Aristotle, Sophistical Elenchi

Aristotle, Sophistical Elenchi. Book I, Chapter 1

Concerning sophistical elenchi and those things which appear, indeed, to be elenchi, yet are not, but are  paralogisms, let us now speak, beginning, according to nature, from such things as are first. That some things, therefore, are syllogisms, but that others, though they are not, appear to be so, is evident. For as this takes place in other things through a certain similitude, so likewise in arguments. For with respect to the habit of the body, some have it in a good condition; but others appear to have it, being inflated on account of the race from which they are descended, and decorate themselves conformably to this inflation. And some are beautiful, on account of beauty, but others appear to be so in consequence of adventitious decoration. The like also takes place in things inanimate. For of these, some are silver, and others are gold in reality: but others, though they are not, yet appear so to sense. Thus, substances of the nature of litharge and tin, appear to be silvery; but those which are dyed with gall appear to be golden. After the same manner, with respect to a syllogism and elenchus, one is in reality, and another is not, but appears to be, on account of unskillfulness; for the unskilful contemplate like those who behold objects at a great distance. For a syllogism is from certain things so posited, that something different from the things posited is necessarily collected through the things posited; but an elenchus is a syllogism, with a contradiction of the conclusion. The unskilful, however, do not do this, but appear to do it, from many causes; one of which is a place most conformable to nature, and most popular, viz. throngh the names of things. For since it is not possible to adduce things by themselves, in discourse, but we use names as symbols instead of things, we think that what happens in names also happens in things; just as those are deceived, who are unskilled in calculations. There is not, however, a resemblance: For names and the multitude of sentences are finite; but things are infinite in number. It is necessary, therefore, that the same sentence and one name should signify many things. Hence, as there, those who are not skilful in calculations, are deceived by the scientific, after the same manner in arguments, those who are unskilled in the power of names, are deceived by paralogisms, both when they dispute themselves, and when they hear others dispute. Through this cause, therefore, and other reasons which will be assigned, there may be a syllogism and an elenchus in appearance, when they are not so in reality. Since, however, it is more the endeavour of some to seem to be wise, than to be, and not seem to be wise; for sophistic is apparent wisdom, not being so in reality, and a sophist is one who endeavours to acquire wealth, from apparent, and not real wisdom, it is evident, that it is necessary to these, that they should rather appear to perform the work of wisdom, than to perform it, and not appear to do so. But the business of him who is skilful in any thing is (comparing one thing with one) not to be deceived himself in things which he knows, and to be able to detect another person who deceives. And of these, the one consists in being able to give a reason, and the other in the ability of receiving one. It is necessary, therefore, that those who wish to argue sophistically, should investigate the genus of the before-mentioned arguments; since it is to the purpose. For a power of this kind will cause a man to appear wise, which with these is the object of deliberate choice. That there is, therefore, a certain genus of arguments of this kind, and that those whom
we call sophists aspire after such a power, is evident.

Aristotle, Sophistical Elenchi. Book I, Chapter 2

Let us now, however, show how many species there are of sophistical arguments, from what number of things this power consists, how many parts there are of this treatise, and let us also speak of other things which contribute to this art. In disputation, therefore, there are four genera of arguments, the didactic, the dialectic, the peirastic, or tentative, and the litigious. The didactic, indeed, are those which syllogize from the proper principles of each discipline, and not from the opinions of him who answers; for it is necessary that he who learns should believe. But dialectic arguments, are those which are syllogistic of contradiction from probabilities. The peirastic, are those which syllogize from things which appear probable to him who answers, and which it is necessary for him to know who pretends to possess science; but in what manner is defined in other treatises. And the litigious, are those which are syllogistic, from things which appear to be probable, but which are not so in reality. Concerning didactic and demonstrative arguments, therefore, we have spoken in the Analytics; but concerning which are dialectic and peirastic, we have spoken in other treatises. We must, therefore, now speak concerning those which are agonistic (i.e. contentious) and litigious.

Aristotle, Sophistical Elenchi. Book I, Chapter 3

In the first place, however, it must be assumed what the number is of the objects, to which those direct their attention who contend and strive to vanquish in disputations. But these are five in number, an elenchus, the false, the paradoxical, a solecism; and in the fifth place, to make him with whom they dispute trifle. And this is to compel him frequently to say the same thing; or that which is not, but which appears to be each of these. Hence, that they may appear to confute by an elenchus, is especially the object of their deliberate choice; but, in the second place, that they may show that those with whom they dispute assert something false; in the third place, that they may lead them to something paradoxical; in the fourth place, that they may make them to commit a solecism; and this is from the argument, to make him who answers speak barbarously; and in the last place, that they may compel them frequently to say the same thing.

Aristotle, Sophistical Elenchi. Book I, Chapter 4

But the modes of employing elenchi, or syllogisms of contradiction, are two; for some of them are conversant with diction; but others are without diction. Those, however, which cause the appearance of an elenchus from diction, are six in number; and these are, equivocation, ambiguity, composition, division, accent, and the figure of diction. But the credibility of this is derived from induction and syllogism, as well because if another mode is assumed, it may be referred to some one of these, and because we may signify that which is not the same, in so many modes, by the same names and sentences. Arguments, however, of the following kind are from equivocation; as, that those who know scientifically learn (manthanousin); for grammarians learn those things which they recite from memory. For the verb to learn (manthanein) is homonymous, for it signifies both to understand by using science, and to acquire science. And again, that evil things are good; for ta deonta are good; but things evil are deonta. For
to deon is twofold, viz. that which is necessary, which frequently happens in things that are evil; (for there is a certain evil which is necessary), and we also say that good things are deonia. Farther still, that the same person sits and stands, is well and ill; for he who did rise from his seat, stands, and he who did recover his health, is well. But sitting, he rose; and being ill, be became well. For, that he who is ill, does or suffers any thing, does not signify one thing; but sometimes it signifies him who is now ill, or now sits, and sometimes him who was ill, or who sat before. Except, indeed, that being ill, and he who was ill, obtained health. But he is well, not being ill; and he who was before ill, is now well. Arguments, however, of the following kind, are from ambiguity; to boulesthai labein me tous polemious; And, ar’ o tis ginōskei, touto ginōskei;  for both he who knows, and that which is known, may in this sentence signify the same thing as knowing. And,
ara o orai tis, touto orai; But he sees a pillar; so that the pillar sees. And, ara o su phēs einai, touto so phēs einai; phēs de lithon einai, su ara phēs lithos einai. And, ara esti sigōnia legein; For, to sigōnta legein is twofold; for it signifies, both that he is silent who speaks, and those things which are spoken. There are, however, three modes of arguments from equivocation and ambiguity. One is, when a sentence, or a name, properly signifies many things; as an eagle, and a dog. Another, when we are accustomed thus to speak. A third is, when that which is conjoined signifies many things, but when separated is simply assumed; as, to epistasthai grammata. For each of these, viz. to know, and letters, signjfies, if it should so happen, one thing; but both in conjunction signify many things, viz, either that letters themselve have science, or that another person has a knowledge of letters. Ambiguity, therefore, and equivocation, are contained in these modes. But the following are referred to composition; as, that it is possible for him who sits to walk, and for him who does not write, to write. For it does not signify the same thing to say separately and conjointly, that he who sits may walk, and that he does not write, may write; and in a sirnilar manner this, if some one should conjoin the words, that he who does not write, writes. For it signifies that he has a power by not writing, of writing. But if the words are not conjoined, it signifies, that he has a power when he does not write, of writing. And, he now learns letters, since he learnt what he knows. Again, that he who is able to carry one thing is able to carry many things. The following particulars, however, pertain to division, that five is two and three, and an odd and an even number. And, that which is greater, is equal; for it is so much, and something more. For the same sentence, when divided and conjoined, does not always appear to signify the same thing; as,

Egō se ethēka doulon onta eleutheron.
Pentēkont’ andrōn ekaton lipe dios Achilleus.

But from accent, in discussions which are not committed to writing, it is not easy to form an argument; but this is rather to be effected in writings and poems. Thus, for instance, some defend Homer against those by whom he is accused as having spoken absurdly when he says,

— to men ou kataputhetai ombrōi.

For they solve this by accent, saying, that ou is to be marked with an acute accent. They also defend what is said about the dream of Agamemnon, because Jupiter himself does not say,

— didomen de oi euchos aresthai.

but commanded the dream didonai to give or promise glory to Agamemnon. Things of this kind, therefore, are assumed from accent. But arguments happen from the figure of diction, when that which is not the same, is interpreted after the same manner; as when the masculine is interpreted as feminine; or the feminine as masculine; or the neuter as either of these. Or, again, when quantity is interpreted as quality; or quality as quantity; or the agent as the patient; or the patient as the agent; and other things as they were before divided. For it is possible, that what is not in the category of action, may be signified in the diction, as if it were in it. Thus, to be well, is asserted in a similar form of diction, as to cut, or to build; though the form signifies a certain quality, and to be disposed in a certain way; but the latter signify to do something. And the like also takes place in other things. The elenchi, therefore, which are derived from diction, are formed from these modes.

