Return to St. Albert the Great, Logic
Prelection
In this chapter, St. Albert the Great asks an important question: what exactly is the subject matter of logic? After showing in the previous chapters that logic is necessary for all philosophy, he now explains more precisely that logic is chiefly concerned with argumentation, the rational process by which the mind moves from what is known to what is unknown. Logic is not fundamentally about words as mere sounds, nor even about propositions considered in isolation, but about reasoning itself as the instrument of science. St. Albert carefully distinguishes logic from grammar, poetry, and rhetoric, all of which use speech in different ways, while showing that the logician uses speech only as a tool serving the deeper work of reasoning. Students of the Classical Liberal Arts Academy should pay close attention to this chapter because it reveals the true nature of logic: not a study of language alone, but the disciplined art by which the intellect advances toward truth through ordered argument and judgment.
CAPUT IV. De Quo Sit Logica ut de Subjecto?
1. Cum autem logica sit scientia contemplativa, docens qualiter, et per quæ devenitur per notum ad ignoti notitiam, oportet necessario quod logica sit de hujusmodi rationis instrumento, per quod acquiritur per notum ignoti scientia in omni eo quod de ignoto notum efficitur.
Literal Translation:
“Since however logic may-be science contemplative, teaching how, and through which-(things) it-is-come through known-(thing) to of-unknown knowledge, it-behooves necessarily that logic may-be about of-this-kind of-reason instrument, through which it-is-acquired through known-(thing) of-unknown science in every that in-which from unknown known is-made.”
Translation:
Since, however, logic is a contemplative science, teaching how, and through what means, one comes through what is known to knowledge of the unknown, it necessarily follows that logic is concerned with an instrument of reason of this kind, through which knowledge of the unknown is acquired by means of the known in every case in which something known is made from something unknown.
Explanation:
Albert is beginning with a definition of logic as a contemplative science, that is, a science concerned with understanding rather than with making or doing. Its task is to teach the mind how to move from what is already known to what is not yet known. For that reason, logic must treat the instrument of reason itself, the means by which this transition happens. The point is that logic studies not just conclusions, but the rational tool by which knowledge is gained at all. For students, this is important because it shows why logic has a universal role in philosophy: wherever the mind advances from ignorance to knowledge, logic is at work as the discipline that explains and directs that process.
2. Hoc autem est argumentatio, secundum quod argumentatio est ratiocinatio mentem arguens et convincens per habitudinem noti ad ignotum de ignoti scientia.
Literal Translation:
“This however is argumentation, according-to that argumentation is reasoning (the) mind arguing and convincing through relation of-known to unknown concerning of-unknown knowledge.”
Translation:
Now this is argumentation, insofar as argumentation is reasoning that argues with and convinces the mind through the relation of the known to the unknown concerning knowledge of the unknown.
Explanation:
Albert is now identifying the instrument of reason just mentioned: it is argumentation. Argumentation is not merely speech or debate, but an act of reasoning that moves the mind from what it already knows to what it does not yet know. It does this by means of a relation between the known and the unknown, so that the known can serve as the basis for conviction about the unknown. For students, the important point is that argumentation is the rational bridge by which knowledge grows. Logic studies this process because it teaches how the mind is led, persuaded, and brought to science through ordered reasoning.
3. Inter species autem argumentationis praecipua est syllogismus.
Literal Translation:
“Among species however of-argumentation chief is syllogism.”
Translation:
Among the species of argumentation, however, the chief one is the syllogism.
Explanation:
Albert is now narrowing his focus from argumentation in general to its highest and most important form, the syllogism. Since logic studies the instrument by which the mind moves from the known to the unknown, and since argumentation is that instrument, it makes sense that the syllogism should be treated as especially important. The syllogism is chief because it gives the most ordered and precise form of reasoning, the form in which conclusions follow from premises in a disciplined way. For students, this marks an important transition: Albert is moving from the general idea of reasoning to the central logical structure by which scientific knowledge is most properly attained.
4. Propter quod quidam dixerunt quod logica tota est de syllogismo et partibus syllogismi: determinantes commune subjectum logicae secundum id quod est subjectum principale.
Literal Translation:
“On-account-of which certain-(men) have-said that logic whole is about syllogism and parts of-syllogism: determining (the) common subject of-logic according-to that which is (the) subject principal.”
Translation:
For that reason, some have said that the whole of logic is about the syllogism and the parts of the syllogism, determining the common subject of logic according to that which is its principal subject.
Explanation:
Albert is reporting a position that makes the syllogism the center of logic so completely that everything else in logic is understood in relation to it. Since the syllogism is the chief species of argumentation, some thinkers concluded that logic as a whole is concerned only with syllogism and whatever belongs to it. In saying this, they define the common subject of logic by reference to its principal subject, that is, by taking the most important part as the key to the whole. For students, the point is that Albert is setting up a question about the true scope of logic: whether logic should be defined narrowly by its highest form of reasoning, or more broadly by the full range of rational instruments that lead the mind from the known to the unknown.
5. Non enim de omnibus fides esse poterit per syllogismum, propter hoc quod discursus syllogisticus non est nisi ab universali universaliter accepto: quod in multis scientiis esse non poterit, ut in rhetoricis.
Literal Translation:
“Not for concerning all-(things) belief to-be can through syllogism, on-account-of this that discourse syllogistic not is unless from universal universally accepted: which in many sciences to-be not will-be-able, as in rhetorical-(things).”
Translation:
For belief about all things cannot arise through syllogism, because syllogistic discourse proceeds only from a universal taken universally; and this will not be possible in many sciences, as in rhetoric.
