1. Quomodo universale est de consideratione logici, et de numero universalium, ac de utilitate libri universalium.
How universal is of consideration of-the logician, and of the number of universals, and of the usefulness of-the book of-universals.
2. Primum autem quod in scientia logica est considerandum, universale est: quia si ratio predicabilis de aliis secundum veritatem attendatur, proprie et vere predicari de alio non potest, nisi quod inest illi de quo predicatur.
First however what in science logical is to-be-considered, universal is: because if the account of-the-predicable concerning others according-to truth be-attended-to, properly and truly to-be-predicated of another it cannot, unless what is-in that-one of which it is-predicated.
3. Cum autem nihil insit sibiipsi (hoc enim secundum intellectum intelligi non potest, quod aliquid sit in seipso, vel insit sibiipsi, ut dicit Aristoteles) oportet, quod omne quod inesse alii accipitur, aut insit ut natura essentialis, aut ut accidens.
Since however nothing is-in itself-to-itself (for this according-to intellect to-be-understood cannot, that something be in itself, or is-in itself-to-itself, as says Aristotle) it-is-necessary, that every thing which to-be-in another is taken, either is-in as nature essential, or as accident.
4. Et per hoc quod inest, sequitur de necessitate, quod communicabile sit omnibus quibus inesse significatur.
And through this that it is-in, it-follows of necessity, that communicable it be to-all to-which to-be-in is-signified.
5. Communicabile ergo multis est secundum aptitudinem et in multis et de multis.
Communicable therefore to-many is according-to aptitude both in many and of many.
6. Omne autem quod sic inest, et hac ipsa de causa praedicabile est.
Every thing however which thus is-in, also by this very from cause predicable is.
7. Ratio ergo et causa predicabilis est, quod sit universale.
The account therefore and cause of-the-predicable is, that it be universal.
8. Cum ergo primus actus rationis (qui scientiam ignoti investigat per notum) sit ordinatio praedicabilium, ordinatio autem praedicabilium cognoscere non potest, nisi sciatur per quam rationem predicabile sit id quod predicatur: quae ratio sumitur ex hoc, quod praedicabile est.
Since therefore the first act of reason (which investigates knowledge of-the-unknown through the known) be ordering of-predicables, the ordering however of-predicables to-be-known it cannot, unless be-known through what account predicable be that which is-predicated: which account is-taken from this, that predicable it-is.
9. (Est enim prius considerare predicabile secundum id quod praedicabile est, quam considerare ordinem predicabilium.)
(It-is for prior to-consider predicable according-to that which predicable is, than to-consider order of-predicables.)
10. Cum ergo ex hoc quod universale sit, pradicabile sit, oportet primo ponere scientiam universalis.
Since therefore from this that universal it-be, predicable it-be, it-is-necessary first to-place knowledge of-universal.
11. Si autem quis objiciat, quod etiam particulare de seipso predicatur, dicemus quod haec predicatio non perfectam habet predicationis rationem: et de hoc in sequentibus in loco opportuno pertractabitur.
If however anyone may-object, that also particular of itself is-predicated, we-will-say that this predication not perfect has of-predication account: and concerning this in the things-following in place opportune it-will-be-treated.
12. Sic ergo ad praedicabilium rationem, et necessarium est et utile de universali premittere tractatum.
Thus therefore to of-predicables account, both necessary is and useful concerning universal to-send-before treatment.
13. Universale autem est, quod cum sit in uno, aptum natum est esse in pluribus, ut in ante habitis ostensum est.
Universal however is, which since it-be in one, apt born is to-be in many, as in before had things shown is.
14. Et per hoc quod in multis per aptitudinem est, praedicabile est de illis.
And through this that in many through aptitude it-is, predicable it-is of those.
15. Et sic universale est, quod de sua aptitudine est in multis et de multis.
And thus universal is, which by its aptitude is in many and of many.
16. Et hoc modo prout ratio est predicabilitatis, ad logicum pertinet de universali tractare, quamvis secundum quod est natura quaedam et differentia entis, tractare de ipso pertineat ad metaphysicum.
