Aristotle opens the Physics by teaching us how all true learning begins. Every science seeks knowledge through causes, principles, and elements, and therefore the study of nature must begin with the first principles of natural things. Yet Aristotle immediately warns us that the path of learning does not proceed from what is most perfect in itself to what is easiest for us to understand. Rather, we begin with what is familiar, general, and confused, and only gradually advance toward what is distinct and intelligible by nature. Thus the mind moves from wholes to parts, from universals to particulars, and from vague apprehension to scientific understanding. This method reflects the natural condition of human knowledge, for our intellect rises from sense experience toward wisdom. Students should therefore pay close attention to Aristotle’s distinction between what is “known to us” and what is “known by nature,” since this principle governs not only the study of physics, but the entire order of liberal education and philosophical inquiry.
1. Ἐπειδὴ τὸ εἰδέναι καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι συμβαίνει περὶ πάσας τὰς μεθόδους, ὧν εἰσὶν ἀρχαὶ ἢ αἴτια ἢ στοιχεῖα, ἐκ τοῦ ταῦτα γνωρίζειν (τότε γὰρ οἰόμεθα γιγνώσκειν ἕκαστον, ὅταν τὰ αἴτια γνωρίσωμεν τὰ πρῶτα καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς πρώτας καὶ μέχρι τῶν στοιχείων), δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῆς περὶ φύσεως ἐπιστήμης πειρατέον διορίσασθαι πρῶτον τὰ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς.
Literal Translation:
“Since the knowing and the understanding belongs concerning all the methods, of-which there are principles or causes or elements, from the these to-know (then for we think to-know each thing, whenever the causes we-know the first and the principles the first and as-far-as the elements), clear that also of-the concerning nature science one-must-attempt to-determine first the things concerning the principles.”
Translation:
Since knowing and understanding arise in every inquiry whose objects include principles, causes, or elements, by knowing these things first (for we think that we know each thing when we grasp its first causes, its first principles, and the elements as far as they go), it is clear that in the science of nature too we must first try to determine the things concerning the principles.
Explanation:
Aristotle opens by stating a general rule about knowledge: in any disciplined inquiry, real understanding comes from grasping first principles, causes, and elements. He is not yet talking only about nature; he begins from a broad claim about how all serious knowledge works. From that general rule he draws the conclusion that natural science must begin by identifying its starting points. This sets the agenda for the whole treatise: before studying natural things in detail, we must ask what their basic principles are.
2. πέφυκε δὲ ἐκ τῶν γνωριμωτέρων ἡμῖν ἡ ὁδὸς καὶ σαφεστέρων ἐπὶ τὰ σαφέστερα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμώτερα·
Literal Translation:
“Has-grown-by-nature but from the more-known to-us the road and clearer unto the things clearer by-nature and more-known.”
Translation:
But the natural route is from what is better known and clearer to us toward what is clearer and better known by nature.
Explanation:
Aristotle now explains the method of inquiry. Human learning does not usually begin with what is most intelligible in itself; it begins with what is closest to our experience. So there is a movement from what is initially clear to us to what is more truly clear in the order of nature. This distinction between what is better known to us and what is better known by nature is fundamental in Aristotle’s method.
3. οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ ἡμῖν τε γνώριμα καὶ ἁπλῶς.
Literal Translation:
“Not for the same things to-us both known and simply.”
Translation:
For the things known to us are not the same as the things known simply.
Explanation:
This short sentence sharpens the distinction just made. “Known to us” means what appears first to human awareness, usually through sense experience. “Known simply” means what is more intelligible in itself, apart from our starting point. Aristotle is warning students not to confuse psychological order, how we come to know, with logical or natural order, what is most basic in reality.
4. διόπερ ἀνάγκη τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον προάγειν ἐκ τῶν ἀσαφεστέρων μὲν τῇ φύσει ἡμῖν δὲ σαφεστέρων ἐπὶ τὰ σαφέστερα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμώτερα.
Literal Translation:
“Wherefore necessary this way to-lead-forward from the things less-clear indeed by-nature to-us but clearer unto the things clearer by-nature and more-known.”
Translation:
Therefore it is necessary to proceed in this way, from things less clear by nature but clearer to us, toward things clearer and better known by nature.
Explanation:
Aristotle turns the distinction into a rule of procedure. Since our learning begins from what is nearer to our senses, we must deliberately move from that beginning toward what is more intelligible in the nature of things themselves. This is not a defect in knowledge but the necessary path of human understanding. The student must accept that inquiry begins with what is in one sense confused and only later reaches deeper clarity.