Explanation:
Albert is qualifying the claim that all logic is centered on the syllogism. Syllogistic reasoning works from universal premises taken in a universal way, and that gives it great rigor, but it also limits its range. Not every field proceeds in that manner. In rhetoric, for example, one often deals with contingent matters, persuasive signs, and probable judgments rather than strict universal premises. So Albert’s point is that logic cannot be reduced simply to syllogism, because some kinds of rational inquiry and persuasion operate by forms of reasoning that do not fit the full syllogistic pattern.
6. Propterea quod in illis praeipue locales habitudines attenduntur, a quibus per enthymemata concluditur id quod quaesitum est.
Literal Translation:
“On-account-of-this that in those chiefly local relations are-attended-to, from which through enthymemes is-concluded that which sought is.”
Translation:
This is because in those disciplines chiefly local relations are considered, from which the thing sought is concluded through enthymemes.
Explanation:
Albert is explaining why some sciences, especially rhetoric, do not proceed chiefly by full syllogism. In those fields, what matters most is the consideration of topical or local relations, that is, the “places” from which persuasive reasoning is drawn. From these one reaches a conclusion by means of enthymemes, which are shortened or less fully stated arguments rather than complete demonstrative syllogisms. For students, the point is that rhetoric still belongs to rational discourse, but it works through probable and abbreviated forms of argument drawn from topical connections, not through the stricter universal procedure of syllogistic demonstration.
7. Cum igitur logica, ut dicit Aristoteles, det omni scientiæ modum disserendi, et inveniendi, et dijudicandi quod quaesitum est: oportet quod de tali sit ut de subjecto, quod omnibus in omni aequaliter applicabile est.
Literal Translation:
“Since therefore logic, as says Aristotle, gives to-every science (the) mode of-disputing, and of-finding, and of-judging that which sought is: it-behooves that about such-(a thing) it may-be as about (the) subject, which to-all in every-(thing) equally applicable is.”
Translation:
Since, therefore, logic, as Aristotle says, gives to every science the method of reasoning, of discovery, and of judging what has been sought, it is necessary that it be concerned, as with its subject, with something of such a kind as is equally applicable to all in every case.
Explanation:
Albert is drawing an important conclusion about the proper subject matter of logic. If logic serves every science by teaching how to reason, discover, and judge, then its subject cannot be something narrow or peculiar to only one field. Rather, logic must deal with something universal, something that can be applied equally across all sciences. His point is that logic studies the common structures or instruments of reasoning themselves, not the special subject matter of physics, metaphysics, rhetoric, or any other discipline taken separately. For students, this helps explain why logic has such a foundational role: it belongs to all the sciences because its subject is what is common to rational inquiry as such.
8. Sunt autem adhuc quaedam in quibus est singularibus quaerimus invenire quod ignotum est, sicut in experimentalibus, in quibus utimur vel syllogismo vel inductione ad universale accipiendum, et non possumus uti syllogismo perfecto.
Literal Translation:
“There-are however still certain-(things) in which in singulars we-seek to-find that which unknown is, as in experimental-(things), in which we-use either syllogism or induction for (the) universal to-be-received, and not we-are-able to-use syllogism perfect.”
Translation:
There are also certain matters in which we seek to discover what is unknown in singular cases, as in the experimental sciences, in which we use either syllogism or induction to arrive at the universal, and we cannot use a perfect syllogism.
Explanation:
Albert is pointing out that not every inquiry begins from fully universal premises. In some fields, especially the experimental disciplines, we begin from singular instances, that is, from particular observed cases, and from them we work toward a universal conclusion. For that reason, induction becomes important, and even when syllogism is used, it is not always the fully perfect syllogistic form that begins from universal premises already in hand. This supports his larger point that logic cannot be reduced simply to perfect syllogism, because logic must also guide inquiry in sciences that move upward from experience to universals. The phrase est singularibus is textually awkward, and the sense seems to be that the inquiry concerns singulars or particular cases.
9. Propter quod syllogismus commune subjectum logicae esse non potest.
Literal Translation:
“On-account-of which syllogism common subject of-logic to-be not can.”
Translation:
For this reason, the syllogism cannot be the common subject of logic.
Explanation:
Albert is now stating the conclusion that follows from the previous discussion. Since logic must apply to every science, and since not all sciences proceed by perfect syllogism, the syllogism cannot be the universal subject matter of logic. It is certainly a principal and highly important part of logic, but it does not cover the whole range of reasoning that logic must address. For students, the point is that logic is broader than syllogistic demonstration alone. It must include all the common instruments by which the mind in different sciences discovers, reasons, and judges.
10. Propter hoc etiam in logicis quae ab Antiquis scriptae sunt, non solum docetur quid syllogismus, et qualiter, et ex quibus sit: sed hic etiam docetur quid argumentatio, et quae partes, et species ejus.
Literal Translation:
“On-account-of this also in logical-(works) which by (the) Ancients have-been-written, not only is-taught what syllogism (is), and how, and out-of which-(things) it may-be: but here also is-taught what argumentation (is), and which parts, and species of-it.”
Translation:
For this reason, also in the logical works written by the ancients, not only is it taught what a syllogism is, and how it is constituted, and from what parts it is made, but here also it is taught what argumentation is, and what its parts and species are.
Explanation:
Albert is supporting his conclusion by appealing to the structure of the logical tradition itself. If the ancients, in their logical writings, taught not only the syllogism but also argumentation more broadly, along with its parts and species, that shows that logic cannot be restricted to syllogism alone. Syllogism is one principal form of reasoning, but logic must also study the wider genus of argumentation from which syllogism is only one species. For students, this is an important step in Albert’s argument about the subject of logic: the tradition of logic itself confirms that its scope includes the broader study of rational discourse, not merely one especially perfect form of it.
11. Sunt tamen qui logicam interpretantur idem quod sermocinalem, dicentes logicam generalem idem esse quod sermocinalem scientiam, sub qua dicunt contineri grammaticam, poeticam, et rhetoricam, et eam quam vocant dialecticam.
