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Aristotle, Categories

Study Aristotle’s Categories, translated by Thomas Taylor (1758-1835) in the Classical Liberal Arts Academy’s Classical Catholic Library.  For help with English vocabulary, please use the Oxford English Dictionary.

Chapter 1. Homonyms, Synonyms and Paronyms

Things are said to be “homonymous” of which the name alone is common, but the definition (of substance according to the name) is different. Thus a man and an image, are each of them named animal (ζῷον). For of these, the name is common, but the definition (reason of substance according to the name) is different. Thus, if any one explains in what “being an animal” in each of these consists, he will assign the peculiar definition of each.

Those things are said to be “synonymous” of which the name is common, and the definition (reason of substance according to the name) is the same. Thus a man is said to be “animal” (ζῷον), and also an ox. For each of these is called by the common name animal (ζῷον) and the idea represented by the name is the same. Thus, if any one gives the definition of each, explaining in what the being an animal in each of these consists, he will give the same definition.

Those things are called “paronymous” which both have their name, from some common thing, yet so as to differ in case. Thus “grammarian” is denominated from “grammar”, and “manly”. from “manliness”.

Note: This chapter makes no sense in translation without some clarification. As a result, it is often made more complicated by scholars than it actually is. Remember that in Aristotle’s time there were no dictionaries. We take these things for granted today, but dictionaries were developed because of Aristotle’s teaching. If you understand that a word may have more than one definition, you understand what Aristotle is teaching here.

In Greek, the word ζῷον (zōon) means both “animal” (from which we get the English words zoo and zoology), and an image of anything. For example, in Herodotus, we read, “First, Darius made and set up a carved stone, upon which was cut the figure (ζῷον) of a horseman”, and “men crush [leaves] and mix with water and use for painting figures (ζῷα) on their clothing”. Thus, Aristotle is not saying that a “living man” and “a picture of a man” are homonymously called “animal”, but that the word ζῷον is predicated homonymously of a man (ἄνθρωπος) and of something drawn (γεγραμμένον). The same thing is spoken of each of them, but with a completely different meaning. The reason why this is important to understand is that it is self-evident that two things equal to a common third are equl to one another. Aristotle is showing that in this case there is an appearance of equality, but it is false beecause things are often spoken homonymously rather than synonymously (below). This will become important in reasoning, as you’ll see. -Mr. Michael

Chapter 2. Connected and Simple Speech

Of things which are spoken (λεγομένων), some are spoken in connection, but others without connection. Those therefore which are enunciated according to connection are such as, “the man runs”, “the man is victorious”; but those without connection are such as, “man”, “ox”, “runs”, “conquers”.

1. Of spoken things, some are predicated of a subject, but are not in a subject.

Thus “man” is predicated of a subject, viz. an individual man (e.g., Socrates is a man.), but is not in any subject.

2. Other things are in a subject, and are predicated of no other subjects.

By being in a subject, however, I do not mean that which is in a subject as a part is in a whole, but as that which cannot exist outside of a subject. Thus, grammar is in a subject (namely, the soul), and is not predicated of any subject; a particular white thing is in a subject, viz. in a body, (for all color must exist in a body) but it is not predicated of any subject.

3. Some things are both predicated of a subject, and are in a subject.

Thus knowledge (of the sciences, i.e., ἐπιστήμη) is in the soul (as in a subject), and is predicated of grammar (as of another subject).

4. Some things are neither in a subject, nor are predicated of a subject.

As for instance, an individual man (e.g., Socrates), or an individual horse (e.g., Bucephalus). For nothing of this kind either is in another subject, or is predicated of another subject. And, in short, individuals, and things which are singular in number, are indeed predicated of no other subject, yet nothing hinders but that some of them may be in another subject. For grammar, is among the things in a subject, but is not predicated of any subject.

Chapter 3.

When one thing is predicated (κατηγορῆται) of another as of a subject, as many things as are spoken about that which is being predicated (κατηγορουμένου), all also be spoken (ῥηθήσεται) about the subject. Thus “man” is predicated of some individual man, and “animal” is predicated of “man”; and therefore “animal” shall also be predicated of that individual man. For that individual man is both “man” and “animal”.

Socrates (an individual man) is man.
Man is animal.
∴ Socrates is animal.

Note that what I speak with students about forming an argument in your speech and writing, this is the model of all such arguments. -Mr. Michael

Of things that belong to different genera, which are also not arranged under one another (subalternately), the differences (διαφοραὶ) will also be different in species (εἴδει); as of “animal” and “science”. For the differences of “animal” are, “pedestrious”, “biped”, “winged”, and “aquatic”; but no one of these is a difference of “science”. For one “science” does not differ from another “science” in being “biped”.

Of things that belong to different genera, which are arranged under one another, nothing hinders the differences from being the same; for superior genera are predicated of the genera which are under them. Hence, as many differences as there are of what is being predicated, so many shall there also be of the subject.

Chapter 4. The Ten Categories

Of things which are not spoken according to connection, each of them signifies either:

  1. Substance (οὐσία)
  2. Quantity (πόσος)
  3. Quality (ποῖος)
  4. Relative (προς τι)
  5. Where (ποῦ)
  6. When (πότε)
  7. To be Situated (κεῖσθαι)
  8. To Have (ἔχειν)
  9. To Act (ποιεῖν)
  10. To Suffer (πάσχειν)

But a Substance is such as, “man” and “horse”. A Quantity is such as, “a two-cubits-long thing” or “a three-cubits-long thing”. A Quality is such as, “a white thing”, or “a grammatical thing”. A Relative is such as, “a double thing”, “a half thing”, “a greater thing”. Where, is such as, “in the Lyceum”, “in the Forum”. When, is such as, “yesterday”, “last year”. But to be situated, is such as, “laid”, “seated”. To have, is such as, “shod”, “armed”. But to act, is such as, “cutting”, “burning”. And to suffer, is such as, “cut”, “burnt”.

Each of the things spoken (είρημένων), considered by itself, is not spoken in any affirmation (κατάφασις) or negation (απόφασις) ; but by the connection of these with each other, affirmation or negation is produced. For every affirmation or negation appears to be either true or false; but of things which are spoken in no connection, none is either true or false; such for instance as, “man”, “white”, “running”, “conquering”.

Chapter 5. Of Substance

Substance, which is most properly, primarily, and especially so called, is that which is neither predicated of any subject, nor is inherent in any subject; such for instance as, “Socrates” (i.e., an individual man), and “Bucephalus” (an individual horse). But secondary substances are called species, in which species those substances that are named primary substances are contained—both these, and the genera of these species. Thus, “Socrates” is contained in “man” as in species; but the genus of the species “man” is “animal”. These, therefore, are called “secondary substances”, such for instance as man (the species) and animal (the genus).

It is however evident from what has been said (in chapter 1), that of things which are predicated of a subject, it is necessary that both the name and the definition should be predicated of it, that is, they must be predicated synonymously. In this way, “man” is predicated of “Socrates”, as of a subject. The name is predicated of it; for you predicate “man” of “Socrates”. The definition of “man” is also predicated of “Socrates”: for “Socrates” is both “man” and “animal”; so that both the name and the definition are predicated of the subject.

But with respect to things which are in a subject, of most, neither the name, nor the definition is predicated of the subject; but of some, nothing hinders but that the name may sometimes be predicated of the subject, though it is impossible that this should be the case with the definition. Thus “whiteness”, which is in “body” as in a subject, is predicated of the subject, for “body” is said to be “white”. But the definition of whiteness can never be predicated of body.