Aristotle, Sophistical Elenchi. Book I, Chapter 5

Of the paralogisms, however, which are without diction, there are seven species. One, indeed, is from accident. The second is, on account of that which is asserted simply, or not simply, but in a certain respect, or somewhere, or when, or with relation to something. The third is on account of an ignorance of the elenchus. The fourth arises from that which is consequent. The fifth from that being assumed which was investigated in the beginning. The sixth from that which is not a cause, being posited as a cause. The seventh from making many interrogations to be one. Paralogisms, therefore, arising from accident are, when it is required to be granted, that any thing is similarly present with a subject and accident. For since many things are accidental to it, it is not necessary that all these should be present with all the attributes, and the snbject of which they are predicated; for thus all will be the same, as the sophists say. Thus, if Coriscus is different from man, he will be different from himself; for he is a man. Or if he is different from Socrates, but Socrates is a man, they say it is granted, that he is different from man; because it happens that that from which he is said to be different, is a man. But other paralogisms are produced in consequence of some particular thing being said to be simply this, or in a certain respect, and not properly; when that which is predicated partially, is assumed as predicated simply; as, if some one should infer that if that which is not is the object of opinion, that which is not, is. For it is not the same thing, to be a certain thing, and to be simply. Or, again, if some one should infer that being is not, if some one among the number of beings is not ; as, for instance, if man is not. For it is not the same thing, for a certain thing not to be, and simply not to be. But through the vicinity of the diction, there appears to be but a small difference between a certain thing existing and existence, and between a certain thing not existing and non-existence. In a similar manner also, paralogisms are produced from being predicated in a certain respect, and simply. Thus, if an Indian since he is wholly black has white teeth, he is black and not black. Or, if both are in a certain respect present, that at one and the same time contraries are inherent. A paralogism, however, of this kind, may easily be seen by any one in certain sentences. Thus, if some one assuming that an Ethiopian is black, should ask whether his teeth are white; if it is answered that they are white, it may be fancied that it is syllogistically shown that an Ethiopian is black and not black. In some sentences, however, the paralogism is frequently latent; viz. in those things in which when an assertion is made in a certain respect, it seems to follow, that the assertion is also simply made; and in those things in which it is not easy to perceive whether the attribution is appropriate. But a thing of this kind takes place in those particulars in which opposites are similarly inherent; for it seems it must be granted, that either both or neither are simply predicated. Thus, if one half of a certain thing is white, and the other half is black, is the thing itself white or black? Other paralogisms are produced, because it is not defined what a syllogism is, or what an elenchus is, but the definition is omitted. For an elenchus is a contradiction of one and the same thing, not of a name alone, but of a thing, and of a name, not synonymous, but of the same thing, which is necessarily collected from the things granted, that which was investigated in the beginning, not being con-numerated; and is assumed according to the same, with reference to the same thing, in a similar manner, and in the same time. The like also takes place in speaking falsely about a certain thing. Some, however, omitting some one of these, appear to confute by an elenchus; as, that the double and the not double are the same. For two is the double of one, but is not the double of three. Or, if the same thing is the double and not the double of the same thing, yet not according to the same; for according to length it is double, but is not double according to breadth. Or, if it is the double of the same thing, and according to the same, and in a similar manner, yet not at one and the same time. Hence, the elenchus is only apparent. By some one however, this paralogism may be referred to things which pertain to diction. But the paralogisms which are produced from an assumption in the beginning, are, indeed, thus produced, and in as many ways as, that which was investigated in the beginning, can be made the subject of petition. They appear, however, to confute, from the inability of perceiving what is the same, and what is different. But an elenchus, on account of that which is consequent is, from fancying that the consecution reciprocates. For when from the existence of that thing, this thing necessarily is, they also fancy that if this thing is, the other necessarily is; whence also deceptions from sense are produced about opinion. For frequently we take gall for honey, because a yellow colour is consequent to honey. And because it happens that the earth when it rains becomes moist, we also think that it has rained if the earth is moist. This, however, is not necessary. In rhetorical compositions also, the demonstrations which are derived from a sign, are from things consequent. For rhetoricians, when they wish to show that a man is an adulterer, assume that which is consequent, as, that his person was decorated, or that he was seen wandering by night. These things, however, are present with many men, with whom the thing predicated is not present. The like also takes place in syllogistic proofs; and such is the argument of Melissus, that the universe is infinite assuming that the universe is unbegotten; (for nothing can be generated from that which is not) but that which is generated, is generated from a principle, or beginning. If, therefore, the universe was not generated, it had hot a beginning; so that it is infinite. This, however, does not necessarily happen. For it does not follow, that if whatever is generated has a beginning, whatever has a beginning is also generated; neither if he who has a fever is hot, is it necessary that what is hot should have a fever. But from that which is not a cause being assumed as a cause, a paralogism is produced when that which is causeless is assumed, as, if the elenchus was produced on account of it. A thing of this kind, however, happens in syllogisms leading to the impossible; for in these it is necessary to subvert something that is posited. If, therefore, it is enumerated in necessary interrogatories, that the impossible will happen prior to the conclusion, an elenchus will frequently appear to be produced on account of this; as that soul and life are not the same. For if generation is contrary to corruption, a certain generation will also be contrary to a certain corruption; but death is a certain corruption, and is contrary to life; so that life is generation, and to live is to be generated. But this is irnpossible. Soul, therefore, and life are not the same. This, however, is not syllogistically concluded. For the impossible will happen, though someone should not assert that life is the same with soul; but only that life is contrary to death, which is corruption, and that generation is contrary to corruption. Such like arguments, therefore, are not simply unsyllogistic; but they are unsyllogistic with respect to the thing proposed; and a thing of this kind is frequently no less concealed from the interrogators themselves. Such, then, are the arguments which arise from what is consequent, and from that which is not a cause. But paralogisms are produced from two interrogations being assumed as one, when it is latent that there are many, and one answer is given, as if there was one interrogation. In some things, therefore, it is easy to see that there are many interrogations, and that one answer must not be given; as whether is the earth the sea, or the heaven? But in other things, it is less evident; and an answer is given as if there was one interrogation, and they are confuted by an elenchus; or they  assent, because they do not answer what was asked, and appear to be confuted; as, is this and that person a man? Hence, if some one should beat this and that person, he will beat a man, and not men. Again, with respect to those things of which some are good, and others are not good, are all these good, or not good? For whichever is said, it is possible that he who makes the assertion may appear to assert either an elenchus, or what is apparently false. For whether he says that some one of those things which are not good, is good, or that some one of those things which are good is not good, he speaks falsely. But sometimes, certain things being assumed, the elenchus also may be true; as, if some one should grant that things white, naked, and blind, are similarly one and many. For if that is blind, which has not sight, but is naturally adapted to have it; those things also will be blind, which have not sight, but are naturally adapted to have it. When, therefore, one thing has it, but another has not, both will see, or will be blind; which is impossible.

Aristotle, Sophistical Elenchi. Book I, Chapter 6

Either, therefore, apparent syllogisms and elenchi are thus to be divided; or all of them are to be referred to the ignorance of an elenchus, this being assumed as a principle. For all the before-mentioned modes may be analyzed into the definition of an elenchus. And in the first place, indeed, if they are unsyllogistic. For it is necessary that there should be a conclusion from the things posited, so that it may necessarily be said to be, and may not only appear to be. In the second place, according to the parts of definition. For of those paralogisms which are in diction, some arise from a twofold signification, such, for instance, as equivocation, an ambiguous sentence, and a similar figure of diction; for it is usual with all these to signify this particular thing. But composition, division, and accent produce false reasoning, because the sentence is not the same, or the name is different. For it is necessary that this should be the same, as the thing is the same, in order that there may be an elenchus, or a syllogism. Thus, if a garment ought to be concluded, a garment, and not a vestment, ought to be syllogistically concluded. For the latter, indeed, is true, but it is not syllogistically concluded; but yet there is need of interrogation, that it signifies the same thing, by him who investigates the why. The paralogisms, however, which are assumed from accident, become manifest, the syllogism being defined. For it is necessary that there should be the same definition of the elenchus, except that contradiction is added; for an elenchus is a syllogism of contradiction. If, therefore, there is not a syllogism of accident, there will not be an elenchus. For it does not follow, if these things existing, it is necessary that this thing should be, but this thing is white, that it is necessary it should be white on account of syllogism. Nor if a triangle has angles equal to two right, but it happens to it that it is a figure, either the first, or the principle, does it follow that figure, or principle, or that which is first, is a thing of this kind. For the demonstration is not, so far as it is figure, nor so far as it is first; but so far as it is a triangle. And in a similar manner in other things. Hence, if an elenchus is a certain syllogism; the syllogism which is from accident, will not be an elenchus. Hence, however, artists, and, in short, scientific men, are confuted by the unscientific; for they form syllogisms from accident against skilful men. But the unscientific, not being able to divide, grant when they are interrogated, or not granting, fancy they have granted. Paralogisms, however, which are derived from that which is asserted. In a certain respect and simply, are formed because affirmation and negation are not assumed of the same thing. For of that which is in a certain respect white, the negation is, that which in a certain respect is not white; but of that which is simply white, the negation is, that which is simply not white. If, therefore, when it is granted that a thing is in a certain respect white; another person assumes it as if simply said to be white, he does not produce an elenchus; but he appears to produce an elenchus; and he appears to produce it in consequence of the ignorance of what an elenchus is. But those paralogisms are the most manifest of all, which were before mentioned, from the definition of an elenchus; and on this account also, they are thus denominated. For, from the defect of definition, the appearance of an elenchus is produced; and by those who thus divide paralogisms, the defect of definition must be posited, as common to all of them. The paralogisms also which are produced from that which was posited in the beginning being assumed, and those which are derived from that which is not cause being admitted to be a cause, become manifest through definition. For it is necessary that the conclusion should happen, in consequence of the existence of those things which were posited; which is not among things that are not causes. And again, that not being enumerated which was investigated in the beginning, which those paralogisms have not, that subsist on account of requiring as a postulate that which was posited in the beginning. But those paralogisms which are derived from what is consequent, are a part of accident; for that which is consequent, happens. It differs, however, from accident in this, that it is only possible to assume accident in one thing; as, that yellow and honey are the same, and also whiteness and a swan; but that which is derived from what is consequent, is always perceived in many things. For things which are the same with one and the same thing, we consider as the same with each other; whence an elenchus is produced, which is denominated from what is consequent. This, however, is not entirely true; as, if whiteness is from accident; for snow and a swan are the same, so far as pertains to whiteness. Or, again, as in the argument of Melissus, who assumes that to have been generated, and to have a beginning, are the same. Or that to become equal things, and to receive the same magnitude, are the same. For because that which was generated had a beginning; they also require it should be granted that what had a beginning was generated; as if these two things, that which was generated, and that which was finite, were the same, because each has a beginning. In a similar manner also, in things which are made equal, if those things which receive one and the same magnitude, become equal; those likewise which become equal, receive one magnitude. Hence, that which is consequent is assumed. Since, thcrefore, the elenchus which is derived from accident, is perceived in the ignorance of an elenchus; it is evident that this is also the case with the elenchus derived from what is consequent. This also is to be considered in another way. But the paralogisms which are derived from making many interrogations to be one consist in this, that we do not distinctly unfold, or that we do not divide the definition of the proposition. For the proposition is one thing of one. For there is the same definition of a thing which is one only and simply; as of man, and of one man only; and in a similar manner in other things. If, therefore, it is one proposition only, which requires one thing of one, an interrogation of this kind, will be simply a proposition. But since a syllogism is from propositions; and an elenchus is a syllogism; an elenchus also will consist from propositions. Hence, if a proposition is one thing of one, it is evident that he who errs in the definition of syllogism is also ignorant of an elenchus. For that appaars to be a proposition, which is not a proposition. If, therefore, he gives an answer, as if to one interrogation, it will be an elenchus; but if he does not, and yet appears to have given an answer, it will be an apparent elenchus. Hence, all the modes fall into the ignorance of an elenchus; those from diction, because contradiction is apparent, which was the peculiarity of an elenchus; but the rest, on account of the definition of syllogism.

Aristotle, Sophistical Elenchi. Book I, Chapter 7

Those paralogisms, however, deceive us, which are derived from equivocation, and an ambiguous sentence; in consequence of not being able to distinguish that which is multifariously predicated. For it is not easy to divide or distinguish some things; such, for instance, as, the one, being, and same. But those which are from composition and division are produced in consequence of fancying that there is no difference between a conjoined and divided sentence, as is the case in most things. And in a similar manner with respect to the paralogisms which are derived from accent. Eor either in nothing, or not in many things, a sentence with intension, and a sentence with remission, appear to signify the same thing. But those paralogisms which are from the figure of diction, are on account of the similitude of diction. For it is difficult to distinguish what things are predicated after the same, and what are predicated in a different manner; (for he who is able to do this, is almost near to the perception of truth, and he especially knows how to assent) since we apprehend that every thing which is predicated of a certain thing, is this particular definite thing, (tode ti), and is assumed by us, as one thing. For this particular definite thing, and being, appear to be especially consequent to the one, and to essence. Hence, this mode of paralogism is to be posited among those fallacies which consist in diction. In the first place, because deception is in a greater degree produced from considering with others, than from considering by ourselves. For the consideration with others, is through discourse; but that which is by ourselves, is no less through the thing itself. In the next place, also, it happens that we are deceived by ourselves, vihen the consideration of things is effected in words. Again, deception is from similitude; but similitude is from diction. But the paralogisms which are from accident deceive, because we are not able to distinguish same and different, one and many; nor to assign to what attributes, and to what thing all these are accidental. In a similar manner, also, with respect to those paralogisms which are derived from what is consequent; for that which is consequent is a certain part of accident. Farther still, in many things it appears to be, and is required as a postulate in this manner, that if this thing is not separated from that, neither will that be separated from this. But those paralogisms which are from a defect of definition, and those which are from a predication in a certain respect and simply deceive, in consequence of the difference being small. For we concede universally, as if the terms a certain thing, or in a certain respect, or simply, or after what manner, or now, signified nothing. The like also takes place in those paralogisms, which assume the thing investigated in the beginning, and in those which are not causes, and such as make many interrogations, as if they were one. For in all these the deception arises from smallness. For we do not accurately distinguish either the definition of the proposition, or of the syllogism, from the before-mentioned cause.