Literal Translation:
“There-are however who logic interpret the-same-as what sermocinal, saying general logic the-same to-be as sermocinal science, under which they say to-be-contained grammar, poetics, and rhetoric, and that which they call dialectic.”
Translation:
There are, however, some who interpret logic as being the same thing as the science of discourse, saying that general logic is the same as sermocinal science, under which they say grammar, poetics, rhetoric, and what they call dialectic are contained.
Explanation:
Albert is here reporting another opinion about the scope of logic. Some thinkers broaden logic so much that they identify it with the whole science of discourse or speech, and therefore place under it grammar, poetics, rhetoric, and dialectic. The point of this view is that all these disciplines concern language and rational expression in some way. But Albert is likely setting up this opinion in order to examine or limit it, since his larger argument is concerned with defining logic more precisely by its role in guiding reason from the known to the unknown. For students, this passage is important because it shows that medieval thinkers did not all draw the boundaries of logic in the same way, and Albert is carefully sorting through those possible definitions.
12. Et ideo dicunt logicae generalis subjectum esse sermonem, prout est designativus rerum quæae significantur per ipsum.
Literal Translation:
“And therefore they say of-logic general (the) subject to-be speech, according-as it is designative of-things which are-signified through it.”
Translation:
And therefore they say that the subject of general logic is speech, insofar as it signifies the things that are signified through it.
Explanation:
Albert is continuing to report the opinion of those who identify general logic with the broader science of discourse. On that view, the subject of logic is speech itself, considered as something that points to or signifies things. In other words, logic would be about language as a signifying medium. This fits the earlier claim that grammar, poetics, rhetoric, and dialectic all fall under one general sermocinal science. For students, the important point is that Albert is laying out a possible definition of logic in terms of speech and signification, but he is doing so as part of a larger inquiry into what logic’s true subject really is.
13. Quam opinionem impugnat Avicenna dicens, quod sermo de se nihil significat: si enim aliquid de se significaret, semper et apud omnes illud significaret: quod falsum est.
Literal Translation:
“Which opinion attacks Avicenna saying, that speech of itself nothing signifies: if for something of itself it-signified, always and among all it it-signified: which false is.”
Translation:
Avicenna attacks this opinion, saying that speech in itself signifies nothing; for if it signified something in itself, it would always and for everyone signify that same thing. But that is false.
Explanation:
Albert now brings in Avicenna against the view that speech itself is the subject of general logic. The argument is that spoken words do not signify by nature in such a way that they would mean the same thing always and for all people. If signification belonged to speech simply of itself, then meaning would be fixed universally and naturally, but in fact words differ across languages and conventions. The point for students is that logic cannot be grounded merely in outward speech as such. Speech is a sign, but its signifying power depends on intellectual and conventional use, not on the bare sound itself.
14. Significantionem ergo accipit a placito instituentis.
Literal Translation:
“Signification receives therefore from (the) pleasure of-(the one) instituting.”
Translation:
Therefore, it receives its signification from the choice of the one who institutes it.
Explanation:
Albert is drawing the conclusion from Avicenna’s argument about speech. If a spoken word does not signify by its own nature, then its meaning must come from convention, that is, from the decision or choice of the one who imposes or institutes the sign. The phrase a placito instituentis points to this conventional basis of language: words mean what they mean because they have been assigned that meaning. For students, the important point is that logic cannot have mere spoken sound as its proper subject, since speech signifies only through an act of institution. This helps move the discussion away from external words alone and toward the intellectual order behind signification.
15. Non ergo significat nisi secundum quod conceptus est in intellectu instituentis.
Literal Translation:
“Not therefore it-signifies unless according-to that which conceived it-is in intellect of-(the one) instituting.”
Translation:
Therefore, it does not signify except according to the way in which it is conceived in the intellect of the one instituting it.
Explanation:
Albert is continuing the argument that speech does not signify by nature, but by convention. A word has meaning only insofar as it expresses a concept existing in the mind of the one who first imposes or institutes it. So the source of signification is not the spoken sound by itself, but the intellectual conception behind it. For students, this is important because it shifts attention from external language to the mind: words matter in logic not merely as sounds, but as signs of concepts, and those concepts are what ground meaningful reasoning.
16. Talium autem sermone (secundum quod sic significativus est concepti) utitur homo ad seipsum et ad alium.
Literal Translation:
“Of-such-things however by-speech (according-to that which thus significative it-is of-(the) conceived-(thing)) uses man to himself and to another.”
Translation:
Man, however, uses speech of this sort, insofar as it is thus significative of what is conceived, both with himself and with another.
Explanation:
Albert is drawing out the consequence of the previous point about signification. Since speech signifies because it expresses what is conceived in the intellect, man uses such speech in two ways: inwardly with himself and outwardly with another person. This reflects the scholastic idea that language is rooted in thought before it is expressed aloud. For students, the important point is that speech matters for logic not simply as external sound, but as the vehicle by which conceived meanings are ordered in the mind and then communicated to others.
17. Propter quod dicit Damascenus, quod in duo dividitur, scilicet in encordialem, hoc est, sermonem interius in mente dispositum, et in eum qui ex signis, qui angelus intelligendo est sui cordis nuntius, quia conceptus cordis nuntiat ad alterum.
Literal Translation:
“On-account-of which says Damascene, that into two it-is-divided, namely into encordial, this is, speech inwardly in (the) mind disposed, and into that which out-of signs, which angel understanding is of-his heart’s messenger, because concept of-(the) heart announces to another.”
Translation:
For this reason Damascene says that speech is divided into two, namely into inward speech, that is, speech arranged inwardly in the mind, and into that which is by signs, which, in being understood, is the messenger of one’s heart, because the concept of the heart is announced to another.