All other things, however, are either predicated of the primary substances (as subjects), or are inherent in primary substances (as in subjects). This is evident from the particulars which are obvious to all men. Thus “animal” is predicated of “man”: and therefore is also predicated of “Socrates”. For if “animal” were predicated of no individual men, neither, in short, would it be predicated of “man”. Also, “color” is inherent in “body”; and therefore it is also inherent in any individual body. For if it is not inherent in any of individual bodies, neither, in short, it is inherent in “body”. Hence, all other things are either predicated of the primary substances (as subjects); or are inherent in them (as in subjects). The primary substances therefore not existing, it is impossible that any one of the other things should exist.

But of the secondary substances, species is more substance than genus; since it is nearer to the primary substance. Thus, if any one explains what the primary substance is, he will explain it, in a manner more known and appropriate, by introducing species than by genus. For instance, he who explains what “Socrates” is, will explain it in a manner more known, by introducing “man”, than by “animal”; for the former is more the peculiarity of “Socrates”; but the latter is more common. He also who explains what an individual tree is, will explain it in a manner more known and appropriate, by introducing “tree” than by “plant”. Farther still, the primary substances, because they are placed under everything else, and everything else is predicated of these, or is inherent in these, on this account are especially called “substances”. But as the primary substances are to all other things, so is species to genus; since species is placed under genus. For genera are predicated of species; but species are not reciprocally predicated of genera. Hence species is more substance than genus.

With respect to species themselves however, no one of such of them as are not genera, is more substance than another. For he will not at all explain more appropriately, who introduces “man” in the explanation of a particular man, than he who introduces “horse” in the explanation of a particular horse. After the same manner also in the primary substance, one of them is not more substance than another; for a certain man is not more substance than a certain ox.

Reasonably therefore, after the primary substances, species and genera alone among the rest, are said to be secondary substances, since these alone, of the things which are predicated, make known the primary substance. For if anyone explains what a particular man is, by introducing species or genus, he will appropriately explain it; and he will make it to be more known, by introducing “man” or “animal”; but whatever else he may introduce among all other things, will be introduced foreign from the purpose; such, for instance, as that he is “white”, or that he “runs”, or anything else of this kind. Hence these things alone among others are very properly said to be substances.

Again, the primary substances, because they are placed under all other things, and all other things are either predicated of these, or are inherent in these, are said to be most properly substances. But as is the relation of the primary substances to all other things, such also is the relation of the species and genera of the primary substances to all the rest, since of these all the rest are predicated. For you say that an individual man is a grammarian; and therefore you also say that a man and an animal are a grammarian. And the like also takes place in other things.

It is common however to every substance, not to be in a subject. For the primary substance is neither inherent in a subject, nor is predicated of a particular subject. And with respect to secondary substances, that no one of them is inherent in a subject is evident as follows: “Man” indeed is predicated of a particular man as of a subject, but is not inherent in a subject; for “man” is not inherent in an individual man. In a similar manner also, “animal” is predicated of a particular man as of a subject, but “animal” is not inherent in any individual man. Farther still, of those things which are inherent in a subject, nothing hinders but that the name may sometimes be predicated of the subject, but it is impossible that the definition should be predicated of it. Of secondary substances, however, both the definition and the name are predicated of a subject; for you predicate the definition of “man” of an individual man, and in a similar manner the definition of “animal”. Hence substance will not be among the number of things which are in a subject.

Not being inherent in a subject, however is not the peculiarity of substance. Differences also belong to things which are not inherent in a subject. For “pedestrious” and “biped”, are predicated indeed of “man” as a subject, but are not inherent in a subject; for neither is “biped”, nor “pedestrious” in “man” . The definition also of difference is predicated of that of which difference is predicated. Thus if “pedestrious” is predicated of “man”, the definition also of “pedestrious” will be predicated of “man”; for “man” is “pedestrious”.

Nor ought we to be disturbed, lest we should be at any time compelled to confess that the parts of substances are not substances, because they are in their wholes as in subjects (not as parts); for things which are in a subject were not said to be so, as parts which exist in any thing.

It also belongs to secondary substances and differences, that all things are synonymously predicated from them. For all the categories from these, are either predicated of individuals, or of species. Thus from the primary substance there is no category; for it is predicated of no subject. But of secondary substances, species indeed is predicated of individuals; but genus is predicated both of species and individuals. In like manner also, differences are predicated of species and individuals. And the primary substances receive the definition of species and genera; and species receives the definition of genus. For as many things as are asserted of that which is predicated, so many may also be asserted of the subject . In a similar manner, species and individuals receive the definition of differences. But those things were synonymous of which the name is common and definition the same. Hence all things which are predicated from substances and differences, are predicated synonymously.

Every substance, however, appears to signify an individual thing. In the primary substances, therefore, it is indubitable and true, that they signify an individual thing; for that which is signified is an individual and one in number. But in secondary substances, though they appear indeed by the figure of appellation similarly to signify an individual thing when any one says “man” or “animal”, yet this is not true, but they rather signify a thing with a certain quality. For the subject is not one, as the primary substance, but “man” and “animal” are predicated of many things. Secondary substances do not signify a thing with a certain quality in a simple manner, as “that which is white”. For “that which is white” signifies nothing else than a thing with a certain quality, but species and genus specify quality about substance; for they signify what quality a certain substance possesses. The limitation, however, is more extended in genus than in species; for he who says “animal” comprehends to a greater extent than he who says “man”.

It also belongs to substances, to have nothing contrary to them. For what can be contrary to the primary substance, as, for instance, to an individual man, or to an individual animal? For there is nothing contrary to these; since nothing is contrary either to “man” or to “animal”. This however is since nothing is contrary either to man or to animal. This however is not peculiar to substance, but is also found in many other things, as, for instance, in quantity. For nothing is contrary to “two cubits”, or “three cubits”, or to “ten”, or any thing of this kind. Unless some one should say that “much” is contrary to “few”; or “the great” to “the small”. But among definite quantities (rather than relative quantities) no one is contrary to another.

Substance also appears not to receive the more and the less. I do not say that one substance is more or less substance than another; for it has been already said that it is; but I say that every substance is not said to be more or less that very thing which it is. Thus if this substance is “man”, he will not be more or less man, neither himself than himself, nor another man than another. For one man is not more “man” than another; in the same manner as one “white thing” is more or less white than another; and one “beautiful thing” is more or less beautiful than another. The same thing also is said to be more or less than itself. Thus a body which is white, is said to be more white now than formerly; and when hot is said to be more or less hot. But substance is not said to be more or less substance. For neither is man said to be more man now than formerly, nor any one of such other things as are substances. Hence substance will not receive the more and the less.

It appears, however, to be especially the peculiarity of substance, that being one and the same in number it is capable of receiving contraries; nothing of which kind can be adduced in other things which are not substances; viz. that being one in number they can receive contraries. Thus color, which is one and the same in number, is not white and black; nor is an action, which is one and the same in number, both depraved and worthy: and the like also takes place in other things which are not substances. But substance being one and the same in number, is capable of receiving contraries. Thus a certain man being one and the same, at one time becomes white, and at another black; likewise hot and cold, depraved and worthy. But in other things nothing of this kind is seen. Unless perhaps some one should object by saying that a sentence and opinion are capable of receiving contraries. For the same sentence appears to be both true and false. Thus if the sentence is true, that some one sits, when he rises from his seat, this very same sentence will be false. In a similar manner also in opinion. For if any one truly opines that a certain person sits, when that person rises from his seat, he will opine falsely, if he has the same opinion about him. If however some one should admit this, yet it differs in the mode. For things which are in substances, the substances being changed, become the recipients of contraries. For that which from being hot becomes cold is changed; for it is changed in quality. This is also the case with that which from being white becomes black, and from being depraved, worthy. In a similar manner in other things, each of them receiving mutation, is capable of receiving contraries. A sentence and opinion, however, remain indeed themselves entirely immoveable; but the thing being moved, that which is contrary is produced about them. For the sentence, that some one sits, remains the same; but the thing being moved, it becomes at one time true, and at another false. In like manner also in opinion. Hence in this way it will be the peculiarity of substance, to be capable of receiving contraries, according to the mutation of itself.

