After the above mentioned philosophers, the business with Plato next succeeds, who in many things followed these Pythagoreans, but who also had some peculiar doctrines different from the philosophy of the Italics. For, when he was a young man, associating first of all with Cratylus, and being familiar with the opinions of Heraclitus, that all sensible things are perpetually flowing, and that there is no science respecting them, he afterwards adopted these opinions. But as Socrates employed himself about ethics, and entirely neglected the speculation respecting the whole of nature; In morals, indeed, investigating the universal, and being the first who applied himself two definitions; Hence Plato, approving this his investigation of universals, adopted thus much of his doctrine, that these definitions respect other things, and are not conversant with anything sensible. For he was of opinion, that it is impossible there should be a common definition of any sensible nature, as sensibles are always changing. Things of this kind, therefore, he denominated ideas, but asserted that all sensible things were denominated as different from, and as subsisting according to, these. For, According to him, the multitude of things synonymous is homonymous to forms according to participation; but he only changed the name participation. For the Pythagoreans say that beings are imitations of numbers; but Plato, changing the name, calls them participations of numbers. They omit, however, to investigate in common what the participation or imitation of forms is. Further still, besides things sensible, and forms, they say that the mathematics are things of a middle nature, differing indeed from sensibles in that they are eternal and immovable, but from forms in that they are certain similar multitudes, every form itself being only one thing. But, since forms are causes to other things, he was of the opinion that the elements of these are the elements of beings. He thought, therefore, that the great and the small were principles as matter, but the one as essence. For from these, through the participation of the one, forms are numbers. He asserted, indeed, that the one is essence, and that nothing else is called the one, in this respect speaking in a manner similar to the Pythagoreans; and, like them, he also considered numbers as the causes of essence to other things. But this is peculiar to him, to make the duad instead of the infinite considered as one, and to compose the infinite from the great and the small.
Further still: Plato asserts that numbers are different from things sensible; but the Pythagoreans say that they are things themselves, and do not place mathematics between these. The one, therefore, and numbers, were considered as different from things themselves, and not as the Pythagoreans consider them; and, as well as forms, were introduced in consequence of dialectic investigation. For the more ancient philosophers were not skilled in dialectic. Through the same investigation, also, Plato made the duad to be a different nature from the one, because numbers, except those that rank as first, are aptly generated from it, as from a certain express resemblance of a thing; though, indeed, the contrary to this happens to be the case. For it is not reasonable it should be so. For now they make many things from matter, but form generates once only. But one table appears to be produced from one matter. However, he who introduces form makes many tables. The male, too, is in a similar manner related to the female. For the female is filled from one copulation, but the male fills many. And yet these are imitations of those principles. Plato, therefore, has thus defined respecting the objects of investigation.
But it is evident, from what has been said, that he uses only two causes; That which relates to what a thing is, and that which subsists according to matter. For forms, according to him, are the causes to other things of essence; but the one is the cause of this to forms. And what is this cause which subsists according to matter? It is that subject matter through which forms are said to belong to things sensible; and the one is said to be in forms, because this is the duad, or the great and the small. Further still: he attributes to the elements the cause of subsisting well and ill, each to its proper element; And this, we say, some of the more ancient philosophers, namely Empedocles and Anaxagoras, have investigated. In a brief and summary manner, therefore, we have discussed who those were that have spoken, and how they have spoken, respecting principles and truth.
But, at the same time, we obtain thus much from them, that of those who have spoken concerning a principle and a cause, no one has said anything in addition to what we have delivered in our Physics; but all of them have spoken obscurely, though in a certain respect they appear to have touched upon these two period for some speak of principle as matter, whether they suppose there is one or many principles, and whether they consider principle as body, or as in corporeal: As Plato, when he speaks of the great and the small; Empedocles, of fire and earth, water and air; and Anaxagoras, of the Infinity of similar parts. But all these touched upon a cause of this kind; and besides these, those who have established as a principle either fire or water or that which is more dense than fire, but more attenuated than air; For some assert that the first element is a thing of this kind. These, therefore, had only an obscure conception of this cause; But certain others had some conception when the principle of motion is derived, namely those who make friendship and strife, or intellect, or love, a principle. But no one has clearly assigned the nature and essence of this principle. However, they especially speak respecting it who adopt the hypothesis of forms, and the things which subsist in forms. For neither do they consider forms and the things which forms contain as matter to sensibles, nor as if the principle of motion was derived from thence. For they say that they are rather the cause of immobility, and of things being at rest period but, according to them, forms impart the particular being which each individual of other things possesses; and the one imparts the same to forms. But that, for the sake of which actions, mutations and motions subsist after a certain manner, they denominate a cause; yet they do not assert that it is a cause, nor do they speak of it conformably to what it naturally is. For those who speak of intellect, or friendship, place these causes as a certain good, but do not speak of them as if for the sake of these either being or any generated nature subsists, but as if from them the motions of things were derived. In a similar manner, those who say that the one, or being, is a nature of this kind, assert indeed that it is the cause of essence; yet do not say that anything either is, or is generated, for the sake of this. So that in a certain respect it happens that they assert, and yet do not assert, that the good is a cause of this kind; for they speak not simply, but casually. That we have therefore rightly determined concerning causes, and respecting their number and quality, all these philosophers appear to testify, since they were not able to touch upon any other cause. And, besides this, that principles should be investigated, either all of them in this manner, or some one of four, is evident. But after this it is requisite that we should consider in what manner each of these speaks, and what are the doubts which arise respecting principles themselves.
Notes
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