Explanation:
Albert is distinguishing between interior and exterior speech. The first is the word as it exists inwardly in the mind, before it is outwardly expressed. The second is speech as it is conveyed through signs so that what is conceived within the heart or mind may be made known to another. The clause about the sign being the “messenger” of the heart expresses the basic idea that outward words serve to communicate inward concepts. The wording of this sentence is somewhat difficult, especially around qui angelus intelligendo est sui cordis nuntius, but the main point is clear: spoken or signed expression is secondary to the interior concept, because external speech exists to carry what is in the mind to someone else.
18. Propter quod logicus et ad se et ad alterum utitur sermone per accidens, et non per se: quia sine sermone designativo procedere non potest ad notitiam ejus quod ignotum est.
Literal Translation:
“On-account-of which (the) logician both to himself and to another uses speech through accident, and not through itself: because without speech designative to-proceed not he-is-able to knowledge of-it which unknown is.”
Translation:
For this reason, the logician uses speech both with himself and with another only accidentally, and not essentially, because without signifying speech he cannot proceed to knowledge of that which is unknown.
Explanation:
Albert is saying that speech is not the primary object of logic, even though the logician must use it. Logic is concerned principally with the mind’s movement from the known to the unknown, not with spoken language as such. Still, because human reasoning ordinarily works through signs and words, the logician makes use of speech both in inward reasoning and in outward teaching. He says this use is per accidens because speech is not what logic studies in itself; rather, it is an instrument that accompanies the work of reason. For students, the important point is that logic is rooted more deeply in thought than in language, even though language is ordinarily needed for reasoning and communication.
19. Ratiocinatione autem utitur per se ad notitiam faciendam ejus quod declaratum est.
Literal Translation:
“By-reasoning however he-uses through itself for knowledge to-be-made of-that which declared is.”
Translation:
However, he uses reasoning essentially in order to produce knowledge of what has been made clear.
Explanation:
Albert is contrasting reasoning with speech. In the previous sentence, he said that the logician uses speech only accidentally, because speech is a signifying instrument that accompanies the work of thought. Here he states the positive point: the logician uses reasoning per se, that is, essentially and directly, because reasoning itself is what brings the mind to knowledge. The purpose of logic is not primarily the handling of words, but the ordered activity of the intellect by which what is implicit or undeveloped becomes known clearly. For students, this sentence sharpens the distinction between language as an instrument and reasoning as the proper act by which logic accomplishes its work.
20. Propter quod cum logici intentio sit docere ea, per quae per se venitur in notitiam ignoti per quod notum est, logicae subjectum est argumentatio: quia per argumentationem efficitur id quod intenditur.
Literal Translation:
“On-account-of which since of-(the) logician (the) intention may-be to-teach those-(things), through which through itself it-is-come into knowledge of-(the) unknown through that which known is, of-logic (the) subject is argumentation: because through argumentation is-brought-about that which is-intended.”
Translation:
Therefore, since the logician’s intention is to teach those things through which one comes of itself to knowledge of the unknown by means of what is known, the subject of logic is argumentation, because through argumentation what is intended is brought about.
Explanation:
Albert is now stating his conclusion about the proper subject of logic. Logic is not chiefly about speech as such, nor simply about syllogism taken narrowly, but about argumentation more generally, because argumentation is the means by which the mind is led from what it already knows to what it does not yet know. That is exactly the work logic intends to accomplish. For students, this is an important summary point: logic studies argumentation because argumentation is the instrument by which reason actually produces knowledge from prior knowledge.
21. Adhuc sermo incomplexus quamvis designet aliquid apud intellectum simplicem, tamen fidem non facit an aliquid sit vel non sit, quia non aliquid esse significat vel non esse.
Literal Translation:
“Further speech incomplex although it-designates something before intellect simple, nevertheless belief not it-makes whether something may-be or not may-be, because not something to-be it-signifies or not to-be.”
Translation:
Further, although an incomplex expression signifies something before the simple intellect, it still does not produce assent as to whether something is or is not, because it does not signify that something is or is not.
Explanation:
Albert is distinguishing here between a simple term and a complete assertion. An incomplex expression, such as a simple word or term, can present something to the mind and so belong to simple understanding, but it does not yet make the mind assent to truth or falsity. That only happens when there is composition or division, when the intellect judges that something is or is not. So the point is that bare terms do not by themselves produce belief about reality; they merely signify something for thought. For students, this helps explain why logic must go beyond isolated words to propositions and argumentation, since truth and falsity arise only where something is affirmed or denied.
22. Non autem venitur ad notitiam ignoti nisi per aliquid, quod de ignoto fidem facit, quod ita sit vel non sit.
Literal Translation:
“Not however it-is-come to knowledge of-(the) unknown unless through something, which concerning (the) unknown belief makes, that thus it may-be or not may-be.”
Translation:
One does not come to knowledge of the unknown except through something that produces assent concerning the unknown, namely that it is so or is not so.
Explanation:
Albert is continuing his distinction between mere terms and true reasoning. We do not reach knowledge of what is unknown through a bare word or simple concept alone, but through something that makes the mind assent to a judgment, affirming or denying that something is the case. In other words, knowledge advances only when the mind is brought to a claim about reality, that it is so or not so. This helps explain why logic must concern itself with propositions and argumentation rather than with isolated words by themselves: only what can generate assent about truth or falsity can lead the mind from the known to the unknown.
23. Sermo igitur incomplexus non potest esse instrumentum per quod de ignoto intellectus ad notitiam deducatur: quod principaliter intendit logicus.
Literal Translation:
“Speech therefore incomplex not can be instrument through which concerning (the) unknown intellect to knowledge may-be-led: which principally intends (the) logician.”
Translation:
Therefore an incomplex expression cannot be the instrument by which the intellect is led to knowledge concerning the unknown; and this is what the logician principally intends.