But if any one should admit these things, viz. that a sentence and opinion can receive contraries, this is not true. For a sentence and opinion are not said to be capable of receiving contraries, because they receive something, but because a passive quality is produced about something else. For because a thing is or is not, a sentence is said to be true or false, and not because the sentence can receive contraries. For, in short, neither a sentence, nor opinion is moved by any thing. Hence, neither will they be capable of receiving contraries; since no contrary passive quality is produced in them. But substance, in consequence of receiving contraries, is said to be capable of receiving contraries; for it receives disease and health; and whiteness and blackness; and since it receives each of things of this kind, it is said to be capable of receiving contraries. Hence, the peculiarity of substance will be this, that being one and the same in number, it can receive contraries according to the mutation of itself.
And thus much concerning substance.

Chapter 6. Of Quantity

Of Quantity, one kind is continuous, but another discrete. And the one consists from parts which have position with reference to each other, but the other from parts which are without position. And discrete quantity, indeed, is such as number, and sentence; but continued quantity, is such as line, superficies, body; and besides these, place and time.

For of the parts of number, there is no common boundary, through which the parts of it are conjoined. Thus, if five is a part of ten, five and five are not conjoined by a common boundary, but are separated. Three and seven also, are not conjoined by a common boundary; and, in short, you cannot obtain a common boundary of the parts in number, by they are always separated; so that number belongs to things which are discrete.

In a similar manner also a sentence belongs to discrete quantity. For that a sentence is quantity is evident, since it is measured by a short and long syllable. But I mean a sentence produced in conjunction with voice. For the parts of it are conjoined by no common boundary; because there is not a common boundary by which syllables are conjoined, but each of them is separated by itself.

But a line is continuous; for a common boundary may be assumed, viz. a point through which the parts of it are conjoined. The common boundary also of a superficies, is a line; for the parts of a superficies are conjoined through a certain common boundary. In a similar manner also in a body you may assume as a common boundary, a line or a superficies, through which the parts of the body are conjoined.

Time also and place are things of this kind; for the present time is conjoined to the past and future. Again, place is among the number of things continuous; for the parts of a body possess a certain place, which are conjoined through a certain common boundary. Hence also the parts of the place which each of the parts of the body possesses, are conjoined through the same boundary, as the parts of the body. So that place also will be continued; for the parts of it are conjoined through one common boundary.

Farther still, some things consist from parts which have position with respect to each other; but others consist from parts which have not position. Thus, the parts of a line have position with reference to each other. For each of them is situated somewhere, and you can explain and show where each of them is situated in a superficies, and with which of the remaining parts it is conjoined. In a similar manner also the parts of a superficies have a certain position; for in like manner it may be explained where each of them is situated, and through what they are conjoined to each other. Thus also the parts of a solid, and the parts of a place are conjoined. In number, however, no one can show that the parts of it have a certain position with respect to each other, or that they are situated any where, or which of the parts are conjoined to each other. Nor can any one show this in the parts of time; for no one of the parts of time endures; and how can that have any position which does not endure? But you may rather say that the parts of time have a certain order; because one part of time is prior, but another posterior. The like also takes place in number; because one is numerated prior to two, and two prior to three; and thus numbers may have a certain order, but you can by no means assume that they have any position. In a similar manner likewise in speech; for no one of its parts endures, but it is spoken, and what is said, can be no longer assumed. Hence there will not be a position of its parts, since no one of them endures.

Some things therefore consist from parts which have position, but others from parts which have not position. Those things, however, which have been mentioned are alone properly said to be quantities; but all the rest are so denominated from accident. For looking to these, we say that other things also are quantities. Thus the whiteness is said to be “much”, because the superficies is great; and an action is said to be “long”, because the time in which it was performed is much; and for the same reason motion is much. For each of these is not said to be a quantity by itself. Thus, if any one should explain what the quantity of an action is, he will define it by time, and say, that it was accomplished in a year, or will explain its quantity in some such way. And explaining what the quantity if of whiteness, he will define it by superficies; for such as is the quantity of the superficies, such also he will say is the quantity of the whiteness. So that the particulars which we have mentioned, are alone properly called quantities essentially; but of other things, no one is so called essentially, but from accident.

Nothing is contrary to quantity. For in definite quantities, it is evident that nothing is contrary; as for instance, to two cubits, or three cubits, or to superficies, or to any thing of this kind. For nothing is contrary to them.

Perhaps some one should say that the “much” is contrary to the “few”, or the “great” to the “small”. No one of these, however, is a quantity, but rather belongs to relatives. For nothing, itself considered by itself, is said to be “great” or “small”, but in consequence of being referred to something else. Thus a mountain is said indeed to be “small”, but a grain of millet seed to be “large”; because the one is greater than things of the same kind, but the other is less than things of the same kind. The reference therefore is to something else; for if they were said to be “small” or great by themselves, the mountain could never be said to be “small”, but the grain of millet seed “large”. Again, we say that there are “many” men in the village, and but “few” in Athens, though there is a far greater multitude in the latter than in the former. We also say that there are “many” in the house, and but “few” in the theatre, though the multitude in the latter far exceeds that in the former. Farther still, two cubits, three cubits, and every thing of this kind signify quantities; but the “great” or the “small”, does not signify quantity, but rather relation; for the great and the small are surveyed with reference to something else. And hence it is evident that they are among the number of relatives. Again, whether any one admits, or does not admit that things of this kind are quantities, there is not any thing contrary to them. For how will any thing be contrary to that which cannot be assumed itself by itself, but is referred to another thing? Farther still, if the “great” and the “small” are contraries, it will happen that the same thing will at the same time receive contraries, and that the same things will be contrary to themselves. For it happens that the same thing is at the same time both “great” and “small”. Thus something with reference to this thing is “small”, but the very same thing with reference to something else is “great”. Hence it happens that the same thing is at the same time both “great” and “small”; so that at one and the same time it receives contraries. Nothing, however, appears at on and the same time to receive contraries; as, for instance, in essence. For this indeed appears to be capable of receiving contraries. No one, however, is at the same time “ill” and “well”; nor is any thing at the same time “white” and “black”; nor does any thing else at one and the same time receive contraries. It will happen also that the same things will be contrary to themselves. For if the “great” is contrary to the “small”, but the same thing is at the same time “great” and “small”; the same thing also will be contrary to itself. It is, however, among the number of things impossible, that the same thing should be contrary to itself. The “great” therefore is not contrary to the “small”, nor the “much” to the “few”. Hence, though some one should say that these do not belong to relatives, but to quantity, yet they will have nothing contrary.

But the contrariety of quantity especially appears to subsist about place. For they admit that the “upward” is contrary to the “downward”, asserting asserting that the place towards the middle is “downward”; because there is the greatest interval from the middle to the extremities of the world. They also appear to derive the definition of other contraries from these; for they define contraries to be those things which being in the same genus are most distant from each other. But quantity does not appear to receive the more and the less; as for instance, the quantity of two cubits; for one thing is not more two cubits than another. Nor is there the the more and the less in number. Thus three or five of one thing are not said to be more than three or five of another thing, nor is five more five, than three is three. Nor is one time said to be more time than another. And, in short, in the above-mentioned species of quantity, no one of them is said to be more or less.

