Classical Rhetoric
Aristotle, Rhetoric. Book I, Chapter 4
In the next place, a distinction must be precisely made respecting each of these, as for instance, what the subjects of consultation are; with what demonstrative citations are conversant; and in the third place what the subjects are about which judgements are employed. In the first place, therefore, it must be assumed what the kind of good or evil is about which he who advises counsels; since he does not give counsel about all things, but about such as may happen to be or not. But with respect to such things as are necessarily either are or will be, or … Continue
Aristotle, Rhetoric. Book I, Chapter 3
With respect to enthymemes, however, there is a great difference, of which nearly all the professors of rhetoric are particularly ignorant, and which is conversant with the dialectic method of syllogisms. For some enthymemes pertain to rhetoric, just as some syllogisms subsist according to the dialectic method; but others pertain to other arts and faculties, some of which are in existence, and others are not yet discovered. Hence, they are not understood by those that hear them, and if rhetoricians employ them more than is fit, they relinquish their own art, and exchange it for some other. But what we … Continue
Aristotle, Rhetoric. Book I, Chapter 2
Now, therefore, we shall endeavour to speak concerning the method itself, [i. e. the rhetorical art] and [show] how, and from what particulars we may be able to obtain the end proposed by this art. Again, therefore, as if defining from the beginning, let us discuss what remains. Let rhetoric then be the power of perceiving in every thing that which is capable of producing persuasion; for this is the employment of no other art; since each of the other arts is doctrinal and persuasive about that which is the subject of its consideration. Thus, for instance, medicine is doctrinal … Continue
Aristotle, Rhetoric. Book I, Chapter 1
Translated by Thomas Taylor (1818); prepared by Guilherme Soares (2021) Rhetoric reciprocates with dialectic [or logic]; for both are conversant with such particulars, as being common may after a manner be known by all men, and pertain to no definite science. Hence, all men in a certain respect participate of both these; for all men to a certain extent endeavour to examine and sustain an argument, to defend and accuse. With respect to the multitude, therefore, some of them do these things casually; but others through custom from habit. Because, however, this is possible in both ways, it is evident … Continue