Explanation:
Albert is drawing the conclusion from the previous two sentences. A simple or incomplex expression, such as a bare term, can present something to the mind, but it cannot by itself bring the intellect to knowledge of something unknown, because it does not yet produce assent that something is or is not the case. The logician’s chief concern is precisely this movement of the mind from the known to the unknown, and that requires something richer than a simple term, namely a proposition and ultimately argumentation. For students, the key point is that logic is not chiefly about isolated words, but about those forms of discourse that can actually lead the mind to judgment and knowledge.
24. Sermo igitur incomplexus non assumitur a logico nisi per accidens, in quantum est pars sermonis complexi, qui est intellectus compositi designativus.
Literal Translation:
“Speech therefore incomplex not is-taken-up by (the) logician unless through accident, in-so-far as it is part of-speech complex, which is of-intellect composite designative.”
Translation:
Therefore, an incomplex expression is considered by the logician only accidentally, insofar as it is part of a complex expression, which signifies the composite intellect.
Explanation:
Albert is concluding that the logician does not study simple terms in their own right as his principal concern. A simple or incomplex expression matters to logic only because it functions as a part of a complex expression, that is, a proposition or statement in which the intellect composes or divides. Since truth and falsity arise only in this composed act of judgment, logic is interested in simple terms only insofar as they contribute to that larger structure. For students, the point is that logic is not mainly about isolated words, but about meaningful combinations of words that express the mind’s judgments and so can enter into reasoning.
25. Amplius sermo complexus in eo quod complexus est, nec significat esse vel non esse: si enim hoc esset, omnis sermo complexus rem esse verus vel non esse significaret: et sic oratio deprecativa, vel optativa, vel subjunctiva, rem esse vel non esse significaret, quod falsum est.
Literal Translation:
“Further speech complex in that which complex it-is, neither signifies to-be or not to-be: if for this were, every speech complex thing to-be true or not to-be would-signify: and thus speech deprecative, or optative, or subjunctive, thing to-be or not to-be would-signify, which false is.”
Translation:
Further, complex speech, simply insofar as it is complex, does not signify being or non-being. For if this were so, every complex expression would signify that a thing is or is not. And thus a prayer, or a wish, or a subjunctive expression would signify that a thing is or is not, which is false.
Explanation:
Albert is making a finer distinction within speech. Even a complex expression, merely as a combination of words, does not yet by that fact alone signify truth or falsity, being or non-being. If every complex expression did that, then every kind of sentence would count as an assertion about reality. But that is not true, because some forms of speech, such as prayers, wishes, or other non-assertive expressions, do not affirm or deny that something is the case. His point is that logic is concerned not with every complex utterance whatsoever, but especially with those that make a judgment and can therefore be true or false. This helps students see why logic focuses on enunciative or assertive speech rather than on all grammatical sentence-forms indiscriminately.
26. Sermo ergo complexus per hoc quod enuntiativus est, rem esse vel non esse significat: per hoc autem quod rem esse vel non esse significat, non habet arguere et fidem facere de enuntiato.
Literal Translation:
“Speech therefore complex through this that enuntiative it-is, thing to-be or not to-be signifies: through this however that thing to-be or not to-be it-signifies, not it-has to-argue and belief to-make concerning (the) enunciated-(thing).”
Translation:
Therefore, complex speech, insofar as it is enunciative, signifies that a thing is or is not. But merely by signifying that a thing is or is not, it does not yet have the power to argue and to produce assent concerning what is enunciated.
Explanation:
Albert is now distinguishing between a proposition and an argument. An enunciative statement does signify being or non-being, that is, it does make an affirmation or denial and so can be true or false. But that alone is still not enough for argumentation. A proposition states something; it does not yet prove it or bring the mind to assent by rational force. For students, this is an important step in the argument: logic cannot stop even at the level of propositions, because the logician’s principal concern is the movement from the known to the unknown. That requires not just enunciation, but argumentation, which gives reasons and produces conviction about what is stated.
27. Per hoc igitur quod enuntiativus est, non est instrumentum per quod logicus consequatur id quod intendit.
Literal Translation:
“Through this therefore that enunciative it-is, not is instrument through which (the) logician may-attain that which he-intends.”
Translation:
Therefore, insofar as it is enunciative, it is not the instrument by which the logician attains what he intends.
Explanation:
Albert is drawing the conclusion from the previous distinction between enunciation and argumentation. A statement, simply as a statement, can affirm or deny that something is so, but that still does not make it the proper instrument of logic. The logician’s aim is not merely to utter propositions, but to lead the mind from the known to the unknown by rational proof. For that reason, enunciative speech by itself is not enough; the true instrument of logic must be argumentation, which gives the reason by which the mind is brought to knowledge.
28. Fidem autem facit per hoc quod ad formam argumenti collectivus est.
Literal Translation:
“Belief however it-makes through this that to (the) form of-argument collective it-is.”
Translation:
It produces assent, however, by this: that it is gathered together into the form of an argument.
Explanation:
Albert is now stating what gives discourse the power to produce assent. A mere enunciative statement does not yet convince the mind simply by being a statement. It produces belief only when it is ordered into the form of an argument, that is, when propositions are collected and arranged so that one leads to another. This supports his larger point that the proper instrument of logic is not bare speech, nor even bare enunciation, but argumentation. For students, the key idea is that the mind is brought to knowledge not just by hearing that something is so, but by seeing how it follows through an ordered rational structure.
29. Argumentatio igitur logici instrumentum est.
Literal Translation:
“Argumentation therefore of-(the) logician instrument is.”
Translation:
Therefore, argumentation is the instrument of the logician.
Explanation:
Albert now gives the compact conclusion toward which the whole discussion has been moving. Logic is ordered to leading the mind from the known to the unknown, and neither mere speech, nor simple terms, nor even enunciative propositions by themselves are sufficient for that task. What actually serves the logician is argumentation, because argumentation is the ordered rational means by which assent is produced and knowledge is advanced. For students, this sentence is a key summary: the proper instrument of logic is argumentation, since logic is concerned above all with reasoning that brings the mind to truth.