It is, however, especially the peculiarity of quantity, to be said to be equal and unequal. For each of the above-mentioned quantities are said to be equal and unequal. Thus body is said to be equal and unequal; and also number and time are said to be equal and unequal. In a similar manner too in the rest of the above-mentioned particulars, each of them is said to be equal and unequal. Of the residue, however, such as are not quantities do not entirely appear to be called equal and unequal. Thus, for instance, disposition, is not entirely said to be equal and unequal, but
rather similar and dissimilar. Whiteness also is not entirely said to be equal and unequal, but rather similar or dissimilar. Hence it will be especially the peculiarity of quantity, to be said to be equal and unequal.

Chapter 7. Relatives

Those things are said to be relatives (προς τι) that are said to be what they are from belonging to other things, or in whatever other way they may be referred to something else. Thus the greater is that which it is, by being so called with reference to something else; for it is said to be greater than a certain thing. And the double is that which it is by being so called with reference to somethings else; for it is said to be the double of a certain thing. And in a similar manner with respect to other things of this kind. Such things, however, are among the number of relative, such as habit, disposition, sense, science, position. For all that we have enumerated are what they are, by being so called from belonging to other things, or in whatever other manner they may be referred to something else; nor are they any other things. For habit is said to be the habit of some one; science the science of something; and position the position of something; and in a similar manner with respect to other things.

Relatives therefore are such things as are said to be what they are, from belonging to other things, or in whatever other manner they may be referred to something else. Thus the mountain is said to be great. The similar also is said to be similar to something; and others things of this kind are in like manner said to be what they are with relation to something.

Reclining (accubitus), however, standing still (statio), and sitting (sessio), are certain positions; and position is among the number of relatives. But to recline (iacere), or to stand still (stare), or to be seated (sedere), are not indeed themselves positions, but are paronymously denominated from the above-mentioned positions.

Contrariety, however, is inherent in relatives. Thus “virtue” is contrary to “vice”, each of them being a relative; and “science” is contrary to “ignorance”. But contrariety is not inherent in all relatives; for to the “double” nothing is contrary, nor to the “triple”, nor to any things of this kind.

Relatives, however, appear to receive the more and the less. For the “similar” and the “dissimilar” are said to be so more and less; and the “equal” and the “unequal” are said to be so more and less; each of them being a relative. For the “similar” is said to be similar to something; and the “unequal”, unequal to something. All relatives, however, do not receive the more and the less. For the “double” is not said to be more and less double, nor any one of things of this kind.

But all relatives are referred to things which reciprocate. Thus, a “servant” is said to be a “servant” of a “master”; and a “master”, the “master” of a “servant”. The “double” also is the double of the “half”; and the “half” is the half of the “double”. The “greater” is greater than the “less”; and the “less” is less than the “greater”. The like also takes place in other things; except that they sometimes differ in diction by case. Thus, “knowledge” is said to be the knowledge of “that which is knowable”; and “that which is knowable” is knowable by “knowledge”. “Sense” also is the sense of “that which is sensible”; and “that which is sensible” is sensible by “sense”.

Sometimes, however, they do not appear to reciprocate, if that is not appropriately attributed to which a thing is referred but he who attributes errs. Thus “wing”, if it is attributed to “bird” does not reciprocate, nor can we say “bird” of a “wing”; for the first is not appropriately attributed, viz. “wing” to “bird”. For “wing” is not predicated of it so far as it is “bird”, but so far as it is “winged”; since there are wings of many other things which are not birds. Hence, if it is appropriately attributed, it also reciprocates, Thus, “wing” is the wing of “that which is winged”; and “that which is winged” is winged by “wing”.

Sometimes, however, it is, perhaps, necessary to invent a name if a name is not given to that to which it may be appropriately attributed. Thus, “rudder”, if it is attributed to “ship”, is not appropriately attributed. For “rudder” is not predicated of “ship”, so far as it is “ship”, since there are ships without rudders; and hence they do not reciprocate. For “ship” is not said to be the ship of a rudder. But, perhaps, the attribution will be more appropriate, if it is thus attributed: “rudder” is the rudder of “that which is ruddered”; or in some other way; for a name is not assigned. And a reciprocation takes place, if it is appropriately attributed; for “that which is ruddered” is ruddered by a “rudder”. In a similar manner also in other things. Thus, “head” will be more appropriately attributed to “that which is headed”, than to “animal”. For a thing has not a head so far as it is an animal; since there are many animals which have not a head.

And perhaps some one may thus easily assume those things to which a name is not given, if from those things which are first, he assigns names to those also with which they reciprocate; as in the instances above reduced, from “wing”, “winged”, and from “rudder”, “ruddered”. All relatives therefore, if they are appropriately attributed, are referred to things with which they reciprocate. For if they should be attributed to any thing casual, and not to the things to which they are truly referred, they will not reciprocate.

But, I say, that neither will any thing reciprocate, if it is attributed to any things accidental to them, and not to that to which it is referred. Thus, “servant”, if he is not attributed as the servant of “master”, but of “man”, or “biped”, or any things else of this kind, will not reciprocate; for the attribution is not appropriate. If, however, that to which a thing is referred, is appropriately attributed, everything else which is accidental being taken away, and this things alone being left, to which it is appropriately attributed, if will always be referred to it. Thus “servant”, if he is referred to “master”, every thing else being taken away which is accidental to “master”, as the being a biped, the being capable of science, and the being a man, and his being a master, is alone left; in this case the servant will always be referred to him. For a servant is said to be the servant of a master. But if that to which it is at any time referred is not appropriately attributed; other things being taken away, and that alone being left, to which it is attributed; in this case it will not be referred to it. For let a servant be referred to man, and a wing to bird and let the being a master be taken away from man; for servant will no longer be referred to man; since master not existing neither does servant exist. In a similar manner also, let the being winged be taken away from bird; and wing will no longer be in the number of relatives; for that which is winged not existing, neither will wing be the wing of any things. Hence it is necessary to attribute that to which a thing is appropriately referred. And if, indeed, a name is assigned, the attribution becomes easy; but if it is not assigned, it is perhaps necessary to invent a name. But being thus attributed, it is evident that all relatives are referred to things which reciprocate.

Relatives are Simultaneous

Relatives, however, appear to be naturally simultaneous; and in most of them, it is true that they are. For the double and the half are simultaneous; and the half existing, the double is; the master existing, the servant is; and the servant existing, the master is. Other things also are similar to these. They likewise co-subvert each other. For the double not existing, the half is not; and the half not existing, the double is not. The like also takes place in other things which are of this kind.

It does not, however, seem to be true in all relatives, that they are simultaneous by nature. For the object of science may appear to be prior to science; since for the most part, with things pre-existing, we obtain the sciences of them. For in few things, or in none, can any one see science originating together with the object of science. Farther still, the object of science being subverted, co-subverts science; but science does not co-subvert the object of science. For the object of science not existing, the science of the object is not; but science not existing, nothing hinders but that the objects of science may exist. Thus, in the quadrature of the circle, if it is an object of scientific knowledge, the science of it does not yet exist, though it is itself an object of science. Again, “animal” being taken away there will not be science, but it will happen that there will still be many objects of scientific knowledge. Things also pertaining to sense subsist similarly to these; since the sensible appears to be prior to sense. For the sensible being subverted co-subverts sense; but sense does not co-subvert the sensible. For the senses are conversant with body, and are in body; but the sensible being subverted, body also is subverted; since body is among the number of sensibles; and body not existing, sense also is subverted. Hence the sensible co-subverts sense. But sense does not co-subvert the sensible. For animal being subverted, sense indeed is subverted, but there will still be the sensible, such, for instance, as body, the hot, the sweet, the bitter, and all such other things as are sensible. Farther still, sense is produced together with that which is sensitive; for at one and the same time animal and sense are produced. But the sensible is prior to the existence of animal or sense. For fire and water and things of this kind from which the animal consists, are, in short, prior to the existence of animal or sense; so that the sensible will appear to be prior to sense.