Aristotle, Sophistical Elenchi. Book I, Chapter 8

Since, however, we have assigned the causes from which apparent syllogisms are produced, we shall also have the causes from which sophistical syllogism:1s and elenchi may be produced. 1 call, however, a sophistical elenchus and syllogism, not only a syllogism and elenchus which are apparent but not real, but also the syllogism and elenchus which are real, yet falsely appear to be appropriate to a thing. Of this kind are those which do not confute according to the thing, and expose the ignorant, which was the province of the peirastic art. But the peirastic art is a part of dialectic, which is able syllogistically to collect what is false, in consequence of the ignorance of him who admits the argument. Sophistical elenchi, however, though they syllogistically infer contradiction, yet they do not make it manifest whether the opponent is ignorant; for the sophists by these arguments impede the man of science. But that we obtain these sophistical elenchi by the same method, is evident, for from those things through which it appears to the hearers, that the subject of interrogation is syllogistica1ly collected, from these, the same thing may also appear to him who answers. Hence, either through all, or some of these, the syllogisms will be false; for that which some one not being interrogated, fancies he has granted, he will also grant when interrogated; except that in some things it will at the same time happen, that what is deficient will be the subject of interrogation, and what is false will be detected; as in the paralogisms which are from diction and solecism. If, therefore, paralogisms of contradiction arise from an apparent elenchus, it is evident that false syllogisms will be derived from as many places as an apparent elenchus. But an apparent elenchus is produced from the parts of a true elenchus; for each part failing, there will appear to be an elenchus; that which is assumed, because the conclusion does not happen in consequence of the reasoning, viz. that which endeavours to lead to the impossible; also that which makes two interrogations to be one, from the proposition being erroneously assumed; that which assumes what is from accident, in the place of that which is per se; and a part of this which is derived from what is consequent. Farther still, not to happen in the thing, but in the discussion of it; afterwards, instead of assuming contradiction universally, according to the same, with reference to the same thing, and after the same manner to assume it in a certain thing, or to err according to each of these; and again, because that which was investigated in the beginning being enumerated, it is assumed as granted. Hence, we shall be in possession of those things from which paralogisms are produced; for they will not be produced from a greater number of places, but they will all originate from the above-mentioned places. A sophistical, elenchus, however, is not simply an elenchus, but against a certain person; and the same thing must be said of a sophistical syllogism. For unless it is assumed, that what is derived from the homonymous, signifies one thing; and that what is derived from a similar figure of diction, alone signifies this particular thing; and others after the same manner, there will neither be elenchi, nor syllogisms, neither simply, nor against him who is interrogated. But if this is assumed, there will be, indeed, elenchi and syllogisms against him who is interrogated; but simply, there will not be. For they do not assume that which signifies one thing, but that which appears to signify it, and they assume only  from this person who answers.

Aristotle, Sophistical Elenchi. Book I, Chapter 9

It is not, however, proper to endeavour to assume from how many places those are confuted, who are confuted by elenchi, without the science of all things. But this is the province of no one art. For there are perhaps infinite sciences; so that there are also infinite demonstrations. But there are likewise true elenchi. For in such things as it is possible to demonstrate, it is also possible to confute him who introduces a thesis which is a contradiction of the truth. Thus, if he should assert that the diameter of a square is commensurable with the side, some one may confute him, by demonstrating that it is incommensurable; so that it will be requisite to have a scientific knowledge of all things. For some elenchi will be from geometrical principles, and the conclusions of these; others will be from medical principles; and others from the principles of other sciences. False clenchi, also, in a similar manner rank among infinites. For according to every art there is a false syllogism; as, in geometry, a geometrical, and in medicine, a medical false syllogism. But I denominate according to art, that which is according to the principles of art. It is evident, therefore, that places are not to be assumed of all elenchi, but of those only which pertain to dialect; for these are common to every art and power. It is, indeed, the province of the man of science, to survey the elenchus which is in each science, whether it is only apparent, or real, and on what account it is; but the elenchus which is assumed from things
common, and does not fall under any art, pertains to him who is skilled in dialectic. For if we are in the possession of the particulars from which probable syllogisms, about any thing, are formed, we shall also
be in possession of the particulars, from which probable elenchi are produced; for an elenchus is a syllogism of contradiction. Hence, an elenchus is either one or two syllogisms of contradiction. We shall be in possession, therefore, of the number of places from which elenchi of this kind are derived. And if we are in possession of this, we shall also have the solutions of them; for the objections of these are solutions. We shall likewise be in possession of the number of places, from which apparent elenchi are produced; not of those which are apparent to every one, but of those which seem to be elenchi to certain persons. For places are indefinite, if any one considers from what particulars they appear to the multitude to be produced. Hence, it is evident, that it is the province of one skilled in dialectic, to be able to assume from what number of particulars, through common propositions, a real or apparent elenchus, either dialectic, or apparently dialectical, or peirastic, are produced.

Aristotle, Sophistical Elenchi. Book I, Chapter 10

That, however, is not a difference of arguments, which it is asserted to be by some, viz. that some arguments pertain to name, and others to the conception of the mind; for it is absurd to apprehend that some arguments belong to a name, but that others and not the same, belong to the conception of the mind. For what else is it for an argument not to pertain to the conception of the mind, than for him who argues not to use a name in that signification in which it would be admitted by him who was interrogated, and who fancies that the interrogation was was made in that sense of the word? But this very thing also pertains to name; and to the conception of the mind, when it is understood by the opponent in the signification in which it was admitted by him who answers. If, therefore, some one, when a name signifies many things fancies that it signifies one thing, i.e. both be who interrogates, and he who is interrogated; (as, perhaps being, or the one signifies many things, but also he who answers, and Zeno, who interrogates thinking it to be one, interrogate and answer, and the argument is, that all things are one) — in this case, the disputation pertains to the name, and to the conception of him who is interrogated. But if some one fancies that it signifies many things, it is evident, that the disputation does not pertain to the conception of the mind. For in the first place, that which pertains to name and conception is conversant with those arguments which signify many things. And in the  second place, it may be adapted by any one who answers. For to pertain to the conception of the mind, does not consist in argument, but in him who answers being disposed in a certain manner, to those things which are granted. Farther still, it is possible that all these arguments may pertain to name. For to pertain to name is here, nothing else than not to pertain to the conception of the mind. For unless all these arguments may be referred hither, there will be certain others, which will neither pertain to name, nor to conception; but they say, that all arguments are to be referred to one of these genera and dividing, they assert that all of them pertain either to name, or to conception, and that there are no other besides these. With respect, however, to such syllogisms as are derived from a multifarious signification, some of these are not assumed from name. For it is absurdly said, that all the fallacies which are from diction, pertain to name; but there are, indeed, certain paralogisms, which are not produced, because he who answers is disposed in a certain manner towards these, but because the argument contains an interrogation of this kind, i.e. which signifies many things. In short, it is absurd, immediately to discuss an elenchus, and not prior to this a syllogism; for an elenchus is a syllogism. Hence, prior to the discussion of a false elenchus, it is necessary to discuss a syllogism; for an elenchus of this kind, is an apparent syllogism of contradiction. Hence, too, the cause of deception is either in the syllogism, or in contradiction, (for it is necessary that contradiction should be added) but sometimes it is in both, when the elenchus is apparent, and not real. But the cause of this
deception in contradiction, and not in syllogism, is, when some one asserts that he does not speak who is silent. And the cause of this deception, that some one may give that which he has not is in both,
(i.e. in contradiction and syllogism). But that the poetry of Homer is a figure, because it is a circle, is in syllogism. And that which errs in neither, is a true syllogism. That we may return, however, whence we digressed, do mathematical arguments pertain to the conception of the mind, or not? And if it should seem to some one, that a triangle signifies many things, and he should grant that it has angles equal to two right, not so far as it is figure of which this is concluded, does this discussion pertain to the conception of his mind, or not? Again, if a name signifies many things, but he does not understand, nor fancy that it does, how is it possible that this disputation should not pertain to the conception of the mind? Or, in what manner is it requisite to interrogate, unless so that some one may afterwards ask him who admits the division, whether
it is possible for him who is silent to speak, or not, or whether it partly is not, and partly is possible? If, therefore, some one should grant that it is by no means possible, but another person should contend that
it is, will not the disputation be against the conception of the mind? Though this disputation appears to be referred to those arguments, which originate from name. There is not, therefore, a certain genus of arguments which pertain to the conception of the mind. But some pertain to name; yet all are not such, I do not mean to say, those which are true elenchi, but neither those which are only apparent. For there are apparent elenchi, which are not from diction; such as the elenchus from accident, and some others. If some one, however, should think fit to divide as follows: viz. I say, that he who is silent may speak, partly in this, and partly in that way; in the first place, thus to think is absurd; for sometimes the subject of interrogation does not appear to subsist multifariously; and it is impossible for any one to divide that, which he does not conceive to be multifarious. In the next place, what else will to teach be? For it will cause the manner in which a thing subsists to become manifest to him who neither considered, nor knew, nor apprehended that it is predicated after another manner. For what should prevent this being done in things which are not double? As, for instance, are the monads in four equal to the duads? But the duads are inherent, partly in this, and partly in that way. And, is there one science of contraries, or not? But of contraries, some are known, and others are unknown. Hence, he appears to be ignorant, who thinks that to teach is one thing, and to discuss another; and that it is necessary, that he who teaches should not interrogate, but should himself unfold; but that he who disputes should interrogate.

