated essentially, and not from accident; in these, that which is some particular thing, may also be truly said to be simply such. But non-being because it is an object of opinion, cannot be truly said to be a certain being; for the opinion of it is, not that it is, but that it is not.
Return to Aristotle, On Interpretation
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