It is, however dubious, whether no substance is among the number of things which are relatives, as seems to be the case, or whether this happen in certain secondary substances. For it is true, indeed, in primary substances; since neither the whole, nor the parts of primary substances are relatives. Thus, a man is not said to be a man of something; nor is an ox said to be an ox of something. In a similar manner also with respect to the parts of these. For a hand is not said to be a hand of some one, but the hand of some one; and a man is not said to be the man of some one; nor an ox the ox of some one; nor wood the wood of some one; but they are said to be the possession of some one. In things of this kind, therefore, it is evident that they are not among the number of relatives. In some of the second substances there is, however a doubt; for instance, head is said to be the head of some one; hand is said to be the hand of some one; and in like manner other things of this kind; so that these may appear to be among the number or relatives.

If, therefore, the definition of relatives has been sufficiently framed, it is among the number of things very difficult, or among the numbers of things impossible to show that no substance ranks among relatives. But if the definition has not been sufficiently framed, but those things are relatives, the substance of which is the same as the being referred after a certain manner to a certain thing; something may perhaps be said in answer to these things. The former definition, however, is consequent to all relatives; yet it is not the same things, for the very being of them to consist in relation, and that being what they are, they are referred to other things.

And from hence it is manifest, that he who definitely knows any one of relatives, will also definitely know that to which it is referred. It is also, therefore, evident from these things, that if any one knows that this particular thing is among the number of relatives; and if the substance of relatives is the same as subsisting in a certain manner with reference to something; he will also know that with reference to which this particular thing after a certain manner subsists. For if, in short, he does not know that with reference to which this particular things after a certain manner subsists; neither will he know whether it subsists after a certain manner with reference to something. And in particulars, indeed, a thing of this kind is evident. Thus, if any one definitely knows that this particular thing is double, he will also immediately definitely know that of which it is the double. For if he does not know that it is the double of something definite, neither, in short, will he know that it is double. In like manner, if any one knows that this particular thing is better than something else, it is necessary from what has been said, that he should immediately definitely know that than which it is better. But he will not indefinitely know that this is better than that which is worse: for a knowledge of this kind is opinion and not science; since he will not accurately know that it is better than something worse. For it may so happen that nothing is worse than it. Hence it is evidently necessary, that he who definitely knows any relative, should also definitely know that to which it is referred. It is possible, however, definitely to know what the head and the hand are, and every thing of this kind, which are substances; but it is not necessary to know that to which they are referred. For it is not necessary to know definitely of whom this is the head, or of whom this is the hand. And hence these will not be among the number of relatives. But if these are not among the number of relatives, it will be true to say, that no substance is a relative. Perhaps, however, it is difficult for him to assert any thing very clear about things of this kind, who has not made them the subject of frequent consideration. And to have doubted about each of these is not useless.

Chapter 8. Quality

I denominate Quality (ἡ ποιότης) that according to which certain things are said to be so. But quality is among the number of things which are multifariously predicated.

One species of quality, therefore, is called habit and disposition. But habit differs from disposition in this, that it is a thing more lasting and stable. And of this kind are the sciences and the virtues. For science appears to rank among the number of things which are more stable, and are with difficulty removed. In like manner virtue, such as justice and temperance, and every thing of this nature, does not appear to be easily removed or easily changed.

But dispositions are said to be things, which are easily moved and rapidly changed; such as heat and cold, disease and health, and other things of this kind. For a man is disposed after a manner according to these, but is rapidly changed, from being hot becoming cold, and passing from health to disease. The like also takes place in other things: unless some one through length of time has become naturalized to these, and the disposition is incurable, or cannot without great difficulty be removed; in which case it may be called a habit. But it is evident that those things ought to be called habits which are more lasting, and are with greater difficulty removed. For those are not said to possess a scientific habit, who do not very much retain the dogmas of science, though they are disposed after a certain manner according to science, either worse, or better. Hence, habit differs from disposition in this, that the latter is easily removed, but the former is more lasting, and is with more difficulty removed. Habits are also dispositions; but dispositions are not necessarily habits. For those who have habits, are also after a manner disposed according to them; but those who are disposed are not also entirely in the possession of habit.

Another species of Quality is that according to which we say that men are pugilistic, or adapted to the course, or healthy, or diseased; and, in short, whatever is said to take place according to natural power or weakness. For each of these is not denominated from being disposed after a certain manner, but from possessing a natural power or inability of doing something easily, or of suffering nothing. Thus men are said to be pugilistic, or adapted to the course, not because they are disposed after a certain manner, but from possessing a natural power of doing something easily. And they are said to be healthy, from possessing a natural power of suffering nothing easily from casual circumstances; but to be diseased, from possessing a natural weakness of suffering nothing easily from any thing casual. The hard and the soft have a subsistence similar to these. For a thing is said to be hard from possessing a power of not being easily divided; and that is said to be soft, which has an imbecility with respect to this very thing.

The third species of quality consists of passive qualities and passions. And things of this kind are such as sweetness, bitterness, sourness, and every thing allied to these; and farther still, heat and cold, whiteness and blackness. That these, therefore, are qualities is evident. For the recipients of them are called from them qualia. Thus honey from receiving sweetness, is said to be sweet; and a body from receiving whiteness, is said to be white. The like also takes place in other things. But they are called passive qualities, not because the recipients of the qualities suffer any thing. For neither is honey said to be sweet, from suffering any thing; nor any thing else among other things of this kind. Similarly to these also, heat and cold are said to be passive qualities, not from the recipients themselves suffering any thing; but because each of the above mentioned qualities is productive of passion in the senses, they are called passive qualities. For sweetness produces a certain passion according to taste, and heat according to the touch. And in a similar manner the rest.

But whiteness and blackness, and other colours, are not called passive qualities after the same manner with the above-mentioned, but in consequence of being produced from passion. That many mutations, therefore, of colours are produced through passion is evident. For a man when he blushes, becomes red; and when he is terrified, pale; and every thing else of this kind. Hence, if any one naturally suffers a passion of this kind, it is likely that he will have a similar colour. For the disposition which is now produced about the body when he blushes, may also be produced in the natural constitution; so that a similar colour will be naturally produced.

Such symptoms, therefore, of this kind as receive their beginning from certain passions which are difficult to be moved, and are permanent, are called “passive qualities”. For whether in the natural constitution paleness or blackness is produced, they are called qualities; for according to these we call them quales; or whether through long disease or heat, paleness or blackness happens to the same person, and he is not easily restored to his former condition, or these remain through the whole of life; these also are called qualities; for in a similar manner from these we call them quales.

But such symptoms as are produced from things which are easily dissolved, and rapidly restored to their former condition, are called passions, and not qualities; for they are not called according to them certain quales. For neither is he who blushes in consequence of being ashamed called red; nor is he who is pale through being terrified called pale; but they are rather said to have suffered something. Hence things of this kind are indeed called passions, but not qualites.

Similarly to these also passive qualities and passions are denominated in the soul. For such things as immediately, from the birth of any one, are produced from certain passions difficult to be removed,–these are called qualities; such as insanity, anger, and things of this kind. For men are said to be quales according to these, viz. wrathful, and insane. In a similar manner also, such other mutations of a thing from its proper condition as are not natural, but are produced from certain other symptoms, which are with difficulty removed, or which are, in short, immoveable;–these also, and things of this kind are called qualities; for those who possess them are called quales according to them. But such as are produced from things which are easily and rapidly restored to their former condition, are called passions; as for instance, if any one being afflicted becomes more angry. For he is not called angry, who in a passion of this kind is more wrathful, but he is rather said to have suffered something. And hence things of this kind are indeed said to be passions, but are not called qualities.