Aristotle, Sophistical Elenchi. Book I, Chapter 11

Again, it is not the province of one who demonstrates, but of one who makes trial, to affirm or deny. For the peirastic art, is a certain dialectic. Hence, it makes all things the subject of its consideration, and surveys not him who possesses knowledge, but him who is ignorant, and pretends that he knows. He, therefore, who in reality surveys things which are common, is skilled in dialectic; but he who does this only apparently, is a sophist. With respect also to a litigious and sophistical syllogism, there is a twofold genus. One is that which appears to be a syllogism about those things with which peirastic dialectic is conversant, although the conclusion should be true; for it deceives in assigning the why. In the other genus are those paralogisms, which, though they are not according to the method of each thing, yet appear to be according to art. For false descriptions are not litigious, (since paralogisms are according to those things which are subjected to art) not
even if there is a certain false description about a true conclusion; such as the false description of Hippocrates, and the quadrature of the circle through lunulae. But as Bryso squared the circle, though it should be squared by his method, yet because it is not according to the thing, on this account it is sophistical. Hence, the apparent syllogism about these things, is a litigious argument; for it appears to be according to the thing; so that it is fallacious and unjust. For as the injustice which is in contests, has a certain form of justice and is a certain unjust combat, thus also contradiction is an unjust litigious combat. For there, those who make conquest entirely the object of previous choice, try all things; and here, those who are contentious. Those, therefore, who are such for the sake of victory itself, appear to be litigious men, and lovers of strife; but those who are so for the sake of the renown which contributes to gain, are sophists. For the sophistic art, as we have said, is a certain power of obtaining wealth, from apparent wisdom. Hence, sophists desire an apparent demonstration. And the lovers of strife, indeed, and sophists, employ the same arguments, but not for the sake of the same things. And the same argument will be both sophistical and litigious, yet not according to the same; but so far as it is for the sake of apparent victory, it is litigious; and so far as it is for the sake of apparent wisdom, it is sophistical. For the sophistical art, is a certain apparent, and not real wisdom. But he who is litigious is in a certain respect with reference to him who is skilled in dialectic, as he who makes a false description, is to the geometrician. For he who is litigious, paralogizes from the same things with dialectic; just as he who makes a false description subsists with reference to a geometrician. He, however, is not litigious, because he describes falsely from principles and conclusions which are subject to art; but it is evident, that he who is subjected to dialectic, is with respect to other things contentious. Thus, for instance, the quadrature of the circle through lunulre, is not litigious; but the quadrature of Bryso is litigious. And it is not possible to refer the one except to geometry alone, because it is from the proper principles of geometry: but it is possible to transfer the other against many, who do not know what is possible, and what is impossible in every thing; for they accord. Or, as Antiphon squared the circle. Or, if some one should not grant that it is better to walk after supper, on account of the argument of Zeno, the reason is not geometrical; for it is common. If, therefore, he who is litigious, subsists with reference who makes a false description, with reference to the geometrician, a litigious syllogism will not be among false descriptions. Now, however, he who is skilled in dialectic, is not in any definite genus, nor does he demonstrate any thing, nor is he such as the universal philosopher. For neither are all things in one certain genus; nor, if they were, is it possible that beings should be contained under the same principles. Hence, no one of those arts which demonstrate a certain nature, is interrogative; for it is not possible that each of the parts of contradiction should be granted; since a syllogism is not produced from both. But dialectic is interrogative; and if it should demonstrate, though not all things, yet it would not interrogate things first, and proper principles. For the opponent not conceding, he would no longer have arguments from which he would be able to speak against the objection. Dialectic also is peirastic. For the peirastic art, is not such as geometry, but may be possessed by an unlearned man. For it is possible that he who is ignorant of a thing, may make trial of one who is similarly ignorant, if he concedes, not from things which he knows, nor from peculiarities, but from things consequent; which are such that nothing hinders, but that he who knows them may be ignorant of the peirastic art; and it is necessary that he who does not know them must be ignorant
of the art. Hence, it is evident, that the peirastic art, is the science of nothing definite; and on this account, it is conversant with all things. For all arts likewise use certain common things. Hence, all men, and even idiots, after a certain manner use dialectic, and the peirastic art; for all men endeavour to a certain extent to form a judgment of those sentences which announce any thing. But these are common. For these men have no less a knowledge of these, though they appear to speak very foreign from the purpose. All men, therefore, confute; for inartificially they participate of this, with which dialectic is artificially conversant; and he is skilled in dialectic, who is peirastic in the syllogistic art. Since, however, these are many, and are predicated of all things, yet are not of such a kind as to be contained in a certain nature and genus, but as negations; but other things are not such, but are peculiarities; hence, from these, trial may be made about all things and that there is a certain art, and that it is not such as those arts which demonstrate. Hence, he who is litigious, does not entirely subsist after the same manner as he who makes a false description; for he who is litigious, is not paralogistic from principles of a certain definite genus, but is conversant with every genus. These, therefore,
are the modes of sophistical elenchi. But it is not difficult to see, that it belongs to him who is skilled in dialectic, to make these the object of contemplation, and to be able to effect these. For the method about propositions comprehends the whole of this theory. And thus much concerning apparent elenchi.

Aristotle, Sophistical Elenchi. Book I, Chapter 12

With respect, however, to showing that something is falsely asserted, and bringing an argument to something inopinable, (for this was the second object of sophistical deliberate choice), in the first place, indeed, this especially happens from inquiring after a certain manner, and through interrogation. For to make an interrogation to nothing definitely posited, is adapted to the investigation, of these things; for those who speak casually err in a greater degree; and they speak casually, who have nothing proposed. To ask many questions also, though that should be definite, against which the discussion is made, and to require that he who answers should assert what appears to him to be the truth, produces a certain abundance of arguments for the purpose of leading to the inopinable, or the false; and whether being interrogated, he asserts or denies some one of these things, he should be led to those particulars against which an abundance of arguments may be supplied. Now, however, it is less possible to injure through these, than formerly; for now the question is
asked, What has this to do with the thing proposed in the beginning? The element, however, of obtaining either something false, or inopinable, is not immediately to interrogate against any thesis, but to assert the interrogation is made through the desire of learning; for this consideration makes a place for argument. But for the purpose of evincing that something false is asserted, this is a proper sophistical place, viz. to lead the opponent to those things against which an abundance of arguments may be supplied. But it will be possible to do this both properly and improperly, as was before observed. Again, for the purpose of asserting paradoxes, it is requisite to consider from what genus of philosophers he is who disputes, and afterwards to ask what that is which the philosophers of that class assert paradoxical; for with each sect of philosophers, there is something of this kind. But the element of these, is to assume the theses of the several sects in the propositions. An appropriate solution, however, of these is to be adduced, for the purpose of evincing that the inopinable does not happen from the argument; but this is always the wish of him who contends. Farther still, arguments also must be derived from volitions, and from apparent opinions; for they do not wish and say the same things; but they employ the most decorous words, and wish things which appear to be profitable. Thus, they say it is necessary rather to die well, than to live pleasantly; and to be poor justly, than to be rich basely; but they wish the contrary. He, therefore, who speaks conformably to volitions, must be led to apparent opinions; but he who speaks conformably to these, must be led to concealed volitions. For it is necessary to speak paradoxes in both ways; since they assert what is contrary either to apparent, or to unapparent opinions. The place, however, of causing paradoxes to be asserted, is most widely extended, (ss Callicles in the Georgias of Plato is introduced saying, and to which allt the ancients assent), from a subsistence according to nature, and according to law. For they say that nature and law are contraries; and that justice, according to law, indeed, is beautiful, but according to nature is not beautiful. It is necessary, therefore, to oppose him according to law, who says that justice is according to nature; but to lead him to nature, who says that it is according to law. For in whichever of these two ways it is said to subsist, it is paradoxical. But according to them, that which is according to nature, is true; and that which is according to law, is that which appears to the multitude. Hence, it is evident that they, in the same manner as those who now dispute, endeavoured to confute him who answers, or to make him assert paradoxes. Some interrogations, however, have on both sides an inopinable answer; as, whether it is proper to obey wise men, or a father? And, are those things to be done which are advantageous, or those which are just? And, is it more eligible to be injured; or to injure? But it is necessary to lead to conclusions which are contrary to the opinions of the multitude and the wise. And if, indeed, some one should so speak as those who are conversant with disputations, he ought to be led to conclusions contrary to the multitude; but if he should speak as the multitude, he ought to be led to conclusions contrary to those who are conversant with disputations. For the wise, indeed, say, that the happy man is necessarily just; but it seems to the multitude inopinable, that a King should not be happy. But thus to collect things inopinable, is the same thing as to lead to what is contrary to nature and law. For law is the opinion of the multitude; but wise men speak according to nature, and according to truth. And it is necessary, indeed, to investigate paradoxes from these places.

Aristotle, Sophistical Elenchi. Book I, Chapter 13

With respect, however, to being the cause of nugacity in a person, what nugacity is, we have already shown. But all such arguments wish to effect this; if it is of no consequence, whether a name, or a sentence, is adduced. For this being admitted, the sophist thus argues: The double, and the double of the half, are the same thing. If, therefore, the double is the double of the half, it will be the double of the half of the half. And again, if instead of the word double, the words the double of the half, are posited, it will be thrice said, the double of the half of the half of the half. And, is desire therefore, the desire of the pleasant? But this is the appetite of the pleasant; desire, therefore, is the appetite of the pleasant of the pleasant. All such arguments, however, are among the number of things which are relatives, where not only the genera of them, but also the things themselves, are predicated with reference to something, and are referred to one and the same thing. Thus, appetite is the appetite of something; desire is the desire of something; and the double is the double of something, and is the double of the half. These arguments also have a place in things the essence of which is not in reality among relatives, but, in short, of which there are habits or passions, or something of this kind is manifested in the definition of them, when those things are predicated of them. Thus, the odd is a number having a middle; but there is an odd number; there is, therefore, a number number having a middle. And, if to simou is a concavity of nose; but there is a concave nose; there is, therefore, nose nose concave. Fallacies of this kind, however, sometimes appear to produce nugacity, but do not in reality, because the inquiry is not added, whether the double considered by itself signifies something or nothing. And if it signifies any thing, whether it signifies the same as that which is conjoined, or has a different signification; but the conclusion is immediately adduced; and in consequence of the same name, there appears to be the same thing, and the same signification.

Aristotle, Sophistical Elenchi. Book I, Chapter 14

But with respect to solecism, what it is we have before shown. Sometimes, however, it is possible to produce a solecism; and not producing, to appear to produce it; and producing, not to appear to do so; as Protagoras said, if mēnis (anger), and pēlēx (a helmet), are of the masculine gender. For he who says oulomenēn (perni-cious), commits a solecism according to him, but to others does not appear to commit it. But he who says oulomenon, appears, indeed, to commit a solecism, but does not. It is evident, therefore, that a certain art is able to effect this. Hence, many arguments which do not in syllogizing produce a solecism, appear to produce it, as happens to be the case in elenchi. Nearly, however, all apparent solecisms are from hoc; and when the case neither signifies masculine nor feminine, but that which is between. For hic signifies the masculine; but hac the feminine; and hoc ought, indeed, to signify that which is between, but frequently signifies either of these; as, for instance, what is this? Calliope, wood, Corsicus. All the cases, therefore, of the masculine and feminine gender, differ; but of that which is between, some differ, and other do not. Hence, frequently when hoc is given, they syllogize as if it were said hunc. And in a similar manner, they
assume one case for another. But a paralogism is produced, because hoc is common to many cases. For hoc signifies, at one time, hic, and at another time hunc. It is necessary, however, that it should signify alternately, with the verb est hic, but with esse hunc; as, for instance, est Corsicus, esse Corsicum. The like takes place in feminine nouns; and also in those things which are called okeuē (furniture), but which have a feminine or masculine inflexion. For those which terminate in o and v have alone the inflexion of okeuē; as xulon (wood), schoinon (a rope). But those which do not thus terminate, have the inflexion of the masculine or feminine gender; some of which we refer to ta skeuē; as askos (a bladder) is a masculine noun; but klinē (a bed) is a feminine noun. Hence, also, in things of this kind, est and esse produce a difference, after the same manner. In a certain respect, also, a solecism is similar to the elenchi which are so called, because things
which are not similar, are similarly assumed. For as in them, an elenchus happens to be produced in things, so in these a solecism is committed in words. For man and white are both things and words. It is evident, therefore, that an endeavour must be made that the solecism may be syllogistically concluded from the before-mentioned cases. Hence, these which have been enumerated, are the species of contentious arguments, and the parts of the species, and the modes.