30. Logica autem generalis et docens de hoc est ut de subjecto, per quod utens logicus in scientiam venit ignoti per notum.
Literal Translation:
“Logic however general both teaching about this is as about (the) subject, through which using (the) logician into knowledge comes of-(the) unknown through (the) known.”
Translation:
General logic is the science that teaches about this as about its subject, and by using it the logician comes to knowledge of the unknown through the known.
Explanation:
Albert is now making the conclusion explicit: general logic takes argumentation as its subject matter and teaches about it precisely because it is the instrument by which the mind advances from what is known to what is unknown. Logic is therefore not chiefly about words as mere words, nor even about propositions considered in isolation, but about that ordered rational process by which knowledge is acquired. For students, this sentence gathers the whole discussion into one point: general logic studies argumentation because argumentation is the means the intellect uses to attain science.
31. Argumentatio igitur logicae docentis proprium subjectum est.
Literal Translation:
“Argumentation therefore of-logic teaching proper subject is.”
Translation:
Therefore, argumentation is the proper subject of teaching logic.
Explanation:
Albert is now stating the conclusion in its most precise form. Logic, taken as a teaching science, has argumentation as its proper subject because argumentation is the means by which the mind is led from what is known to what is unknown. This gathers together the earlier distinctions: neither mere speech, nor simple terms, nor even propositions alone are sufficient to define logic’s subject. What belongs to logic most properly is the ordered act of reasoning that produces knowledge. For students, this is a key sentence because it identifies the heart of logic: logic teaches about argumentation because argumentation is the rational instrument through which learning and science become possible.
32. Et haec est trium Philosophorum sententia, Avicennæ scilicet, Alfarabii, et Algazelis.
Literal Translation:
“And this is of-three philosophers (the) opinion, of-Avicenna namely, and of-Alfarabi, and of-Algazel.”
Translation:
And this is the opinion of three philosophers, namely Avicenna, Alfarabi, and Algazel.
Explanation:
Albert closes the discussion by appealing to major Arabic philosophers as authorities for the claim that argumentation is the proper subject of logic. By naming Avicenna, Alfarabi, and Algazel, he shows that this account is not merely his own private view, but one supported by an important philosophical tradition. For students, the significance is that Albert is situating his teaching within a broader medieval inheritance: logic is understood as the science of argumentation because argumentation is the instrument by which the mind passes from what is known to what is unknown.
33. Utuntur tamen sermone omnes sermocinales scientiae, grammaticia scilicet, poetica, et rhetorica, et ea quae vocatur logica.
Literal Translation:
“Use however speech all sermocinal sciences, grammar namely, poetics, and rhetoric, and that which is-called logic.”
Translation:
All the sermocinal sciences, however, use speech, namely grammar, poetics, rhetoric, and that which is called logic.
Explanation:
Albert is here noting what these disciplines have in common: they all make use of speech. Grammar, poetics, rhetoric, and logic are grouped together as “sermocinal” sciences because each in some way deals with discourse or verbal expression. But this does not yet mean that they are all the same science or that speech is the proper subject of logic. Rather, Albert is marking a shared instrument among them before distinguishing their proper concerns more carefully. For students, this is an important step in the argument: several arts may use speech, while still differing in what they principally study and in the end toward which they use it.
34. Grammatica prout modus inflexionum et constructionum intellectus simplicis et compositi complexe designativus existit simpliciter absque eo quod sciat de significato utrum sit vel non sit.
Literal Translation:
“Grammar according-as mode of-inflections and of-constructions of-intellect simple and composite complexly designative exists simply apart-from this that it-may-know concerning (the) signified whether it may-be or not may-be.”
Translation:
Grammar, insofar as it is the mode of inflections and constructions that signifies the simple and composite intellect in a complex way, exists simply without knowing of the thing signified whether it is or is not.
Explanation:
Albert is distinguishing grammar from logic by showing that grammar concerns the forms of speech as such, especially inflections and constructions, insofar as they signify what is in the mind. But grammar, considered in itself, does not judge whether the thing signified is true or false, that is, whether it is or is not. Its role is to order expression, not to determine truth. For students, the point is that grammar belongs to the sciences of discourse because it shapes language as language, whereas logic goes further by considering how speech and reasoning lead the mind to truth about things.
35. Poetica autem utitur eo prout modulus pronuntiatus delectatione vel abominatione provocat audientem ad aliquid faciendum vel fugiendum, propter quod ex variis compositis et secundum metalogiam sive fabulam fingit tentans mendacia quae provocent audientes.
Literal Translation:
“Poetics however uses it according-as measure pronounced by-delight or by-abhorrence provokes (the) hearer to something to-be-done or to-be-fled, on-account-of which out-of various composite-(things) and according-to metalogiam or fable it-fashions attempting falsehoods which may-provoke hearers.”
Translation:
Poetics, however, uses it insofar as spoken measure or meter, through delight or aversion, moves the hearer to do something or to avoid it. For this reason, out of various compositions and according to what is here called metalogia, or fable, it fashions invented falsehoods that may stir the hearers.
Explanation:
Albert is distinguishing poetics from the other verbal arts by its special way of moving the soul. Grammar orders speech as speech, and logic reasons toward truth, but poetics works by shaped and artful utterance that affects the hearer through pleasure or revulsion. Its purpose is practical and affective: it moves someone toward action or away from it. That is why Albert says poetry fashions fictive or false statements, not in order to deceive as sophistry does, but in order to move the hearer through imaginative representation. The word metalogiam is somewhat uncertain in this passage, but the sense is clear from the apposition sive fabulam: Albert is referring to a fabular or fictional mode of composition.