And in-this way according-as account is of-predicability, to logician it-pertains concerning universal to-treat, although according-to what it-is nature a-certain and difference of-being, to-treat concerning it it-pertain to metaphysician.
17. Praedicare enim et predicari rationis est ordinantis et componentis predicabilia secundum praedicabilium propriam rationem.
To-predicate for and to-be-predicated of-reason is of-ordering and of-composing predicables according-to of-predicables proper account.
18. Universale autem sic acceptum prout est predicabile quod in multis et de multis, aut inest essentialiter, aut accidentaliter: sive ut essentia, sive ut accidens.
Universal however thus accepted, according-as it is predicable, which is in many and of many, either is-in essentially, or accidentally: whether as essence, or as accident.
19. Si inest ut tota essentia, aut ut pars essentialis.
If it is-in as whole essence, or as essential part.
20. Si inest essentia: aut inest ut tota formalis essentia, constat quod est species, quia species totum est formale esse individuorum de quibus praedicatur: quia quidquid est post speciem, est de materia vel individuantibus.
If it is-in as essence: either it is-in as whole formal essence, it-is-established that it is species, because species is whole formal to-be of the individuals of which it is predicated: because whatever is after species, is from matter or individuating-things.
21. Si autem ut essentialis tune aut est secundum potentiam in qua est esse pars per inchoationem, aut est pars secundum actum in quo est esse secundum actum perfectum.
If however as essential then either it is according-to potency in which there is to-be part through inchoation, or it is part according-to act in which there is to-be according-to perfect act.
22. Et priori quidem modo est genus, secundo vero modo est differentia.
And in the prior indeed mode it is genus, in the second however mode it is difference.
23. Si vero inest ut accidens: aut inest ut accidens naturae, quod de ipsius naturae aptitude causatur et emanat: aut ut accidens commune, quod est accidens individui.
If indeed it is-in as accident: either it is-in as accident of nature, which from the aptitude of the nature itself is caused and emanates: or as common accident, which is accident of the individual.
24. Et priori quidem modo est proprium, et secundo modo est accidens vocatum.
And in the prior indeed mode it is property, and in the second mode it is called accident.
25. Et de omnibus his tractare est necessarium logico, propter hoc quod predicabilium considerat ordinem et predicatorum compositionem.
And concerning all these to-treat is necessary for-the-logician, on-account-of this that he-considers the order of predicables and the composition of predicates.
26. Qualiter omnia ista praedicantur per notam compositionis, et qualiter per hoc verbum substantivum est, in sequentibus erit manifestum: sed hic tantum sufficiat, quod quidquid predicatur, praedicatur non ut pars, sed ut idem secundum esse.
How all these are predicated through the note of composition, and how through this substantive verb is, in the things-following will be manifest: but here let-it-suffice only, that whatever is predicated, is predicated not as part, but as the same according-to to-be.
27. Idem autem dico per se, vel per accidens.
The same however I say through itself, or through accident.
28. De his igitur in hoc nostro libro erit tractatus.
Concerning these therefore in this our book there-will-be treatment.
29. Nec considerabimus hic res ipsas quibus talia ad ordinem unum predicabilis referuntur.
Nor will-we-consider here the things themselves to which such things are referred to the one order of predicable.
30. Hoc enim in libro Predicamentorum habet determinari.
For this in the book of the Predicaments has to-be-determined.
31. Sed accidens ipsis rebus, quo eorum primum predicabilium generis habet nomen et rationem, et secundum speciei, et tertium differentiae, quartum vero proprium, quintum autem accidentis.
But the accident to the things themselves, by-which the first of their predicables has the name and account of genus, and the second of species, and the third of difference, the fourth indeed of property, the fifth however of accident.
32. Hoc enim ad istius primi libri pertinet intentionem.
For this pertains to the intention of this first book.
33. Per hoc enim accidentia diversum modum in quid vel in quamvis conveniant omnia in accipitunt praedicand quale: hoc, quod quodlibet ipsorum est praedicabile: per quod etiam scientia est una, et non multae.
For through this the accidents, although they agree in a diverse mode in what or in however they receive the predicating of such-a-kind: this, that each-of them is predicable: through which also the science is one, and not many.