The fourth species of quality is figure, and the morphe which is about every thing; and besides these, rectitude and curvature, and whatever else is similar to possess a certain quality. For to be a triangle or a square is said to be a certain quale, and also a right line or a curve. According to morphe also, everything is said to be quale. The rare and the dense likewise, the rough and the smooth may appear to signify a certain quale. It seems, however, that these are foreign from the division of quality; since each of them rather appears to manifest a certain position of parts. For a thing is said to be dense from having its parts near to each other; but a thing is said to be rare, from having its parts distant from each other. And a thing is smooth, indeed, from its parts being situated in a certain respect in a right line; but it is rough, because one part exceeds, and another is deficient. Perhaps, therefore, there may appear to be a certain other mode of quality; but those we have enumerated are nearly such as are mostly adopted.

The above-mentioned, therefore, are qualities. But those things are qualia which are paronymously denominated according to them; or which in some other manner are denominated from them. Most, therefore, and nearly all of them are called paronymously; as for instance, a white [man] from whiteness, a grammarian from grammar, and a just [man] from justice; and in a similar manner in the rest. Some things, however, because names are not given to qualities, cannot be paronymously denominated from them. Thus a racer or a pugilist, who is so called according to natural power, is not paronymously denominated from any quality. For names are not given to the powers, according to which these are called quales; as names are given to sciences, according to which men are said to be pugilists, or wrestlers, from disposition. For there is said to be a pugilistic and palaestric science; and from these those who are disposed to them are paronymously denominated quales.

Sometimes, however, the name being assigned [to quality] that which is called quale according to it is not paronymously denominated. Thus from virtue a worthy man derives his appellation; for from possessing virtue, he is said to be worthy, but he is not paronymously denominated from virtue. A thing of this kind, however does not take place in many things. Those things, therefore, are called qualia which are paronymously denominated from the above-mentioned qualities, or which are in some other manner denominated from them.

But contrariety is inherent in quality. Thus justice is contrary to injustice, whiteness to blackness, and other things in a similar manner. Things also which subsist according to them are denominated qualia. Thus the unjust is contrary to the just, and the white to the black. A thing of this kind, however, does not happen in all things. For nothing is contrary to the yellow, or the pale, or to such like colours, though they are qualities. Farther still, if one of contraries is a quality, the other also will be a quality. And this is evident from particulars, to any one who directs his attention to the other categories. Thus, if justice is contrary to injustice, but justice is a quality, injustice also is a quality. For no one of the other categories accords with injustice, neither quantity, nor relation nor where, nor, in short, any one of things of this kind, except quality.

Qualia also receive the more and the less. For one thing is said to be more or less white than another; and one thing is said to be more or less just than another. The same thing likewise receives an accession. For a thing which is white, is capable of becoming still more white. This, however, is not the case with all, but with most things. For some one may doubt whether justice can be said to be more or less justice; and in a similar manner in other dispositions. For some doubt about things of this kind; and assert that justice is not entirely said to be more or less than justice, nor health than health. But they say that one person has more of health than another, and that one person has less of justice than another; and in a similar manner with respect to grammar, and other dispositions. The things, however, which are denominated according to these, indubitably receive the more and the less. For one man is said to be more a grammarian than another, and to be more just and healthy than another; and in a similar manner in other things. But triangle and square do not appear to receive the more and the less, nor any other figure. For those things which receive the definition of a triangle, and the definition of a circle, are all of them similarly triangles, or circles. But of things which do not receive the same definition, one is not said to be more [a certain quality] than another. For a square is not more than an oblong, a circle; since neither of them receives the definition of the circle. In short, unless both receive the definition of the thing proposed, the one cannot be said to be more [a certain quality] than the other. All qualities, therefore, do not receive the more and the less. Hence, of the above-mentioned particulars, no one is the peculiarity of quality.

Things, however, are said to be similar or dissimilar according to qualities alone. For one thing is not similar to another according to anything else than so far as it is quale. Hence it will be the peculiarity of quality, to be called similar or dissimilar according to it.

It is not, however, necessary to be disturbed, lest any one should say, that we, proposing to speak of Quality, include many things which are Relatives; for we said earlier that habits and dispositions are among the number of Relatives. For nearly in all things of this kind, the genera are said to be relatives; but of particulars no one is a relative. Thus “science” being a genus, that which it is, it is said to be with reference to something else; for it is said to be the science of a certain thing. But of particulars, no one is said to be that which it is, with reference to something else. Thus “grammar” (a particular science) is not said to be the grammar of something; nor music the music of something; unless perhaps according to genus these also are said to be relatives. For instance, grammar is said to be the science of something, not the grammar of something; and music is the science of something, not the music of something. So that particular sciences are not among the number of relatives. We are said, however, to be quales from particular sciences; for we possess these. And we are said to be scientific from possessing certain particular sciences. Hence these are particular qualities according to which we are sometimes said to be quales; but these are not among the number of relatives. Again, if the same thing should be a particular quality and a relative, there is no absurdity that it should be numerated in both genera.

Chapter 9. To Act, To Suffer and Remaining Categories

To act and to suffer receive contrariety, and the more and the less. For to heat is the contrary of to cool, to be heated is the contrary of to be cooled, and to be pleased is the contrary of to be pained; so that they receive contrariety.

They also receive the more and the less. For it is possible to heat more and less, to be heated more and less, and to be pained more and less. To act and to suffer, therefore, receive the more and the less. And thus much we have said of these things.

But we have spoken of the being situated in what we said about relatives, and have observed, that it is paronymously denominated from positions. And with respect to the other categories, viz. when, where, and to have, because they are manifest, nothing else can be said of them, than was said in the beginning; that to have, signifies, indeed, to be shod, to be armed; that where signifies, for instance, in the Lyceum, in the Forum; and such other things as are asserted of these. What has been said, therefore, of the proposed genera is sufficient.

Chapter 10. Of Opposites

Let us now speak concerning opposites, and in how many ways it is usual for things to be opposed. One thing, therefore, is said to be opposed to another in four ways; either:

  1. as Relatives: e.g., double to half
  2. as Contraries; evil to good
  3. as Privation and Habit; blindness to sight
  4. as Affirmation and Negation;

And thus speaking, according to a rude delineation, things of this kind are opposed; as relatives, as the double to the half; as contraries, as evil to good; as privation and habit, as blindness and sight.

Such things, therefore, as are opposed as relatives, are said to be that which they are with reference to opposites, in whatever way they may be referred to them. Thus the double of the half, is said to be that which it is with reference to something else; for it is said to be the double of something. Science also is opposed to the object of science as a relative; and science is said to be that which it is with reference to the object of science. The object of science likewise is said to be that which it is, with reference to an opposite, viz. science; for the object of science is said to be an object of science to something, viz. to science. Such things, therefore, as are opposed as relatives, are said to be what they are with reference to opposites, or in whatever manner they may be referred to each other.

But things which are opposed as contraries, are by no means said to be that which they are with reference to each other, but are said to be contrary to each other. For neither is good said to be the good of evil, but the contrary to evil; nor is white said to be the white of black, but the contrary to it. So that these oppositions differ from each other.