Aristotle, Sophistical Elenchi. Book I, Chapter 15

It contributes, however, not a little to concealment, if those things are arranged in a certain respect, which pertain to interrogation, in the same manner as in dialectic interrogations. After the above-mentioned particulars, therefore, these must be first discussed. But one thing which contributes to confutation by an elenchus is prolixity; for it is difficult to survey many things at once. And for the purpose of prolixity, the before-mentioned elements must be employed. Another thing which contributes is celerity; for those who perceive slowly, perceive less. Anger, also, and contention contribute; for those who are disturbed, are less able to observe every thing. But the elements of exciting anger are, for a man to render himself obviously willing to act unjustly, and conduct himself in a manner perfectly impudent. Farther still, to arrange interrogations alternately; whether some one has many arguments for the purpose of proving the same thing; or for the purpose of showing that they subsist in one way, and not in another. For at the same time it will happen that the opponent will direct his attention either to many things, or to such as are contrary. In short, every thing, which we have before said contributes to concealment, is also useful to contentious arguments. For concealment is for the sake of being latent; and to be latent is for the sake of deception. But against those who deny whatever they think will contribute to the argument, he who interrogates must either interrogate from negation, as if he wished to assume the contrary, or the interrogation must be made equally from each part of contradiction. For it being immanifest what the interrogator wishes to assume, those who answer will be less indignant. When, however, some one concedes the several particulars partially, by making an induction of universal, frequently an interrogation must not he made, but that universal must be used as granted. For sometimes those who answer think they have conceded, and appear to the auditors, in consequence of making mention of induction, as if the several particulars have not been interrogated in vain. But in those things in which universal is not signified by some name, similitude must be used as it may be expedient. For similitude is frequently latent. In order, however, to assume a proposition, it is requisite to niake inquiry by a comparison of the contrary; as, if it should be necessary to assume, that a father is to be obeyed in all things, it must be asked whether it is necessary to be obedient to parents in all things, or to disobey them in all things? And if it is answered that it is necessary frequently to obey them, it must be asked whether many things are to be conceded to them, or a few? For if it is necessary to be obedient to parernts it will appear that many things are rather to be conceded to them than a few. For when contraries are placed near to each other, they will appear to men to be great and greater, and worse and better. That sophistical false accusation, however, of those who interrogate, when not syllogistically concluding any thing, they do not make the extreme an object of interrogation, but conclusively say, as if syllogizing, it is not, therefore, this and this, very much and frequently causes some one to appear to be confuted by an elenchus. It is also sophistical, when a paradox is posited, to require that what appears to be the truth should be answered, that being proposed which appeared to be true from the beginning, and in things of this kind to ask, whether does it appear soto you? For itis necessary, if the interrogation is among the number of those things from which a syllogism is formed, that either an elenchus, or a paradox, should be produced, or that it should have the form of an elenchus; an elenchus, indeed, if the interrogation is conceded; but that which is inopinable, if he who answers  neither concedes, nor says that it appears to him to be true; and the form of an elenchus, if he does not concede, but acknowledges that it appears to him to be true. Farther still, as in rhetorical disputations, so likewise in such as are elenchtic contrarieties must in a similar manner be surveyed, either those which are contrary to what is said by him who answers, or to what he acknowledges is well said or done; or which are contrary to those things that appear to be such, or to similars; and either to most, or to all of these. But as those who answer frequently, when they are confuted by an elenchus, assert that the proposition in which they appear to be confuted has a twofold meaning, and that they deny it in one sense, and it is approved by the opponent in another, this method must also be adopted by those who interrogate, against objectors, that if the proposition happens in one way, and does not happen in another, they admit it only in one way; as Cleophon does in his Mandrobulus. It is likewise requisite, by receding from the proposed disputation, to cut off the remaining parts of the arguments; and he who answers should, in consequence of foreseeing, anticipate in objecting and speaking. Sometimes, also, an argument must be urged against sqmething else different from that which was asserted, assuming that, if some one has not an argument against the proposed problem; which Lycophron did, when the thing proposed was to make an encomium on the lyre. Against those, however, who require that arguments should be adduced against a certain thing, (since it appears necessary that the cause should be assigned; but certain things being mentioned, the opponent will be more cautious) it must be said that it universally happens in elenchi, that he who argues asserts that he wishes to prove the affirmation of that which is denied, and the negation of that which is affirmed, rather than definitely to say that he proves one part of contradictions; as, for instance, this, that there is the same science of contraries, or, that there is not the same. It is not proper, however, to interrogate the conclusion as if it were a proposition. But some things are not to be interrogated, but must be used as things acknowledged. From what places, therefore, interrogations are derived, and how interrogations must be made in contentious associations, has been shown.

Aristotle, Sophistical Elenchi. Book II, Chapter 1

In the next place, we must speak concerning responsion, and in what manner it is proper to solve sophistical arguments, what such arguments are, and in what their utility consists. They are useful, then, to philosophy for two causes. In the first place, indeed, since they are for the most part assumed from diction, they enable us to know, in a better manner, in how many ways every thing is predicated, and what kind of things happen similarly, and what in a different manner, both in things, and in names. In the second place, they contribute to the inquiries which some one may make by himself. For he who is easily deceived from paralogism by others, and does not perceive this, may also himself frequently suffer this from himself. In the third and remaining place, they contribute to renown; in consequence of appearing through these, to be exercised in every thing, and not to be unskilful in any thing. For he who, engaging in disputation with another, blames his arguments, without being able to determine any thing concerning their futility, produces a suspicion of appearing indignant, not on account of the truth, but on account of unskilfulness. It is evident, however, in what manner those who answer should oppose such like arguments, since we have already rightly shown from what places paralogisms are derived, and have sufficiently detected the frauds of the sophists in interrogating. But it is not the same thing, assuming an argument, to see and dissolve its futility, and be able to oppose with celerity him who answers. For that which we know, we are frequently ignorant of, when it is transposed. Again, as in other things, the more swift and the more slow, become increased by exercise, thus also it is in arguments. Hence, if any thing is manifest to us, but we have not made it the subject of meditation, we are frequently on certain occasions deprived of its use. It sometimes, however, happens in elenchi, as in mathematical diagrams; for having analyzed them, we are sometimes unable again to compose them. For knowing the cause of the connection of the argument, we are incapable of dissolving it.

Aristotle, Sophistical Elenchi. Book II, Chapter 2

In the first place, therefore, as we say that we must sometimes prefer to syllogize probably rather than truly; thus, also, we must solve rather probably than truly. For, in short, we must contend with litigious men, and consider them not as confuting, but as appearing to confute; since we do not say, that they conclude any thing syllogistically. Hence, he who answers, must endeavour that his arguments may not appear to syllogize and be confuted. For if an elenchus is a contradiction not homonymous, collected from certain assumptions, them will be no necessity of dividing against things ambiguous, and equivocation; for he does not make a syllogism, with whom such things are the subjects of interrogation. A previous division, however, is to be made, for no other reason, than because the conclusion appears to have the form of an elenchus. We must, therefore, be cautious, not of being confuted, but of appearing to be confuted. Indeed, ambiguous interrogations, those which subsist on account of equivocation, and other deceptions of this kind, obscure a true elenchus, and cause it to be immanifest whether some one is confuted by an elenchus, or not. For since it is possible at the end, a conclusion being made, for him who answers to say, that the interrogator has denied, not what the answerer affirmed, but has interrogated homonymously, or ambiguously, and, therefore, that he affirms one thing, and the interrogator assumes another, and denies in the conclusion, though it especially contributes to the same thing; — hence, it is immanifest whether he is confuted by an elenchus. For it is imrnanifest whether he who answers the sophist asserts what is true. But if dividing, he should ask the homonymous, or the ambiguous, the elenchus will not be immanifest. That also should be done which litigious interrogators now less require than formerly, viz. that he who is interrogated should answer yes or no. Now, however because those who inquire do not interrogate well, it is necessary that he who is interrogated should add something to the answer, thus correcting the faultiness of the answer. For if he who interrogates distinguishes sufficiently, it is necessary that he who answers, should say yes or no. But if some one should apprehend that to be an elenchus which subsists according to equivocation, it will not be possible for him who answers to avoid being confuted by an elenchus. For in visible things it is necessary to deny the name which he affirms, or to affirm the name which he denies. For in the way in which some correct, there is no advantage. For they say, Coriscus is not musical and immusical; but this Coriscus is musical, and this Coriscus is immusical; since that Coriscus is musical, and that this Coriscus is musical will be the same sentence; which he who answers at one and the same time affirms and denies. Perhaps, however, the words this Coriscus do not signify one and the same thing; because neither has the name Coriscus one signification. Hence, it is of no consequence, whether it is said Coriscus, or this Coriscus. If, however, he assigns to the one to assert simply, but to the other he adds the words a certain thing, or this thing, it will be absurd; for it will not be more inherent in the one than in the other; since it is of no consequence to which it is attributed. Since, however, it is immanifest whether he who does not distinguish the ambiguity, is confuted by an elenchus, or not; for in disputations it is allowed to make a distinction; it is evident, that he who does not distinguish, but simply grants the interrogation, errs. Hence, the assertion of him who answers, if not he himself, is similar to a confuted elenchus. But it frequently happens that those who see the ambiguity are unwilling to distinguish, on account of the copiousness of those who propose things of this kind, that they may not appear to be morose in every thing; and in the next place, they frequently meet with a paradox, not thinking that the argument depends on this. Hence, since it is allowed to make a distinction, we must not hesitate to do so, as was observed before. Unless, however, some one makes two interrogations to be one, there will not be a paralogism from equivocation and ambiguity, but it will either be an elenchus or not. For what difference is there in asking whether Callias and Themistocles are musicians; or whether to both of them, being different from each other, there is one common name? For if that common name signifies more than one thing; he who uses it will ask many things. If, therefore, it is not right, to think fit to assume simply one answer to two interrogations, it is evident, that it is not proper to give an answer simply to any thing homonymous, not even though, as some think, it should be true in every thing. For this is just the same as if it should be asked, whether Coriscus and Callias are at home, or not? Whether both are present, or are not present; for in both ways the propositions are many. For it does not follow that if the assertion is true, there is on this account one interrogation; since there may be ten thousand different interrogations, to all which it may be true to answer yes, or no; yet, at the same time, one answer must not
be given to all of them, for thus disputation would be subverted. But this is just the same, as if the same name should be assigned to different things. If, therefore, it is not proper to give one answer to two interrogations, it is evident, that yes or no must not be answered in things homonymous. For neither does he who says this answer but he merely speaks. But this is in a certain respect verified in those who dispute, because that which is consequent is concealed. As we have said, therefore, since neither are certain things elenchi which appear to be so; after the same manner certain things appear to be solutions which are not; and which we say it is sometimes proper to adduce rather than those which are true, in contentious arguments, and when an opposition is made to a paralogism derived from duplicity. The answer likewise to things which appear to be true should be, Be it so; for thus, in the smallest degree a parexelenchus will be produced. But if some one is compelled to assert something paradoxical, in this case, the verb to appear, must be especially added to the answer; for thus, neither an elenchus, nor a paradox, will appear to be produced. Since, however, it is evident, in what manner that which is posited in the beginning is made a postulate; and all men think that it is made a postulate, if that which is desired to be granted is near to the object of investigation; hence, certain things are to be subverted, and not granted, as if the interrogator desired the question proposed in the beginning to be granted. And when any one thinks fit to make a thing of that kind a postulate, which necessarily, indeed, follows from the thesis, but is false, or inopinable, it must be said, that it is the same as the object of investigation. For those things which are consequent from necessity appear to be the parts of the thesis itself. Again, when universal is assumed not in name, but by comparison, it must be said, that the opponent assumes it, not as it was given, nor as he proposed it; for from this an elenchus is frequently produced. But those who are excluded by these answers should contend that the thing is not well demonstrated, objecting according to the definition which has been given of a syllogism and an elenchus. In names, therefore, which are properly so called, it is necessary to answer either simply, or by making a distinction. With respect, however, to  those things which, understanding in a less degree, we admit, as, for instance, such things as are not clearly interrogated, but with diminution, in these there frequently happens to be an elenchus; as, for instance, is that which pertains to the Athenians, the possession of the Athenians? Yes. The like also must be said in other things. Does not man also pertain to animals? Yes. Man, therefore, is the possession of animals. For we say, that man is of animals, i.e. pertains to animals, because he is an animal; and we say, that Lysander is of the Lacedaemonians, because he is a Lacedaemonian. It is evident, therefore, that in those things in which what is proposed is obscure, a concession must not be made simply. But when of two things, the one existing, the other also necessarily appears to exist; but this existing, that also does not necessarily exist. In this case, he who is interrogated which of the two he thinks exists, ought to give that which is less widely extended; for it is more difficult to syllogize from many things. If some one, however, should argue, that there is something contrary to one thing, but not to another; though the assertion should be true, yet it is necessary to say, that the contrary of the other also is but that the name of it is not posited. But since of those things which the multitude assert, some are of that kind that he who does not admit them will be said by the multitude to have answered falsely; but others are not of this kind; as those of which there are contrary opinions on each side; (for whether the soul of animals is corruptible or incorruptible is not determined by the multitude) and those also about the truth of which there are opposite opinions. In these he who transfers the names may especially be latent. But I mean in those things in which it is immanifest in which way it is usual to enunciate what is so proposed, that it may be inquired whether it appears to the answerer in the same manner as sentences, (for they denominate both true opinions, and universal enunciations, sentences, as, that the diameter of a square is incommensurable with the side). For because it is immanifest in which way the truth subsists, he does not appear to cavil sophistically; and because there are opinions on both sides, he does not appear to answer falsely; but the transition causes his answer to be incapaqle of being confuted by an elenchus. Farther still, those interrogations which some one may have foreseen, must be previously objected to, and previously announced; for thus, especially, he who inquires will be impeded.