5. ἔστι δ’ ἡμῖν τὸ πρῶτον δῆλα καὶ σαφῆ τὰ συγκεχυμένα μᾶλλον· ὕστερον δ’ ἐκ τούτων γίγνεται γνώριμα τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ διαιροῦσι ταῦτα.
Literal Translation:
“Are but to-us the first clear and plain the things having-been-mingled-together more; later but out-of these become known the elements and the principles by-dividing these.”
Translation:
What is first clear and evident to us is rather the mixed-together whole; later, from these, the elements and the principles become known by dividing them.
Explanation:
At the beginning of inquiry, we first encounter wholes that are not yet analytically distinguished. They are “clear” in the sense that we can point to them and experience them, but they are still confused because their internal structure has not been sorted out. Knowledge advances when we analyze these wholes and separate out their elements and principles. Aristotle is describing the movement from an undifferentiated grasp of a thing to a precise understanding of what composes and explains it.
6. διὸ ἐκ τῶν καθόλου ἐπὶ τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα δεῖ προϊέναι·
Literal Translation:
“Therefore from the universal things unto the according-to each things it-is-necessary to-go-forward.”
Translation:
Therefore one must proceed from universals to particulars.
Explanation:
This is Aristotle’s concise statement of the method just described. We begin with broader, more general wholes as they first appear to us, and then move toward the more specific distinctions within them. Here “universal” does not yet mean a fully abstract concept in the later technical sense alone; it means the more general and inclusive object of first awareness. Inquiry advances by articulating what is initially grasped in a broad way.
7. τὸ γὰρ ὅλον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν γνωριμώτερον, τὸ δὲ καθόλου ὅλον τί ἐστι·
Literal Translation:
“the for whole according to the perception more-known, the but universal a whole something is.”
Translation:
For the whole is more knowable according to perception, and the universal is in a way a whole.
Explanation:
Aristotle justifies the move from universals to particulars by appealing to sense perception. What we perceive first is a whole, not an analyzed set of components. The universal is like a whole because it gathers many things under one undivided grasp. So our first awareness naturally takes the form of something broad and inclusive before analysis breaks it down.
8. πολλὰ γὰρ περιλαμβάνει ὡς μέρη τὸ καθόλου.
Literal Translation:
“many for it-encompasses as parts the universal.”
Translation:
For the universal encompasses many things as parts.
Explanation:
This explains why the universal counts as a kind of whole. It contains many particular instances or aspects within its scope. Aristotle’s point is that our first grasp is broad because it covers many things together without yet distinguishing them carefully. The work of inquiry is to unfold that compressed whole into its constituent parts.
9. πέπονθε δὲ ταὐτὸ τοῦτο τρόπον τινὰ καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα πρὸς τὸν λόγον· ὅλον γάρ τι καὶ ἀδιορίστως σημαίνει, οἷον ὁ κύκλος, ὁ δὲ ὁρισμὸς αὐτοῦ διαιρεῖ εἰς τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα.
Literal Translation:
“Have-suffered but the same this in-a-certain-way also the names in-relation-to the account; a whole for something also indeterminately it-signifies, as for-example the circle, the but definition of-it divides into the according-to each things.”
Translation:
Names too are affected in somewhat the same way in relation to the account; for a name signifies something whole and indeterminate, as “circle” does, while its definition divides it into its particular aspects.
Explanation:
Aristotle now gives an example from language. A simple name, like “circle,” gives us a whole object in an undifferentiated way. A definition, by contrast, analyzes that object and states what makes it what it is. This shows in linguistic form the same movement he has been describing in thought: from a broad, immediate grasp to articulated understanding through division and explanation.
10. καὶ τὰ παιδία τὸ μὲν πρῶτον προσαγορεύει πάντας τοὺς ἄνδρας πατέρας καὶ μητέρας τὰς γυναῖκας, ὕστερον δὲ διορίζει τούτων ἑκάτερον.
Literal Translation:
“also the children the indeed first address all the men fathers and mothers the women, later but distinguish of-these each.”
Translation:
Children too at first call all men fathers and all women mothers, but later they distinguish each of these.
Explanation:
Aristotle ends with an ordinary example from childhood learning. A child begins with broad, undifferentiated categories and only later learns to distinguish correctly between individuals. This makes his method vivid: human knowledge naturally starts with something general and confused, then advances toward what is more precise. The example is simple, but it captures the entire movement of the chapter’s opening argument.
The sources, goals, method, outline, and direction of this lesson are the work of Mr. William C. Michael, O.P., Headmaster of the Classical Liberal Arts Academy. The written copy has been composed from his materials and instructions with the assistance of artificial intelligence tools, and reviewed and approved by him before publication.