36. Rhetorica autem sermone utitur prout est designativus ejus per quod persuadere intendit.
Literal Translation:
“Rhetoric however by-speech uses according-as it is designative of-that through which to-persuade it-intends.”
Translation:
Rhetoric, however, uses speech insofar as it signifies that by which it intends to persuade.
Explanation:
Albert is now distinguishing rhetoric by its proper end. Grammar is concerned with the structure of speech, poetics with moving the hearer through delight or aversion, but rhetoric uses speech as a means of persuasion. The important point is that rhetoric does not chiefly aim at strict demonstration; rather, it uses signs, considerations, and forms of discourse that can move an audience toward assent. For students, this helps clarify why rhetoric belongs among the rational or sermocinal arts while still differing from logic in the stricter sense: it works through signifying speech ordered toward persuasion rather than toward demonstrative proof.
37. Solus autem logicus sermone utitur prout est pars instrumenti, per quod solum idem fit de incognito, cum notitia ipsius ex noto arguitur per complexionem argumenti.
Literal Translation:
“Alone however (the) logician by-speech uses according-as it is part of-(the) instrument, through which alone the-same is-made concerning (the) unknown, when knowledge of-itself out-of known-(thing) is-argued through complexity of-argument.”
Translation:
The logician alone, however, uses speech insofar as it is part of the instrument through which alone the same result is brought about concerning the unknown, when knowledge of it is inferred from what is known through the structure of an argument.
Explanation:
Albert is drawing the sharp distinction between logic and the other verbal arts. Grammar, poetry, and rhetoric all use speech, but the logician uses speech in a unique way: not chiefly as expression, ornament, or persuasion, but as part of the rational instrument by which the mind passes from the known to the unknown. Speech matters here because it enters into the structure of argument, and through that structured argument knowledge of what was previously unknown is drawn from what is already known. The phrase idem fit de incognito is somewhat compressed, but the sense is that the proper effect aimed at by logic is achieved regarding the unknown precisely through argument.
38. Propter alterum ergo sermone utitur, et non propter seipsum.
Literal Translation:
“On-account-of another-(thing) therefore by-speech he-uses, and not on-account-of itself.”
Translation:
Therefore, he uses speech for the sake of something else, and not for its own sake.
Explanation:
Albert is concluding his distinction between logic and the other sermocinal sciences. The logician does use speech, but not because speech itself is his principal concern. He uses it for the sake of another end, namely as part of the instrument by which the mind is led from what is known to what is unknown through argument. So speech is secondary in logic: it is a means rather than the thing chiefly studied. For students, this sentence neatly sums up Albert’s point that logic is not fundamentally about words as words, but about reasoning, with speech serving that deeper intellectual work.
39. Hujus autem probatio est, quod notum (per quod ignoti scientia accipitur) dupliciter consideratur, scilicet prout est res extra animam noscentis accepta, et prout est notio quaedam in anima noscentis.
Literal Translation:
“Of-this however (the) proof is, that known-(thing) (through which of-unknown knowledge is-received) in-two-ways is-considered, namely according-as it is thing outside (the) soul of-(the one) knowing received, and according-as it is notion certain in (the) soul of-(the one) knowing.”
Translation:
The proof of this, however, is that the known, through which knowledge of the unknown is received, is considered in two ways: namely, insofar as it is a thing received outside the soul of the knower, and insofar as it is a certain notion in the soul of the knower.
Explanation:
Albert is beginning to explain more carefully how the known leads us to the unknown. He says that what is known can be viewed in two ways. First, it can be considered as a real thing outside the mind, that is, as something existing in reality and apprehended by the knower. Second, it can be considered as a notion or concept within the soul of the knower. This distinction is important because logic is especially concerned with the second mode, things as they are present in the mind and ordered for reasoning, while still depending on the first, since knowledge begins from realities outside us. For students, this sentence marks another key step in Albert’s effort to show how logic mediates between the world as known and the mind’s inner concepts by which it reasons.
40. Non autem facit notitiam ignoti prout est res extra animam noscentis accepta, sed potius prout est notio rei in anima noscentis existens: sic enim significativa est et illativa eius quod ignotum est: quod ignotum ipsi aliquo modo percipit intellectus perfecta comprehensione.
Literal Translation:
“Not however it-makes knowledge of-(the) unknown according-as it is thing outside (the) soul of-(the one) knowing received, but rather according-as it is notion of-(the) thing in (the) soul of-(the one) knowing existing: thus for significative it is and illative of-that which unknown is: which unknown to-it in-some way perceives (the) intellect by-perfect comprehension.”
Translation:
It does not, however, produce knowledge of the unknown insofar as it is a thing received outside the soul of the knower, but rather insofar as it is a notion of the thing existing in the soul of the knower. For in this way it is significative and inferential with respect to what is unknown, which the intellect in some way grasps in complete comprehension.
Explanation:
Albert is sharpening the point that logic works not directly with external things as they exist outside the mind, but with the notions of those things as they exist within the mind. A thing outside the soul does not, simply as external, cause the mind to reason from the known to the unknown. Rather, this happens when the thing is present in the intellect as a concept or notion, because only then can it function as a sign and as a basis for inference. That is why logic is concerned especially with things as known in the soul. For students, the key idea is that reasoning proceeds through concepts in the mind: reality is the source of knowledge, but logical movement from one truth to another happens through the intellect’s inner grasp of things.
41. Hoc ergo modo voces significativas rerum considerat logicus et non aliter.
Literal Translation:
“This therefore mode voices significative of-things considers (the) logician and not otherwise.”
Translation:
Therefore, the logician considers spoken signs of things in this way and not otherwise.
