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1. Let us now speak concerning opposites, and in how many ways it is usual for things to be opposed.
2. One thing, therefore, is said to be opposed to another in four ways; either as Relatives, or as Contraries, or as Privation and Habit; as Affirmation and Negation.
3. And thus, speaking, according to a rude delineation, things of this kind are opposed; as Relatives, as the double to the half; as contraries, as evil to good; as privation and habit, as blindness and sight.
4. Such things, therefore, as are opposed as Relatives, are said to be that which they are with reference to opposites, in whatever way they may be referred to them. Thus, the double of the half, is said to be that which it is with reference to something else; for it is said to be the double of something. Science also is opposed to the object of science as a relative; and science is said to be that which it is with reference to the object of science. The object of science likewise is said to be that which it is, with reference to an opposite, viz. science; for the object of science is said to be an object of science to something, viz. to science.
5. Such things, therefore, as are opposed as Relatives, are said to be what they are with reference to opposites, or in whatever manner they may be referred to each other. But things which are opposed as contraries, are by no means said to be that which they are with reference to each other, but are said to be contrary to each other. For neither is good said to be the good of evil, but the contrary to evil; nor is white said to be the white of black, but the contrary to it. So that these oppositions differ from each other.
6. Such contraries, however, as are of that kind, that it is necessary one of them should be inherent in those things, in which it is naturally adapted to be inherent, or of which it is predicated; such as these have nothing intermediate.
7. But those contraries in which it is not necessary that one of them should be inherent, have something intermediate.
8. Thus, for instance, health and disease are naturally adapted to subsist in the body of an animal; and it is necessary that either health or disease should subsist in the body of an animal. The odd and the even also are predicated of number; and it is necessary that either the odd or the even should subsist in number. Nor is there any thing intermediate in these, neither between disease and health, nor between the odd and the even.
9. But those contraries in which it is not necessary that one of them should be inherent, have something intermediate. Thus, black and white are naturally adapted to be in body; and it is not necessary that one of these should be inherent in body; for not every body is either black or white. Vileness and worth also are predicated of man, and of many other things; yet it is not necessary that one of these should be in those things of which it is predicated. For not all things are either vile or have worth. There is also something between these. Thus, between the white and the black, there is the dark brown and the pale, and such other colours; but between vileness and worth, that which is neither vile nor has worth is the medium.
10. In some things, therefore, names are given to the intermediate natures. Thus, the dark brown, the pale, and such other colours, are the media between white and black. But in some things it is not easy to assign a name to that which is intermediate; but that which is intermediate is defined by the negation of each of the extremes; as, for instance, that which is neither good, nor bad, neither just, nor unjust.
11. Privation and habit, however, are predicated of something which is the same. Thus, sight and blindness are predicated of the same thing–the eye. And universally, each of these is predicated of that in which habit is naturally adapted to be produced.
12. But we then say that each of the things which are capable of receiving habit, is deprived of it, when it by no means is inherent in that in which it is naturally adapted to be inherent, or when it is naturally adapted to possess it. For we say that a man is toothless, not because he has not teeth; and we say that he is blind, not because he has not sight; but because he has not these, when he is naturally adapted to have them. For some persons have neither sight nor teeth from their birth; yet they are neither called toothless, nor blind.
13. To be deprived, however, and to possess habit, are not privation and habit. For the sight is habit, but blindness privation. But to possess sight is not sight, nor is to be blind blindness. For blindness is an individual privation; but to be blind is to be deprived, and is not privation. For if blindness were the same with to be blind, both might be predicated of the same person. But a man, indeed, is said to be blind, yet he is by no means said to be blindness. To be deprived also, and to possess habit, appear to be opposed in the same manner as privation and habit; since the mode of opposition is the same. For as blindness is opposed to sight, so likewise to be blind is opposed to the possession of sight.
15. That, however, which falls under affirmation and negation, is not affirmation and negation. For affirmation is an affirmative sentence, and negation is a negative sentence; but nothing which falls under affirmation or negation is a sentence, but a thing.
16. These, however, are said to be opposed to each other, as affirmation and negation; since in these also there is the same mode of opposition. For as affirmation is sometimes opposed to negation; as, for instance, he sits, is opposed to, he does not sit; thus, also the thing which is under each sentence is opposed; for instance, that some one sits, is opposed to, some one does not sit.
17. But it is evident that privation and habit are not opposed as Relatives; since that which a thing is, is not asserted of its opposite. For sight is not the the sight of blindness, nor is it in any other way referred to it. In like manner, neither is blindness said to be the blindness of sight; but blindness, indeed, is said to be the privation of sight, but is not said to be the blindness of sight.