Such contraries, however, as are of that kind, that it is necessary one of them should be inherent in those things, in which it is naturally adapted to be inherent, or of which it is predicated; such as these have nothing intermediate. But those contraries in which it is not necessary that one of them should be inherent, have something intermediate. Thus, for instance, health and disease are naturally adapted to subsist in the body of an animal; and it is necessary that either health or disease should subsist in the body of an animal. The odd and the even also are predicated of number; and it is necessary that either the odd or the even should subsist in number. Nor is there any thing intermediate in these, neither between disease and health, nor between the odd and the even. But those contraries in which it is not necessary that one of them should be inherent, have something intermediate. Thus black and white are naturally adapted to be in body; and it is not necessary that one of these should be inherent in body; for not every body is either black or white. Vileness and worth also are predicated of man, and of many other things; yet it is not necessary that one of these should be in those things of which it is predicated. For not all things are either vile or have worth. There is also something between these. Thus, between the white and the black, there is the dark brown and the pale, and such other colours; but between vileness and worth, that which is neither vile nor has worth is the medium. In some things, therefore, names are given to the intermediate natures. Thus the dark brown, the pale, and such other colours, are the media between white and black. But in some things it is not easy to assign a name to that which is intermediate; but that which is intermediate is defined by the negation of each of the extremes; as, for instance, that which is neither good, nor bad, neither just, nor unjust.

Privation and habit, however, are predicated of something which is the same. Thus sight and blindness are predicated of the same thing–the eye. And universally, each of these is predicated of that in which habit is naturally adapted to be produced. But we then say that each of the things which are capable of receiving habit, is deprived of it, when it by no means is inherent in that in which it is naturally adapted to be inherent, or when it is naturally adapted to possess it. For we say that a man is toothless, not because he has not teeth; and we say that he is blind, not because he has not sight; but because he has not these, when he is naturally adapted to have them. For some persons have neither sight nor teeth from their birth; yet they are neither called toothless, nor blind. To be deprived, however, and to possess habit, are not privation and habit. For the sight is habit, but blindness privation. But to possess sight is not sight, nor is to be blind blindness. For blindness is a certain privation; but to be blind is to be deprived, and is not privation. For if blindness were the same with to be blind, both might be predicated of the same person. But a man, indeed, is said to be blind, yet he is by no means said to be blindness. To be deprived also, and to possess habit, appear to be opposed in the same manner as privation and habit; since the mode of opposition is the same. For as blindness is opposed to sight, so likewise to be blind is opposed to the possession of sight.

That, however, which falls under affirmation and negation, is not affirmation and negation. For affirmation is an affirmative sentence, and negation is a negative sentence; but nothing which falls under affirmation or negation is a sentence, but a thing. These, however, are said to be opposed to each other, as affirmation and negation; since in these also there is the same mode of opposition. For as affirmation is sometimes opposed to negation; as, for instance, he sits, is opposed to, he does not sit; thus also the thing which is under each sentence is opposed; for instance, that some one sits, is opposed to, some one does not sit.

But it is evident that privation and habit are not opposed as relatives; since that which a thing is, is not asserted of its opposite. For sight is not the the sight of blindness, nor is it in any other way referred to it. In like manner, neither is blindness said to be the blindness of sight; but blindness, indeed, is said to be the privation of sight, but is not said to be the blindness of sight. Farther still, all relatives are referred to things which reciprocate; so that blindness also, if it was among the number of relatives, would reciprocate with that to which it is referred. But it does not reciprocate; for sight is not said to be the sight of blindness.

That things also which are predicated according to privation and habit, are not opposed as contraries, is from these things manifest:

1. For of contraries between which there is nothing intermediate, it is always necessary that one of them should be inherent in those things in which it is naturally adapted to be inherent, or of which it is predicated. But between these there is nothing intermediate, of which it was necessary that the one should be inherent in that which is capable of receiving it; as is evident in disease and health, and in the odd and the even number. Of those things, however, between which there is something intermediate, it is never necessary that one of them should be inherent in every thing [which is capable of receiving it]. For it is not necessary that every thing which is capable of receiving should be either white or black, either hot or cold; since nothing prevents there being a certain medium between these. Again, of these also there was a certain medium, of which it was not necessary that one of them should be inherent in that which is capable of receiving it; unless in those things in which one of them is naturally inherent, and in these, that which is definitely, and casually one.

In privation and habit, however, neither of the above-mentioned particulars are true. For it is not always necessary that one of the opposites should be inherent in that which is capable of receiving it; since that which is not yet naturally adapted to have sight, is neither said to be blind, nor to have sight. Hence these things will not be among the number of such contraries as have nothing intermediate. Neither will they be among the number of things which have something intermediate; since it will be some time or other necessary that one of them should be inherent in every thing capable of receiving it. For when a man is now naturally adapted to have sight, then he is said either to be blind, or to have sight; nor has he one of these definitely, but either of them as it may happen. But in contraries in which there is something intermediate, it is never necessary that one of them should be inherent in every thing [which is capable of receiving it], but in certain things [only], and in these one of them definitely, and not either of them casually. Hence it is evident that things which are opposed according to privation and habit, are not in either of these ways opposed as contraries.

2. Farther still, in contraries indeed, the recipient existing, it is possible that the change of the contraries into each other may be effected, unless one of them is naturally inherent in something; as, for instance, it is naturally inherent in fire to be hot. For it is possible for that which is well to be ill; for that which is white to become black; for the cold to become hot; and the hot to become cold. It is also possible for the worthy to become depraved, and the depraved to become worthy. For he who is depraved being led to better pursuits and discourses, advances though but a little to a better condition. If, however, he once makes a proficiency, though but in a small degree, it is evident that he will become at length perfectly changed, or will have made a great proficiency; for he will always become more disposed to virtue, if he has made any progress whatever from the beginning. Hence it is likely that he will receive a greater increase, and this always taking place, that he will at length be perfectly restored to a contrary habit, unless he is prevented by time.

But in privation and habit, it is impossible that a mutation into each other should be effected. For a mutation may take place from habit to privation; but it is impossible there should be a mutation from privation to habit; since neither can he who has become blind again see; nor being bald again possess hair; nor being toothless again have teeth.

3. It is evident, however, that such things as are opposed as affirmation and negation, are opposed according to no one of the above-mentioned modes; for in these alone it is always necessary, that one of them should be true, but the other false. For neither in contraries is it always necessary that one of them should be true, but the other false; nor in relatives; nor in habit and privation. Thus, for instance, health and disease are contraries; and neither of them is either true or false. In a similar manner also, the double and the half are opposed as relatives; and neither of them is either true or false. Neither in things which are predicated according to privation and habit [is one of them true, and the other false]; as, for instance, sight and blindness. And, in short, no one of things which are predicated without any conjunction is either true or false; but all the above-mentioned particulars are predicated without conjunction. Nevertheless, a thing of this kind may especially appear to happen in those contraries which are predicated according to conjunction. For, that “Socrates is well” is the contrary of “Socrates is ill”.

But neither in these is it always necessary, that one of them should be true, and the other false. For Socrates existing, one of them will be true, but the other false; but Socrates not existing, both will be false. For Socrates, in short, not existing, neither is it true that “Socrates is ill”, nor that “Socrates is well”.

But in privation and habit, [the subject] in short, not existing, neither of them is true; and [the subject] existing, the one is not always true, but the other false. For that “Socrates sees” is opposed to “Socrates is blind”, as privation to habit. And Socrates existing, it is not necessary that one of them should be true or false; for when he is not naturally adapted to have them, both are false. But Socrates, in short, not existing, thus also both are false, viz. that he sees, and that he is blind.

In affirmation and negation, however, whether “Socrates is” or “Socrates is not”, one of them will always be false, and the other true. For it is evident, with respect to these two, “Socrates is ill”, and “Socrates is not ill”, that when he exists one of them is true, but the other false. And in a similar manner, when he does not exist. For when he does not exist, that he is ill is false; and that he is not ill is true. Hence, in those things alone which are opposed, as affirmation and negation, it will be the peculiarity, that one of them is always either true or false.

Chapter 11. Opposites, continued.