Explanation:
Albert is drawing the conclusion from the previous distinction. The logician considers words or vocal signs not simply as sounds, nor merely as external signs in themselves, but precisely insofar as they signify concepts of things within the mind and can thereby serve reasoning. In other words, logic studies language only under the aspect in which it functions as part of the mind’s movement from the known to the unknown. For students, this sentence neatly sums up Albert’s view of speech in logic: words matter to the logician only as signifying instruments ordered to thought and inference.
42. Dico autem perfecta comprehensione: quia sunt forte quidam adeo perspicaces, quod ex intellectu unius vocis complexae statim de ignoto fidem concipiunt: sed hoc est imperfectum, et non generale.
Literal Translation:
“I-say however by-perfect comprehension: because there-are perhaps certain-(men) so perspicacious, that out-of (the) understanding of-one voice complex immediately concerning (the) unknown belief they-conceive: but this is imperfect, and not general.”
Translation:
I say “by perfect comprehension,” however, because there are perhaps some who are so perceptive that from understanding a single complex expression they immediately form an assent about the unknown. But this is imperfect and not universal.
Explanation:
Albert is clarifying why he added the phrase “perfect comprehension” in the previous sentence. Sometimes a very sharp mind can grasp one statement and at once leap to a judgment about something not yet fully known. But that kind of immediate mental leap is not the ordinary or complete way in which knowledge is acquired. It is exceptional, not universal, and therefore not the proper model for logic. For students, the point is that logic is concerned with the general and disciplined way the mind comes to knowledge through ordered reasoning, not with rare flashes of intuitive quickness that some especially perceptive people may have.
43. Et ideo non sufficit, sed opus est argumentatione perfecte hoc faciente.
Literal Translation:
“And therefore not it-suffices, but need is of-argumentation perfectly this doing.”
Translation:
And therefore this does not suffice, but there is need of argumentation, which does this perfectly.
Explanation:
Albert is concluding from the previous point that a mere quick grasp of a single statement is not enough for the full and proper attainment of knowledge. Even if some especially sharp person can move immediately from one complex utterance to belief about the unknown, that remains imperfect and exceptional. What is needed for the complete and general way of coming to knowledge is argumentation, because argumentation carries out this work in a full, ordered, and reliable manner. For students, this reinforces Albert’s main thesis: logic is centered on argumentation because argumentation is the perfected instrument by which the intellect is led from the known to the unknown.
44. Si quis autem quaerit inde efficatur notum id, ex quo ignoti accipitur scientia et fides, hoc nihil est quaerere: quia in quolibet aliquid per se notum est homini et naturae insitum, per quod ignoti potest accipere scientiam.
Literal Translation:
“If anyone however asks whence is-made known that from-which of-(the) unknown is-received science and belief, this is nothing to-ask: because in each-(man) something through-itself known is to-man and to-nature inborn, through which of-(the) unknown he-is-able to-receive science.”
Translation:
If, however, someone asks how that becomes known from which knowledge and belief about the unknown are received, that is really to ask nothing worthwhile; for in each man there is something self-known and implanted by nature, through which he can receive knowledge of the unknown.
Explanation:
Albert is answering an objection that could lead to an infinite regress. If all knowledge of the unknown comes from something already known, one might ask how that first known thing itself becomes known. Albert’s reply is that this question misses the point, because not everything is known through some prior proof. There are first things naturally known to man, principles that are implanted in human nature and are known of themselves. These serve as the starting points from which the mind can move on to knowledge of what is unknown. For students, this is an important scholastic principle: reasoning must begin from some immediate and naturally known truths, otherwise no science could ever get started.
45. Aliter enim homo nullius esset perceptibilis scientiae vel disciplinae, sicut nec brutum animal, si prima cognoscendi principia per seipsa non inessent homini.
Literal Translation:
“Otherwise for man of-no perceptible science or discipline would-be, just-as neither (a) brute animal, if first principles of-knowing through themselves not were-in man.”
Translation:
For otherwise man would be capable of no science or discipline, just as a brute animal is not, if the first principles of knowing were not present in man through themselves.
Explanation:
Albert is strengthening the previous point about first principles naturally present in the human mind. If man did not already possess self-evident principles of knowing, then he would never be able to begin learning at all. In that case he would be no more capable of science or disciplined instruction than a brute animal, which lacks the rational foundation needed for such knowledge. The argument is that all learning depends on some truths being immediately present to the intellect from the start. For students, this is a key scholastic claim: human beings can learn because the mind is naturally ordered to truth and already has within it the first principles from which science can grow.
46. De argumentatione igitur vel syllogismo est logica tota ut de subjecto.
Literal Translation:
“Of argumentation therefore or of-syllogism is logic whole as of (the) subject.”
Translation:
Therefore the whole of logic is concerned with argumentation, or with the syllogism, as with its subject.
Explanation:
Albert is drawing together the argument he has been making about the proper subject of logic. Logic is not chiefly about speech as mere speech, nor about simple words or even propositions taken by themselves, but about the rational instrument by which the mind moves from the known to the unknown. That instrument is argumentation, and in its most eminent form it is the syllogism. So when he says that the whole of logic is about argumentation or syllogism as its subject, he means that logic studies these as the central means by which knowledge is acquired and judged. For students, this sentence serves as a compact summary of the whole discussion: logic is defined by its concern with reasoning as the instrument of science.
47. De aliis autem vocibus incomplexis est propter illam.
Literal Translation:
“About other however voices incomplex it-is on-account-of that.”
Translation:
But it is concerned with the other incomplex expressions on account of that one.
Explanation:
Albert means that logic deals with other simple or incomplex expressions only because of argumentation or syllogism. Simple terms are not the principal subject of logic in their own right. Rather, logic considers them insofar as they serve the larger work of reasoning, since they are parts out of which propositions and arguments are formed. For students, this sentence neatly restates Albert’s hierarchy: argumentation is primary in logic, and simple words are treated only in relation to that primary subject.
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