34. Diffiniri autem universale definitione non potest: quia per hoc quod predicabile est de multis, non vera est unius et eiusdem rationis, sed est dictum per prius et posterius de illis de quibus est per ambitum sua communitatis predicatum.
To-be-defined however universal by-definition cannot: because through this that it is predicable of many, it is not truly of one and the same account, but it is said through prior and posterior of those of which it is predicated through the extension of its commonness.
35. Tractantes autem de his, modum et ordinem tenebimus Porphyrii.
Treating however concerning these, we-will-hold the mode and order of Porphyry.
36. Ut duplex utilitas habeatur nostri operis: et de universalibus habeatur doctrina, et etiam libri Porphyrii habeatur intellectus, quem scripsit ad quemdam Grisarotium suum discipulum.
So-that a twofold usefulness of our work may-be-had: both concerning universals may-be-had doctrine, and also of the book of Porphyry may-be-had understanding, which he wrote to a certain Grisarotius his disciple.
37. Cum autem sit duplex necessarium, scilicet inevitabile, et utile, ad eam quae est apud Aristotelis libros doctrinam praedicamentorum (qua caeteris doctrinis predicamentorum praexcellentior est) nosse quid sit genus, quid differentia, quid species, quid proprium, et quid accidens, secundum quod haec universalia habent rationem predicabilium, oportet tractare de istis.
Since however there is a twofold necessary, namely unavoidable, and useful, for that doctrine of predicaments which is among the books of Aristotle (by which it is more-excellent than the other doctrines of predicaments) to know what genus is, what difference, what species, what property, and what accident, according-to that these universals have the account of predicables, it-is-necessary to-treat concerning these.
38. Inevitabile enim est, secundum quod rationem predicabilis oportet cognoscere ante predicabilium ordinem.
Unavoidable indeed it is, according-to which the account of predicable it-is-necessary to-know before the order of predicables.
39. Utile est secundum quod adminiculum est scire intentionem generis et speciei et differentiae et proprii accidentis, antequam determinetur de his quae in uno genere ordinantur ut species, et antequam determinentur quae ex uno genere dividuntur per oppositas differentias, et antequam assignentur uniuscuiusque generis propria, et ampla distinctio generum in substantia, et accidentium genera determinentur.
Useful it is according-to that it is a help to-know the intention of genus and of species and of difference and of property and of accident, before it-is-determined concerning those things which in one genus are ordered as species, and before there-are-determined those things which from one genus are divided through opposite differences, and before there-are-assigned the properties of each genus, and the broad distinction of genera in substance, and the genera of accidents are determined.
40. Est autem necessarium et utile ad definitionum assignationem: quae omnes prout praedicabiles sunt, ex genere et differentiis constituuntur, in quibus cavere oportet ne aliquod accidentale ponatur.
It is however necessary and useful for the assigning of definitions: which all, according-as they are predicables, are constituted from genus and differences, in which it-is-necessary to-take-care lest something accidental be posited.
41. Non enim potest vitari malum nisi cognitum, ut dicit Boethius.
For evil cannot be avoided unless known, as says Boethius.
42.Omnino etiam necessarium ad demonstrationem, cuius medium secundum potissimum modum demonstrandi definitio est dicens quid et propter quid.
Altogether also necessary for demonstration, of which the middle according-to the most-powerful mode of demonstrating is definition saying what and on-account-of-what.
43. Est enim talis definitio, ut dicit Aristoteles, demonstratio positione differens.
For such definition is, as says Aristotle, a demonstration differing by position.
44. Necessarium est etiam et utile ad divisionum scientiam: quia omnis divisio vel est generis in species, vel totius in partes, vel accidentis in accidentia, vel subjecti in accidentia, vel accidentis in subjecta, vel vocis in significationes.
Necessary it is also and useful for the knowledge of divisions: because every division either is of genus into species, or of whole into parts, or of accident into accidents, or of subject into accidents, or of accident into subjects, or of word into significations.
45. Et patet, quod quaedam in divisione sunt, quae sine doctrina istorum sciri non possunt.
And it is-clear, that certain things in division are, which without the doctrine of these cannot be known.