Aristotle, Sophistical Elenchi. Book II, Chapter 3

Since, however, a right solution is the developement of a false syllogism, by showing from what interrogation the falsehood is effected; but a syllogism is said to be false in a twofold respect; viz. either if it concludes falsely, or, if not being a syllogism, it appears to be a syllogism . What is now said to be a solution, will be a correction of an apparent syllogism, showing on account of what interrogation, it appears to be, but is not a syllogism in reality. So that it happens, that those arguments which conclude by negation, and those which appear to conclude, are solved by making a distinction. Again, since of the arguments which are syllogistically collected, some are true, but others have a false conclusion; those, indeed, which are false according to the conclusion, may be solved in a twofold respect; viz. by taking away some one of the interrogations, and by showing that the conclusion does not thus subsist. But those arguments which are false according to the propositions may be solved by taking away some interrogation; for the conclusion is true. Hence, those who wish to solve an argument, should first consider if it is conclusive, or inconclusive; and, in the second place, whether the conclusion is true or false; that we may solve it, either by dividing, or subverting; and by subverting either in this, or in that way, as was before observed. It makes, however, a great difference, whether some one being interrogated, or not, solves the argument. For to foresee is difficult; but to see at leisure is easy.

Aristotle, Sophistical Elenchi. Book I, Chapter 15

Of elenchi, therefore, which are derived from equivocation and ambiguity, some have an interrogation signifying many things; but others have a conclusion multifariously assumed. Thus, in the deception, that he who is silent speaks, the conclusion is twofold. But in this, that he who knows, at the same time does not know, (as in this argument, He who knows how to speak or to act, at the same time knows that which he says or does; but this man knows how to speak Iambic verses, he, therefore, at the same time knows Iambic verses) one of the interrogations is ambiguous. And that which is twofold, at one time is, and at another time, is not true; for the twofold partly signifies that which is, and partly that which is not. Hence, in those assertions in the conclusion of which there is the multifarious, an elenchus is not produced, unless the opponent assumes contradiction, as in that deception, that a blind man sees; for without contradiction there was not an elcnchus. But in those, in the interrogations of which there is the multifarious, it is not necessary previously to deny that which is twofold; for the argument does not subsist with reference to this, but on account of this. In the beginning, therefore, since both the name and the assertion are twofold the answer must be, that it partly is, and partly is not. Thus; the assertion, that he who is silent speaks, is partly true, and partly false, And that ta deonta should be done, is true of some things, and false of others; for ta deonta are predicated multifariously. If, however, the multifarious is latent from the beginning, in the end the interrogation must be corrected by an addition. It is not, therefore, true, sigōnta legein, but tonde sigōnta. The like also must be done in those things, which have the multifarious in the propositions; as, they do not, therefore, at the same time know that which they know. True. But not those who thus know. For it is not the same thing, that those who know at one and the same time know; and that those who thus know, cannot at one and the same time know. And, in short, he who answers, ought to oppose, though the adversary should simply conclude, and assert that he denied
not the thing affirmed by him, but the name; and, therefore, that it is not an elenchus.

Aristotle, Sophistical Elenchi. Book II, Chapter 5

It is also evident how those arguments are to be solved, which are derived from composition and division. For if a divided has a different signification from a compounded sentence, in the solution that must be asserted, which is contrary to the conclusion. But all such arguments are from composition and division: Did he strike him with that with which you saw him striking? And, with that with which he struck, with that did you see him striking?  This deception, therefore, has something of an ambiguous interrogation; but, nevertheless, it is from composition. For that which is assumed from division is not twofold; because the same sentence is not produced when divided, as when it was conjoined; unless oros, and oros pronounced with an accent, signify a different thing; but in writings the name is the same, since it is written from the same elements, and after the same manner. And there, indeed, the marks or notes are the same, but the things pronounced are different. Hence, that which is assumed from division, is not twofold. It is likewise evident, that not all elenchi are assumed from the twofold, as some say. A distinction, therefore, must be made by him who answers. For it is not the same thing for a man to say, that he saw some one striking with his eyes, and that with his eyes he saw some one striking. To this also the argument of Euthydemus pertains, Have you now, being in Sicily, seen the three-ranked gallies which are
in the Piraeus? And again, Is it possible, being good, to be a bad shoemaker? But some one, being a good shoemaker, may be depraved; and therefore may be a depraved or bad shoemaker. Again, Are those things of which the sciences are worthy, worthy disciplines? But the discipline of a bad man is worthy; therefore, that which is bad is a worthy discipline. But that which is bad is both a discipline, and that which is bad: that which is bad, therefore, is a bad discipline. Is it true to say, now that you are born? You are therefore born now. Or does not this sentence signify one thing when divided, and another when conjoined? For it is now true to say that you are born; but not that you are now born. With respect to the manner in which you are able, and the things which you are able to do, will you do these things, and in the manner in which you are able? But when you do not play on the harp, you possess the ability of playing on the harp; you will therefore play on the harp, when not playing on the harp. Or, may we not say, that he possesses the ability of playing on the harp, when he does not play on the harp; but when he does not do this, he has the ability of doing it? Some also solve this sophism in another way. For if he  who answers concedes that he is able to do so, they say it will not happen that he who does not play,  plays on the harp; for he does not grant that he does it, in whatever way it is possible to do it; nor is it the same thing to say, as it is possible, and, in what ever way it is possible to do it. It is evident, however, that they do not solve the sophism well. For of arguments which are assumed from the same place, there is the same solution; but this is not adapted to all arguments of the same kind, nor to questions in whatever way they may be made; for the solution is adapted to him who interrogates, and not to the argument.

Aristotle, Sophistical Elenchi. Book II, Chapter 6

Arguments, however, are not derived from accent, neither in writings, nor in sentences pronounced; unless there may be a few, such as the following argument. Is not to hou katalueis a house? Yes. Is
not to ou katalueis, a negation tou katalueis? Yes. But you said that to hou katalueis, was a house; a house, therefore, is a negation. It is evident, however, how these sophisms are to be solved; for ou does not signify the same thing when it is pronounced more acutely, and when it is pronounced more gravely.

Aristotle, Sophistical Elenchi. Book II, Chapter 7

It is likewise evident, in what manner those arguments must be opposed which are derived from things being asserted after the same manner, which are not the same; since we have the genera of the categories. For the one, indeed, being interrogated, grants, that it is not any one of those things which signify essence; but the other shows that it is some one of those things which are in the number of relatives or quantities, and seem to signify essence, on account of the diction. As, for instance, in this argmuent: Is it possible to do, and to have done the same thing at one and the same time? No. But it is possible to see, and at the same time to have seen, the same thing, and according to the same. Is it possible for any thing which suffers to act? No. But, it is cut, it is burnt, it is perceived, are similarly enunciated; and all of them signify to suffer something. Again, to speak, to run, to see, are similarly enunciated with each other. But to see, is to perceive something; so that it is to act and to suffer at one and the same time. If, however, some one having there granted that it is not possible to make and to have made the same thing, should say that it is possible for some one to see and to have seen, he will not yet be confuted by an elenchus, if he should not say that to see is to do something, but to suffer; for there is need of this interrogation. But by the hearer, he is thought to have granted this, when he granted that to cut is to do something, and that to have cut is to have done something; and such other things as are similarly asserted. For the auditor himself will supply the rest, as asserted in a similar manner. This, however, is not similarly asserted, but appears to be so on account of the diction. But the same thing happens here, as in equivocations. For in these, he who is ignorant of words, thinks that the opponent denies the thing which the answerer affirms, and not the name only; though an interrogation is still requisite, whether looking to one thing, he asserts that which is homonymous; for this being granted, there will be an elenchus. The following arguments also are similar to these: Whether has some one lost that which, once having, he afterwards has not? For he who loses one die, will not have ten dice. May we not say, that he has lost that which he now has not, but which he had before? But that it is not necessary, that he who had so many things, or so much, and now has not, should have lost so many things, or so much? Asking, therefore, what he has, in the conclusion he introduces so many; for ten things are so many. If, therefore, he had asked from the beginning, Has he who had so many things, and now has not, lost so many? No one would admit that he had, but that he had lost either a certain number, or some one of these. Such, likewise, is the deception that some one may give that which he has not; for he has not one die only. May we not say, that he who gives one die only, does not give that which he has not, but that this signifies the manner in which he has not, viz. that he has one die. For the word only, does not signify this particular thing, nor this quality, nor a certain quantity, but how it subsists with reference to something else, as, not to be possessed together with another thing. It is just, therefore, as if some one should ask, Can any one give that which he has not? But another person  denying that this is possible should inquire, Whether any one can give rapidly, not possessing rapidly? And this being assented to, he should conclude that some one may give that which he has not. It is evident also, that he does not syllogisticaily conclude. For to give rapidly is not to give this thing, but to give in this manner. Some one, however, may give in a manner different from that in which he possesses a thing; for possessing it gladly, he may give it painfully. To these deceptions also all the following are similar: Can any one strike with that hand which he has not? Or, can any one see with that eye which he has not? For he has not one alone. Some solve this deception by saying, that he has one alone, whether it be an eye, or any thing else, who has many. But others say, that he has received that which he has, for he gave one die alone; and he, they say, has one die alone from this man. Others again, immediately subverting the interrogation, say that it is possible that a man may have that which he has not received. Thus, he who receives sweet wine, if it should be corrupted in receiving it, will have sour wine. As, however, we before observed, all these solve the sophism not with reference to the argument, but wiith reference to man. For if this were the solution, he who should give the opposite to it, would not be able to solve it; as is the case in other deceptions. Thus, if the solution is, that it partly is, and partly is not, if it should be simply granted, there will be a conclusion; but if there is not a conclusion, it will not be a solution. But in the before-mentioned deceptions all things being granted, we do not admit that there is a syllogism. The following also, are among the number of such like arguments: Has not some one written that which is written? But it is written that you now sit, which is a false assertion; but it was true, when it was written; at one and the same time, therefore, a true and a false assertion was written. To say, however, that an assertion, or an opinion, is true or false, does not signify this particular thing, but the quality of the assertion; for there is the same reasoning also in opinion. Again, with respect to that which any one learning learns, is it that thing which he learns? But some one learns rapidly that which is slow. The opponent, however, when he says rapidly, does not say that which some one learns, but the manner in
which he learns. Again, that which any one walks through, does he tread on? But he walks through the whole day. When it is said, however, that he walks through the whole day, it is not said that which he walks, but when he walks. Nor when we say, he drinks a cup, do we indicate that which is drunk, but that from which it is drunk. Likewise, with respect to that which some one knows, does he know it, by discovering or learning it? But of two things, one of which he discovers, and the other he learns; with these if both are assumed at one and the same time, neither accords. Or, may we not say, that here every is assumed; but there not every. ‘I’o these these also may be added the deception, that there is a certain third man besides man himself, and individual men. For man, and every thing which is common, is not this particular thing, but signifies acertain quale, or relative, or after what manner, or something of this kind. In a similar manner also, in the question, Whether Coriscus, and Coriscus the musician, are the same, or a different thing? For the former of these signifies this particular thing, but the latter, a thing with a certain quality; so that this instance cannot be adduced; Nor does the exposition make a third man; but the concession that what is common, is that very thing which is this particular thing. For thus to be this particular thing, is not that which Callias is, and which man is. Nor is it of any consequence, if some one should say, that what is adduced is not that which this particular thing is, but that which is a thing with a
certain quality; for besides the many there will be one certain thing, as, for instance, man. It is evident, therefore, that it must not be granted, that what is predicated in common of many things, is this particular thing; but that it either signifies quantity, or quality, or relation, or something else of this kind.