18. Farther still, all Relatives are referred to things which reciprocate; so that blindness also, if it was among the number of Relatives, would reciprocate with that to which it is referred. But it does not reciprocate; for sight is not said to be the sight of blindness.
19. That things also which are predicated according to privation and habit, are not opposed as contraries, is from these things manifest. For of contraries between which there is nothing intermediate, it is always necessary that one of them should be inherent in those things in which it is naturally adapted to be inherent, or of which it is predicated. But between these there is nothing intermediate, of which it was necessary that the one should be inherent in that which is capable of receiving it; as is evident in disease and health, and in the odd and the even number. Of those things, however, between which there is something intermediate, it is never necessary that one of them should be inherent in everything [which is capable of receiving it]. For it is not necessary that everything which is capable of receiving should be either white or black, either hot or cold; since nothing prevents there being an individual medium between these. Again, of these also there was an individual medium, of which it was not necessary that one of them should be inherent in that which is capable of receiving it; unless in those things in which one of them is naturally inherent, and in these, that which is definitely, and casually one. In privation and habit, however, neither of the above-mentioned particulars are true. For it is not always necessary that one of the opposites should be inherent in that which is capable of receiving it; since that which is not yet naturally adapted to have sight, is neither said to be blind, nor to have sight. Hence these things will not be among the number of such contraries as have nothing intermediate. Neither will they be among the number of things which have something intermediate; since it will be some time or other necessary that one of them should be inherent in everything capable of receiving it. For when a man is now naturally adapted to have sight, then he is said either to be blind, or to have sight; nor has he one of these definitely, but either of them as it may happen. But in contraries in which there is something intermediate, it is never necessary that one of them should be inherent in everything [which is capable of receiving it], but in certain things [only], and in these one of them definitely, and not either of them casually. Hence it is evident that things which are opposed according to privation and habit, are not in either of these ways opposed as contraries.
20. Farther still, in contraries indeed, the recipient existing, it is possible that the change of the contraries into each other may be effected, unless one of them is naturally inherent in something; as, for instance, it is naturally inherent in fire to be hot. For it is possible for that which is well to be ill; for that which is white to become black; for the cold to become hot; and the hot to become cold. It is also possible for the worthy to become depraved, and the depraved to become worthy. For he who is depraved being led to better pursuits and discourses, advances though but a little to a better condition. If, however, he once makes a proficiency, though but in a small degree, it is evident that he will become at length perfectly changed, or will have made a great proficiency; for he will always become more disposed to virtue, if he has made any progress whatever from the beginning. Hence it is likely that he will receive a greater increase, and this always taking place, that he will at length be perfectly restored to a contrary habit, unless he is prevented by time. But in privation and habit, it is impossible that a mutation into each other should be effected. For a mutation may take place from habit to privation; but it is impossible there should be a mutation from privation to habit; since neither can he who has become blind again see; nor being bald again possess hair; nor being toothless again have teeth.
21. It is evident, however, that such things as are opposed as affirmation and negation, are opposed according to no one of the above-mentioned modes; for in these alone it is always necessary, that one of them should be true, but the other false.
22. For neither in contraries is it always necessary that one of them should be true, but the other false; nor in Relatives; nor in habit and privation. Thus, for instance, health and disease are contraries; and neither of them is either true or false. In a similar manner also, the double and the half are opposed as Relatives; and neither of them is either true or false. Neither in things which are predicated according to privation and habit [is one of them true, and the other false]; as, for instance, sight and blindness. And, in short, no one of things which are predicated without any conjunction is either true or false; but all the above-mentioned particulars are predicated without conjunction.
23. Nevertheless, a thing of this kind may especially appear to happen in those contraries which are predicated according to conjunction. For, that Socrates is well is the contrary of Socrates is ill. But neither in these is it always necessary, that one of them should be true, and the other false. For Socrates existing, one of them will be true, but the other false; but Socrates not existing, both will be false. For Socrates, in short, not existing, neither is it true that Socrates is ill, nor that Socrates is well.
24. But in privation and habit, [the subject] in short, not existing, neither of them is true; and [the subject] existing, the one is not always true, but the other false. For that Socrates sees is opposed to Socrates is blind, as privation to habit. And Socrates existing, it is not necessary that one of them should be true or false; for when he is not naturally adapted to have them, both are false. But Socrates, in short, not existing, thus, also both are false, viz. that he sees, and that he is blind.
25. In affirmation and negation, however, whether Socrates is or Socrates is not, one of them will always be false, and the other true. For it is evident, with respect to these two, Socrates is ill, and Socrates is not ill, that when he exists one of them is true, but the other false. And in a similar manner, when he does not exist. For when he does not exist, that he is ill is false; and that he is not ill is true.
26. Hence, in those things alone which are opposed, as affirmation and negation, it will be the peculiarity, that one of them is always either true or false.
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