46. Quare scientia generis, speciei, differentiae, proprii, et accidentis, adminiculum est ad scientiam divisionum generis in species, et accidentis in accidentia, vel accidentis in subjecta, vel subjecti in accidentia.
Wherefore the knowledge of genus, of species, of difference, of property, and of accident, is a help toward the knowledge of divisions of genus into species, and of accident into accidents, or of accident into subjects, or of subject into accidents.
47. Si autem non ad omnem utilis est divisio, per hoc non removetur quin sit ad divisionem.
If however division is not useful for every thing, through this it is not removed that it is for division.
48. Scientiam enim divisionis non habet etiam qui unam ignorat divisionis rationem.
For even he who is-ignorant of one account of division does not have knowledge of division.
49. Cum ergo tam utile sit hoc negotium istarum rerum prout universalia quaedam sunt, istarum quinque rerum prout in ratione sunt, speculatione sive consideratione tentabo traditionem compendiosam faciens doctrinam monstrare.
Since therefore this business of these things, according-as they are certain universals, is so useful, of these five things, according-as they are in reason, by speculation or consideration I-will-attempt, making a compendious transmission, to-show the doctrine.
50. Modus enim noster quasi introductorius erit, ut imperitis sufficiat.
For our mode will-be as-if introductory, so-that it may-suffice for the unskilled.
51. Ea autem quae ab Antiquis de his dicta sunt colligemus: et quamvis in modo introductionis ab altioribus quaestionibus abstinendum sit, tamen propter doctrinae bonitatem etiam illas tangemus.
Those things however which by the Ancients concerning these have been said we-will-collect: and although in the mode of introduction one must-abstain from higher questions, nevertheless on-account-of the goodness of the doctrine we-will-touch also those.
52. Cum tamen in modo introductionis simpliciora facile ab imperitis intelligibilia mediocriter sint potius conjectanda, ut facilior fiat instructio.
Since nevertheless in the mode of introduction the simpler things easily intelligible by the unskilled are rather to-be-conjectured moderately, so-that instruction may-become easier.
53. De una enim et eadem re subtili demonstratione et introductoria disertione potest tractari.
For concerning one and the same thing it-can-be-treated by subtle demonstration and by introductory discourse.
54.Non enim per causas altissimas ista hic demonstrabimus, sed per similitudines et exempla de his faciemus instructionem.
For not through the highest causes will-we-demonstrate these things here, but through likenesses and examples concerning these we-will-make instruction.
Translation
1. How the universal belongs to the consideration of the logician, concerning the number of universals, and concerning the usefulness of the book of universals.
2. The first thing to be considered in logical science is the universal: because if the account of the predicable concerning others according to truth be attended to, nothing can properly and truly be predicated of another unless it is in that of which it is predicated.
3. Since nothing is in itself (for according to intellect this cannot be understood, that something be in itself or inhere in itself, as Aristotle says), it is necessary that everything which is taken to inhere in another either inheres as an essential nature or as an accident.
4. And from the fact that it inheres, it follows necessarily that it is communicable to all those in which it is signified to inhere.
5. Therefore, what is communicable to many is according to aptitude both in many and of many.
6. Everything which thus inheres is, by that very fact, predicable.
7. Therefore, the account and cause of the predicable is that it be universal.
8. Since the first act of reason (which investigates knowledge of the unknown through the known) is the ordering of predicables, and the order of predicables cannot be known unless it is known according to what account that which is predicated is predicable — which account is taken from the fact that it is predicable —
9. (For it is prior to consider the predicable according to that by which it is predicable than to consider the order of predicables.)
10. Therefore, since from the fact that something is universal it is predicable, it is necessary first to establish the science of the universal.
11. If anyone should object that the particular is also predicated of itself, we shall say that such predication does not possess the perfect account of predication; and this will be treated in the following at an appropriate place.
12. Thus, therefore, for the account of predicables it is both necessary and useful to premise a treatment concerning the universal.