Aristotle, Sophistical Elenchi. Book II, Chapter 8

In short, in disputations assumed from diction, the solution will always be according to the opposite of that from which the argument is derived. Thus, if the argument is assumed from composition, the  solution will be through division. But if from division, it will be through composition. Again, if the argument is from an acute accent, a grave accent will be the solution. But if from a grave, an acute accent will be the solution. And if from equivocation, it will be possible to solve the sophism by adducing the opposite name. Thus, if it happens that it can be said a thing is animated, by denying that it is not animated, it is evident, that it is inanimate. But if the answerer says it is inanimate, but he who argues concludes it is animated, it must be said that it is inanimate. The like method must also be adopted in ambiguity. But if the argument is derived from similitude of diction, the opposite will be the solution. As, can any one give that which he has not? Or, can he not give that which he has not, but in the manner in which he has not? As, for instance, one die alone. That which any one knows, does he know, learning or discovering it? But not the things which he knows. And, does he tread on that which he walks through? But not when. And in a similar manner, in other deceptions.

Aristotle, Sophistical Elenchi. Book II, Chapter 9

With respect, however, to the deceptions which are from accident, there is one and the same solution of all of them. For since it is uncertain when an assertion can be made of a thing which is present with accident, and in some things this appears to, and is conceded by the multitude, but in others they deny that is necessary; it must be said, as a solution similarly adapted to all these paralogisms that the conclusion does not necessarily follow. It is necessary, however, to produce some thing which is similar. All such paralogisms, therefore, as the following are from accident. Do you know what I am about to ask? Do you know him who approaches? Or, him who is concealed? Is this statue your work? Is this dog your father? Are not a few things, assumed a few times, few? For it is evident, that in all these deceptions it is not necessary that what is verified of accident, should also be verified of the thing. For in those things alone, which according to essence are without difference and one, all things appear to be inherent as the same. For to that which is good, it is not the same thing to be good, and to be that which is intended to be asked. Nor to him who approaches, or is hidden, is it the same thing to be one approaching or hidden, and to be Coriscus. Hence, it does not follow, that if I know Coriscus, but do not know him who approaches, that I know and am ignorant of the same person. Nor does it follow, if this is a work, but it is mine, therefore, it is my work; but it is either my possession, or thing, or something else. All the other deceptions must be solved after the same manner. Some, however, solve these deceptions by dividing the interrogation. For they say it is possible that the same thing may be known and unknown, yet not according to the same. Not knowing, therefore, him who approaches, but knowing Coriscus, they say, that they know and are ignorant of the same thing, yet not according to the same. In the first place, however, as we have said, it is necessary that there should be the same correction of arguments which are derived from the same place. But this will not be the solution if some one does not assume the same axiom, from the verb to know, but from the verb to be, or, to subsist after a certain manner; as, this dog is a father, and is yours; therefore, it is your father. For though this is true in certain things, and it is possible to know and be ignorant of the same thing, yet here, what is said, is by no means appropriate. Nothing, however, hinders, but that the same argument may have many faults, yet not the unfolding of every fault is a solution. For it is possible that some one may show that what is syllogistically collected is false; but may not show whence it is false. And in this way it may be shown, that the argument of Zeno is false, in which it is concluded that nothing can be moved. Hence, if someone in answering should endeavour to tead as to the impossible, he will err, though he should conclude ten thousand times; for this is not a solution. For the solution was the unfolding of a false syllogism, showing why it is false. If, therefore, the opponent concludes nothing, whether he endeavours to collect what is true, or what is false; the manifestation of that thing is a solution. Perhaps, however, nothing hinders this from taking place in certain things; except that in these deceptions this will not appear to be the case. For he knows that Coriscus is Coriscus; and that he who approaches is him who approaches. But it is possible to know, and not to know the same thing. Thus, it is possible to know that a thing is white, but not to know that it is a musician; for thus a man knows and does not know the same thing, yet not according to the same. But here he knows both that which approaches and Coriscus, to be that which approaches, and to be Coriscus. In a similar manner also, those err, who solve the deception by saying that every number is both much and few. For if, when nothing is concluded, this being omitted, they should say, that what is true is concluded (for that every number is both much and few), they will err. There are also some who dissolve these syllogisms by duplicity, concluding that it is your father, or son, or servant. It is evident, however, that if the elenchus should appear to be assumed from the multifarious, it is necessary that the name, or the assertion should properly be that this person is the son of this man, no one asserts properly, if he is the master of a son; but the composition is from accident. Is this yours? Yes, But this is a son; therefore, this is your son; because it happens that it is both yours and a son, yet not your son. Similar to this, also, is the solution of the deception, by which it is concluded that something among the number of evils is good; for prudence is the science of things evil. But the assertion say they to be among the number of these, is not predicated multifariously, but signifies possession only. Or if perhaps, it should be predicated multifariously (for we say that man is among the number of animals, yet is not the possession of them) and if any thing is so referred to evils, as to be said to be of a certain thing, on this account it is of, or pertaining to evils, yet this is not to be entirely among the number of evils. The elenchus, therefore, appears to be assumed from a signification in a certain respect, and simply. Perhaps, however, it is possible that something among the number of evils may be good, in a twofold respect; yet not in this argument, but rather in the argument, whether there can be a good servant of a bad master? But perhaps neither thus, is there the multifarious. For it does not follow that, if he is good, and pertains to this man, that he is, at the same time the good of this man. Nor when we say, that man is; among the number of animals, is this predicated multifariously. For neither when we signify any thing, by taking away a part is that thing predicated multifariously. Thus, when we recite the half of a verse, we signify, Give me the Iliad; as, for instance, Give me, “Sing, goddess, the anger.”

Aristotle, Sophistical Elenchi. Book II, Chapter 10

Arguments, however, which are derived from this particular thing: being predicated properly, or in a certain respect, or somewhere, or after a manner, or with relation to something, and not simply, are to be solved by considering the conclusion with reference to contradiction, that it may be understood whether any thing of this kind is possible in them. For contraries and opposites, and affirmation and negation, simply, indeed, cannot be inherent in the same thing; though nothing hinders, but that each of these may be inherent in a certain respect, or with relation to something, or after a manner, or that one may be inherent in a certain respect, but another simply. Hence, if one is simply predicated, but another in a certain respect, there is not yet an elenchus. This, however, must be surveyed in the conclusion, with reference to contradiction. But all such arguments (i.e. paralogisms) are as follow: Is it possible for that which is not to be? But that which is not is something. By a similar reasoning, being will not be; for it will not be a certain thing, which is among the number of beings. Is it possible that the same person can, at one and the same time, take an oath properly, and perjure himself? Is it possible that the same person can, at one and the same time, believe and disbelieve in the same person? Or, may we not say, in answer to the first of these that to be a certain thing, and simply to be, are not the same? (But non-being, if it is a certain thing, is not simply, on that account). Nor if some one properly swears to this thing, and in a certain respect, is it necessary that he has taken an oath properly. Forswearing, that he shall be perjured, when he swears, he swears this alone, in a proper manner, but he does not simple swear in a proper manner. Nor does he believe, who does not believe. Similar to this also, is that paralogism, respecting the same person speaking falsely and truly, at one and, the same times. But because it is not easy to perceive, whether the word simply is assigned to the speaking truly, or to the speaking falsely, it appears to be
difficult to solve the sophism. Nothing, however, hinders, but that the same thing, may be, indeed, simply false, but in a certain respect true, or of a certain thing; or that certain things may be true, and yet not simply true. The like also takes place in the terms, with reference to something, Where, and when; for all such arguments happen from this. Is health, or wealth, a good thing? But to him who is stupid, and does not use them properly, they are not good. They are good, therefore, and not good. Is to be well, or to be powerful in a city, a good thing? But sometimes these are not better. The same thing, therefore, is good and not good. Or, may we not say, that nothing prevents that which is simply good, from not being good to a certain person? Or, from being good to this person, yet not now, or not in this place? Is not that with respect to which a wise man is unwilling a bad thing? But he is not willing to lose that which is good; good, therefore, is evil. For it is not the same thing to say that good is evil, and that to lose good is evil. The argument also concerning a thief is to be solved in a similar manner. For it does not follow, that if a thief is a bad thing, that to take him is also a bad thing. He, therefore, who wishes to take him does not wish a bad, but a good thing; for to take a thief is a good thing. Disease, likewise, is a bad thing, but not to remove disease. Is the just more eligible than the unjust, and the justly, than the unjustly? But to die unjustly is more eligible than to die justly. Is it just for every man to have his own property? But those things which some one (i.e. a judge) adjudges to another according to his own opinion, though his decision should be false, are the property of that person by law. The same thing, therefore, is just and not just. And again whether is it necessary to condemn him who speaks just things, or him who speaks unjust things? But it is just, that he who is injured should sufficiently relate what he has suffered; and these are unjust things. It does not follow, however, that if it is eligible to suffer something unjustly; the unjustly is, therefore, more eligible than the justly. But simply, indeed, the justly is more eligible, yet nothing hinders this particular thing, though unjustly done from being more eligible than what is justly done. And for every one to have his own property is just; but to have the property of others, is not just; yet nothing hinders this judgment from being just; i.e. if it is according to the opinion of the judge. For it does not follow that if this thing is just, or in this way, it is simply just. In a similar manner also, these things being unjust, nothing hinders but that it may be just to relate them. For it does not follow, that if it is just to relate them, the things themselves are just; as neither does it follow that they arc beneficial, if it is beneficial to speak of them. The like also must be said of just things. Hence, if those things which are asserted are unjust, it does not follow that he who speaks unjust things vanquishes; for be says, those things which it is just to say, but simply, and to suffer which are unjust.