Note: Be sure to consult the Oxford English Dictionary for words you cannot define.

Evil is necessarily contrary to good; and this is manifest from an induction of particulars. Thus disease is contrary to health, injustice to justice, and fortitude to timidity. And in a similar manner in other things. But to evil, sometimes good is contrary, and sometimes evil. For to indigence, which is an evil, excess is the contrary, which is also an evil. In similar manner mediocrity, which is contrary to either of these, is good. And this, indeed, may be seen in a few things; but in most the contrary to evil is always good.

Again, of contraries it is not necessary if the one is, that the other should also be; for all persons being well, there will be health indeed, but not disease. And in like manner, all things being white, there will be whiteness indeed, but not blackness. Farther still, if to Socrates is well, Socrates is ill is contrary; and it is not possible that both can be inherent in the same thing; it cannot be possible, that one of the contraries existing, the other also exists. For that “Socrates is well” existing, that “Socrates is ill” will not exist. But it is evident that contraries are naturally adapted to subsist about the same thing, either in speech or genus. For disease and health are naturally adapted to subsist in the body of an animal; but whiteness and blackness are simply in body; and justice and injustice are in the soul of man. It is necessary, however, that all contraries, should either be in the same genus, or in contrary genera, or should be genera themselves. For white and black are in the same genus; since colour is the genus of them. But justice and injustice are in contrary genera; for of the one virtue is the genus, but of the other vice. And good and evil are not in a genus, but are themselves the genera of certain things.

Chapter 12. Of Priority

One thing is said to be prior to another in four ways.

First, indeed, and most principally according to time; according to which, one thing is said to be older, and more ancient than another. For it is said to be older and more ancient, because the time is longer.

In the second place, [one thing is said to be prior to another,] because it does not reciprocate according to the consequence of existing. Thus one is prior to two. For two existing, it immediately follows that one is; but one existing, it is not necessary that two should exist. Hence, the consequence of the existence of the remainder does not reciprocate from the existence of one. But a thing of that kind appears to be prior, from which the consequence of existing does not reciprocate.

In the third place, the prior is predicated according to a certain order, as in sciences and discourses. For in the demonstrative sciences, the prior and posterior subsist in order; since the elements are prior in order to the diagrams; and in grammar the elements are prior to syllables. And in a similar manner in discourses; for the proem is prior in order to the narration.

Farther still, besides what we have mentioned, the better and the more honourable appear to be prior by nature. For the multitude are accustomed to say that those whom they more honour and love are prior in their esteem. This, however, is nearly the most foreign of all the modes.

So many, therefore, nearly are the modes of priority which are adopted. But, besides the above-mentioned, there also may appear to be another mode of the prior. For of those which reciprocate according to the consequence of existence (mode 3, above), that which is in any respect the cause of the existence of the one, may be justly said to be prior by nature. And that there are certain things of this kind is manifest. For, that man exists, reciprocates according to the consequence of existence with the true sentence respecting him. For if man is, the sentence is true by which we say that man is. And it reciprocates. For if the sentence is true by which we say that man is, then man is. A true sentence, however, is by no means the cause of the existence of a thing; but it appears that a thing is, in a certain respect, the cause that a sentence is true. For in consequence of a thing existing, or not existing, a sentence is said to be true or false. Hence one thing may be said to be prior to another according to five modes.

Chapter 13. Of the Term “Simultaneous”

Those things are said to be simultaneous, simply indeed, and most properly, of which the generation is in the same time; for neither of these is prior or posterior. But these are said to be co-existent according to time. Those things, however, are naturally simultaneous, which reciprocate, indeed, according to consequence of existence, but the one is by no means the cause of the existence of the other; as in the double and the half; for these reciprocate. Thus the double existing, the half also is; and the half existing, the double is. But neither is the cause of existence to the other. Those things also, which being derived from the same genus have a division opposite to each other, are said to be naturally simultaneous. But those things are said to have a division opposite to each other, which subsist according to the same division. Thus the winged is opposed to the pedestrious and the aquatic. For these being derived from the same genus have division opposite to each other. For animal is divided into these, viz. into the winged, the pedestrious, and the aquatic; and no one of these is prior or posterior, but things of this kind appear to be naturally simultaneous. Each of these, however, may again be divided into species; as, for instance, the winged, the pedestrious, and the aquatic. Those things, therefore, will be naturally simultaneous, which being derived from the same genus, subsist according to the same division. But genera are always prior to species; for they do not reciprocate according to the consequence of existence. Thus, the aquatic existing, animal is; but animal existing, it is not necessary that the aquatic should exist. Hence those things are said to be naturally simultaneous, which reciprocate, indeed, according to the consequence of existence, but the one is by no means the cause of existence to the other; and this is also the case with those things which being derived from the same genus, have a division opposed to each other. Those things, however, are simply simultaneous, of which the generation is in the same time.

Chapter 14. Of Motion

Of motion there are six species, viz.

  1. generation,
  2. corruption,
  3. increase,
  4. diminution,
  5. alliation (or change in quality), and
  6. mutation according to place.

With respect to the other motions, therefore, it is evident that they are different from each other. For generation is not corruption; nor is increase diminution, nor mutation according to place; and in a similar manner with respect to other motions. In alliation, however, it is doubtful, whether it is necessary that what is changed in quality, is so changed according to some one of the other motions. But this is not true; for it happens that we are changed in quality, nearly according to all the passive qualities, or the greater part of them, without any communication with the other motions. For it is not necessary that what is moved according to passive quality, should be either increased or diminished. And in a similar manner in the other motions. Hence alliation will be different from the other motions. For if it were the same, it would be requisite that what is changed in quality, should immediately be also increased or diminished, or follow some one of the other motions; but this is not necessary. In a similar manner also, that which is increased, or moved with any other motion, ought to be changed in quality. Some things, however, are increased, which are not changed in quality. Thus, for instance, a square is increased, when a gnomon is placed about it, but does not become at all more changed in quality. The like also takes place in other things of this kind; so that these motions will be different from each other. Simply, however, rest is contrary to motion; but particular rests to particular motions; corruption, indeed, to generation; diminution to increase; and the rest according to place, to the mutation according to place. But the mutation according to a contrary place, appears to be especially opposed; as, for instance, ascent to descent, and descent to ascent. It is not, however, easy to assign what is the contrary to that which remains of the motions that have been explained. But it seems that nothing is contrary to it, unless some one should also oppose to this, the rest according to quality, or the mutation of a quality into a contrary quality; just as in the mutation according to place [ we oppose] the rest according to place, or the mutation into a contrary place. For alliation is a mutation according to quality; so that the rest according to place, or the mutation of a quality into a contrary quality, will be opposed to the motion according to quality. Thus the becoming white is opposed to the becoming black; for a thing is changed in quality, a mutation of quality into contraries taking place.

Chapter 15. Of “Having”

To have is predicated in many modes; since it is predicated either as habit and disposition, or as some other quality. For we are said to have science and virtue. Or it is predicated as a quantity; as, for instance, the magnitude which any one has. For he is said to have a magnitude of three or four cubits. Or it is predicated as things about the body; such as a garment, or a shirt. Or as in a part; as a ring in the hand. Or as a part; as the hand, or the foot. Or as in a measure; as a bushel has (i. e. contains) wheat, or any amphora wine; for the amphora is said to have the wine, and the bushel the wheat. All these, therefore, are said to have as in a vessel. Or it is predicated as a possession; for we are said to have a house or land.

A man also is said to have a woman, and a woman a man. The mode, however, of having now mentioned appears to be most foreign; for by having a woman we signify nothing else than that she co-habits with a man. Perhaps also there may appear to be other modes of having; but all those have been nearly enumerated, which are usually mentioned.Aristotle, Categories