13. A universal is that which, although existing in one, is naturally apt to exist in many, as has been shown before.
14. And from the fact that it exists in many according to aptitude, it is predicable of them.
15. Thus the universal is that which according to its aptitude is in many and of many.
16. And in this way, insofar as it is the account of predicability, it pertains to the logician to treat of the universal, although insofar as it is a certain nature and a difference of being, its treatment pertains to the metaphysician.
17. For to predicate and to be predicated belong to reason ordering and composing predicables according to the proper account of predicables.
18. The universal thus taken, insofar as it is predicable and is in many and of many, either inheres essentially or accidentally, whether as essence or as accident.
19. If it inheres as the whole essence, or as an essential part.
20. If it inheres as essence: either it inheres as the whole formal essence — and then it is clear that it is species, because species is the whole formal being of the individuals of which it is predicated; for whatever is beyond species belongs to matter or individuating principles.
21. But if as essential part, then either it is according to potency, in which being a part exists inchoatively, or it is a part according to act, in which being exists in perfected actuality.
22. In the former way it is genus; in the latter way it is difference.
23. If indeed it inheres as accident: either as an accident of nature, which is caused and emanates from the aptitude of the nature itself, or as a common accident, which is an accident of the individual.
24. In the former way it is property; in the latter way it is called accident.
25. And it is necessary for the logician to treat concerning all these, because he considers the order of predicables and the composition of predicates.
26. How all these are predicated through the note of composition, and how through the substantive verb “is,” will be made manifest in what follows; but here it suffices only that whatever is predicated is predicated not as a part but as the same according to being.
27. And by “the same” I mean either per se or accidentally.
28. Concerning these, therefore, there will be treatment in this book.
29. Nor shall we consider here the things themselves to which such things are referred according to one order of predicable.
30. For this is to be determined in the book of the Predicaments.
31. But rather the accident belonging to the things themselves by which the first of their predicables has the name and account of genus, the second of species, the third of difference, the fourth of property, and the fifth of accident.
32. For this pertains to the intention of this first book.
33. For through this the accidents, although they agree in diverse modes in what or however they receive predication of such a kind, agree in this: that each of them is predicable. Through this also the science is one and not many.
34. The universal, however, cannot be defined by a definition: because from the fact that it is predicable of many, it is not truly according to one and the same account, but is spoken according to prior and posterior of those of which it is predicated through the extension of its commonness.
35. Treating concerning these things, we shall hold to the mode and order of Porphyry.
36. So that a twofold usefulness may be had from our work: both that doctrine concerning universals may be possessed, and also that understanding of the book of Porphyry may be had which he wrote to a certain Grisarotius, his disciple.
37. Since there is a twofold necessity, namely the unavoidable and the useful, for that doctrine of predicaments which is found among the books of Aristotle (and which excels the other doctrines of predicaments), it is necessary to know what genus is, what difference, what species, what property, and what accident are, insofar as these universals possess the account of predicables.
38. For it is unavoidable that the account of the predicable be known before the order of predicables.
39. It is useful insofar as it is a help to know the intention of genus, species, difference, property, and accident before determining those things which are ordered as species in one genus, before determining those things divided from one genus through opposite differences, before assigning the properties of each genus, and before determining the broad distinction of genera in substance and the genera of accidents.
40. It is also necessary and useful for the assignment of definitions: since all definitions, insofar as they are predicables, are constituted from genus and differences, in which one must take care lest something accidental be posited.
41. For evil cannot be avoided unless it is known, as Boethius says.
42. It is altogether also necessary for demonstration, whose middle term, according to the most powerful mode of demonstrating, is a definition expressing what a thing is and why it is.
43. For such a definition is, as Aristotle says, a demonstration differing only by position.
44. It is also necessary and useful for the science of divisions: because every division is either of genus into species, or of whole into parts, or of accident into accidents, or of subject into accidents, or of accident into subjects, or of word into significations.
45. And it is clear that there are certain things in division which cannot be known without the doctrine of these.
46. Therefore the knowledge of genus, species, difference, property, and accident is a help toward knowledge of the divisions of genus into species, and of accident into accidents, or of accident into subjects, or of subject into accidents.
47. But if division is not useful for every matter, this does not remove the fact that it belongs to division.
48. For even one who is ignorant of one account of division does not possess the science of division.
49. Since therefore this inquiry concerning these things, insofar as they are certain universals, is so useful, I shall attempt, by speculation or consideration concerning these five things insofar as they exist in reason, to present the doctrine in a compendious transmission.
50. For our mode will be introductory, so that it may suffice for beginners.
51. We shall gather together those things which the Ancients have said concerning these matters; and although in an introduction one ought to abstain from higher questions, nevertheless, because of the goodness of the doctrine, we shall touch upon them also.
52. Yet in an introductory mode, simpler things easily intelligible to beginners should rather be moderately conjectured, so that instruction may become easier.
53. For one and the same thing may be treated both by subtle demonstration and by introductory discourse.
54. For we shall not demonstrate these matters here through the highest causes, but through likenesses and examples we shall provide instruction concerning them.
Summary
This text is a scholastic introduction to the doctrine of the five predicables—genus, species, difference, property, and accident—and to the logical consideration of universals. It stands firmly within the Aristotelian and Porphyrian tradition, treating the universal not as a metaphysical abstraction alone, but principally as the foundation of logic and scientific reasoning.
The author begins by establishing why the universal must be the first object of logical consideration. Logic concerns predication: how one thing may truly be said of another. Whatever is predicated of many must possess communicability, that is, an aptitude to exist “in many and of many.” This communicability constitutes universality. Therefore, because logic studies predication, and predication depends upon universality, the universal must be examined before any ordering of predicables can occur.
The text carefully distinguishes the logical and metaphysical consideration of universals. The metaphysician considers the universal insofar as it is a mode of being or a nature. The logician, however, considers it insofar as it grounds predication. Thus, logic studies universals formally as instruments of reasoning.
From this principle the author derives the five predicables:
- Species is that which expresses the whole formal essence of individuals.
- Genus expresses an essential part according to potency.
- Difference expresses an essential part according to actuality.
- Property is an accident flowing necessarily from a nature.
- Accident is a contingent attribute belonging to individuals.
These five are not primarily treated as things existing outside the mind, but as logical intentions—that is, modes according to which concepts may be predicated.
A major concern of the text is the unity of logic as a science. Although genus, species, difference, property, and accident differ in mode, they all share the common feature of being predicable. Because they are united under this formal consideration, logic remains one science rather than many disconnected inquiries.
The author then explains why the study of the predicables is necessary and useful. It is necessary because one cannot understand the order of predication without first understanding what makes predication possible. It is useful because nearly every intellectual operation depends upon these distinctions:
- Definition depends upon genus and difference.
- Demonstration depends upon essential definitions.
- Division depends upon genus, species, and difference.
- Scientific classification depends upon understanding essential and accidental predication.
The text strongly reflects Aristotelian epistemology. Scientific knowledge proceeds from the known to the unknown, from universal principles to particular conclusions. Definitions are central because they reveal both what a thing is and why it is. Thus, logic is not merely linguistic analysis but the organon of science itself.
The author also adopts an explicitly pedagogical method. He states that this work is introductory, intended for beginners. Therefore, he avoids excessively subtle demonstrations and instead teaches through examples, likenesses, and orderly exposition. Nevertheless, he does not entirely omit higher questions, because touching upon them enriches understanding.
The work follows the order of Porphyry’s Isagoge, whose purpose was to introduce Aristotle’s Categories. Hence the text situates itself within the traditional curriculum of logical instruction:
- Universals and predicables
- Predication and definition
- Categories and divisions
- Demonstration and scientific method
Underlying the entire exposition is a deeply realist conception of knowledge. Universals are not treated as arbitrary names imposed by the mind, but as grounded in real natures communicable to many individuals. Logic therefore reflects the structure of reality itself. The order of concepts mirrors the order of being.
In summary, the text teaches that:
- universality is the foundation of predication,
- predication is the foundation of logic,
- logic is the instrument of scientific knowledge,
- and the five predicables are indispensable tools for definition, division, and demonstration.
It is therefore both an introduction to logic and a defense of the classical realist account of universals inherited from Aristotle, Porphyry, Boethius, and the medieval scholastic tradition.