Aristotle, Sophistical Elenchi. Book II, Chapter 11

But to those arguments which are from the definition of an elenchus, as an elenchus was before described, a reply must be made, by considering the conclusion with reference to contradiction, how it will be of the same thing, and according to the same, with reference to the same, after the same manner, and in the same time. lf however, an interrogation should be made in the beginning, it must not be acknowledged, as, if it were possible for the same thing to be double and not double; but it must be said, that it is not possible so as that an elenchus may be acknowledged to have been made. All these arguments, however, are from the following place: Does be who knows each particular that it is each particular, know the thing? And in a similar manner with respect to him who is ignorant. But some one knowing Coriscus, that he is Coriscus may be ignorant that he is a musician; so that he both knows and is ignorant of the same thing. And, again, is a quadricubital greater than a tricubital magnitude? But a quadricubital magnitude in length, may be made from a tricubital magnitude; and the greater is greater than the less; the same thing, therefore, is greater and less than itself.

Aristotle, Sophistical Elenchi. Book II, Chapter 12

The arguments, however, which are derived from the question proposed in the beginning, being made a postulate, and assumed if the question is manifest, are not to be granted to the enquirer, not even if it should be probabie that he speaks the truth. But if the question proposed in the beginning is latent, at last ignorance, on account of the futility of such like arguments, must be transferred to the interrogator, as one who does not dispute well. For an elenchus is without that which was enquired from the beginning. In the next place, the defendant should answer that he granted this opponent what he asked , not that he should use it, but as intending syllogistically to prove the contrary, as is usual in sophistical elenchi.

Aristotle, Sophistical Elenchi. Book II, Chapter 13

Those deceptions also, which prove from what is consequent, must be unfolded from the argument itself. But there is a twofold consecution of things consequent. For that which is consequent is either as universal to that which is partial, as, animal to man; for it is considered as a postulate, that if this thing is conjoined with that, that also is conjoined with this; or it is according to oppositions. For if this thing is consequent to that, the opposite also is consequent to the opposite. Hence, also, the argument of Melissus originated. For if that which was generated had a beginning, he requires it to be granted, that what is unbegotten had not a begimiing. If the heaven (i.e. the universe) therefore, is unbegotten, it is likewise infinite. This, however, is not the case; for the consecution is vice versa.

Aristotle, Sophistical Elenchi. Book II, Chapter 14

In those deceptions, however, which syllogistically conclude on account of something being added, it must be considered whether something being taken away, nevertheless that which is impossible will happen. Afterwards this must be rendered apparent, and it must be said by the answerer that it was granted by him, not as appearing to be true, but as adapted to the argument. But he who argues, uses the proposition, though it contributes nothing to the purpose, as if it did contribute.

Aristotle, Sophistical Elenchi. Book II, Chapter 15

But against those deceptions which make many interrogations to he one, definition must be employed immediately in the beginning. For the interrogation is one to which there is one answer; so that neither many things must be affirmed or denied of one thing, nor one thing of many things, but one thing of one. As, however, it happens in things homonymous, that at one time the attribute is in both the things signified, but at another is in neither; so that the interrogation not being simple, it happens that those who answer simply, suffer no inconvenience; in like manner also in these things, when either many things are present with one, or one with many, or are not present, nothing repugnant happens to him who simply concedes, and who errs according to this error. But it then happens, that when the one is, the other is not;
or many things are predicated of many, and both are partly present, and partly are not present with both. Hence, this is to be avoided: as in the following arguments: If one thing is good, but another evil, it may
be truly said, that these are good and evil; and, again, that they are neither good nor evil; for each is not each. Hence, the same thing is good and evil, and is neither good nor evil. Again, Is every thing the same with itself different from other things? Since, however, these are not the same with other things, but with themselves, and are different from themselves; the same things are different from and the same with themselves. Farther still, if that which is good becomes evil, and that which is evil, good, the same things will at the same time become good and evil. And, since two things are unequal, each will be itself equal to itself; so that the same things will be equal and unequal to themselves. These arguments, therefore, fall also into other solutions. For both and all signify many things. Except the name, therefore, it does not happen that the same thing is affirmed and denied; but this was not an elenchus. It is evident, however, that this will not be impossible, unless many interrogations are assumed for one, but one thing is affirmed or denied of one.

Aristotle, Sophistical Elenchi. Book II, Chapter 16

With respect, however, to those paralogisms which lead to frequently saying the same thing, it is evident that it must not be granted that the categories of relatives separated, and assumed by themselves, signify any thing; as, for instance, the double separated from the double of the half; because it appears to be one thing. For ten is understood in the assertion less than ten by unity; and the verb to make in the assertion not to make; and, in short, affirmation is understood in negation. At the same time, it does not follow, if some one should say that this thing is not white, that he should say it is white. But the double perhaps signifies nothing alone, as neither that which is in the half. Or if it does signify any thing alone, yet it does not signify the same thing, as when it is conjoined. Nor does science in species (as if medicine is a science) signify that which is common; but that was the science of that which is the object of science. But in those attributes which are manifested through subjects, this must be said, that what is signified separately, and what is signified in a sentence, are not the same. For the concave, if it is assumed in common, signifies the same thing, in a flat nose, and a crooked leg; though when added to a subject nothing hinders, but that it may signify a different thing; but the one happens to the nose, and the other to the leg. For there it signifies a flat nose, but here a crooked leg. Nor does it make any difference to say, a flat nose, or a concave nose. Again, diction must not be conceded in an upright case; for it is false. For to oimon is not a concave nose; but this is as a passion (i.e. passive quality) of the nose.

Aristotle, Sophistical Elenchi. Book II, Chapter 17

Concerning solecisms, however, we have before shown whence they appear to he produced; but how they are to be solved, will be evident in the arguments themselves. For the intention of all of them is to construct through the pronoun hoc. Is that which you say truly, this thing truly? But you say that something is a stone, therefore this thing is a stone. May it not be replied, however, that to say a stone, is not to quod, but quem, nor hoc but hunc. If, therefore, some one should say, Num quem vere dicis, est hunc? He would not appear to speak conforrnably either to the Greek or Latin syntax. As neither if he should say, Num quam dicis esse, est hic? But when he says lignum wood, or any thing else which signifies neither the masculine nor the feminine gender, it is of no consequence. Hence, a solecism is not produced, if that which you say is, is this thing (hoc); but you say that wood is; (lignum autem dicis esse), this, therefore, is wood. But a stone (lapis) and hic, have the appellation of the mascuiine. If, however, some one should ask, Is he she? And again, what? (quid?) Is not he Coriscns? And afterwards should say, he therefore is she, he would not syllogistically collect a solecism, not even if Coriscus should signify that which she signifies. But he who answers does not concede this; and it is necessary that this should be previously asked. If, however, it neither is, nor is conceded, it is not syllogistically collected, neither in reality, nor against him who is interrogated. Hence, in a similar manner there, it is necessary that a stone should signify hic. But if this is neither assumed, nor granted, the conclusion is not to be admitted. It appears to be, however, because the dissimilar case of the noun, seems to be similar. Is it true to say that
haec is that which you say hanc is? But you say it is a shield; haec, therefore, is a shield. Or, may we not say, that it is not necessary to admit this conclusion, if haec does not signify parmam, (a shield in
the accusative case) but parma (a shield in the nominative case). But parmam is hanc. Nor if that which you say is hunc, is hic, but you say it is Cleon, (ais autem esse Cleonem) is hic therefore Cleon, (id circo
hic est Cleonem). For hic is not Cleon; (non enim est hic Cleonem), since it was said, quem aio hunc esse, est hic, non hunc. For the interrogation when thus made, is not according to the rules of grammar. Do you know hoc? But it is a stone; you know, therefore a stone. Or, may we not say, that it does not signify the same thing in the words, Do you know hoc? And in the words, hoc autem est lapis? but this is
a stone? But that in the former it signifies hunc, and in the latter hic. Num cujus scientiam habes, hoc scis? Habes autem scientiam lapidis: scis igitur lapidis. May we not reply, that when you say hujus, you say lapidis; but when you say hoc, lapidem? But it is granted, cujus scientiam habes, te scire, non hujus, sed hoc; and, therefore, non lapidis, sed lapidem. That arguments, therefore, of this kind, do not syllogistically collect a solecism, but only appear to do so, and why they appear to do so, and how they are to be opposed, is evident from what has been said.

Aristotle, Sophistical Elenchi. Book II, Chapter 18

It is necessary, however, to know with respect to all arguments, that there are some in which it is more easy, and others in which it is more difficult to see, from what cause, and in what, they deceive the hearer;
since these are frequently the same with those· For it is necessary to call that the same argument, which is derived from the same place. But the same argument may appear to some persons to be derived from diction; to others, from accident; and to others, from another place; because each argument, when it is transferred, is not similarly manifest. In the deceptions from equivocation, (which mode of paralogisms
appears to be the most usual) some are manifest to every one, and nearly all ridiculous sentences are assumed from diction; as, for instance, Vir ferrebat per scales diphron. A man put diphro; through a ladder. And opou stellesthe? To the sail-yard. And, Utra bonum ante pariet? Neutra; sed retro ambae. Again, Estne Boreas katharos? By no means; for it occasioned the death of a mendicant and a merchant Is this Evarchus? It is not; but it is Apollonides. And after the same manner nearly, most other deceptions are produced. But other deceptions derived from equivocation, appear to be latent to the most skilful persons; of which this is an indication, that they frequently contend about names; as, whether the one and being are predicated in the same signification of all things, or in a different signification. For to some, being and the one appear to signify the same thing; but others solve the argument of Zeno and Parmenides, from the one and being appearing to be predicated multifariously. In a similar manner also, with respect to arguments which are derived from accident, and each of the other places, some are perceived more easily, but others with greater difficulty; and it is not alike easy in all of them, to perceive in what genus of deceptions they are contained, and whetheir it is an elenchus, or is not an elenchus. The argument, however, is acute, by which some one is involved in the greatest doubt; for this is especially pungent. But doubt is twofold; one, in arguments, which conclude syllogistically, with respect to
which interrogation is to be subverted; but the other in contentious arguments, with respect to the manner in which some one should speak of the thing proposed. Hence, in syllogistic disputations, those arguments which are more acute, are the causes of greater investigation. A syllogistic argument, however, is most acute if some one from those things which appear to be especially probable, subverts and confirms that which is especially probable. For the argument being one, if the contradiction is transposed, it will have all the syllogisms similar; for he will always subvert or confirm that which is similarly probable, from probable assertions. Hence, it will be necessary to doubt. An argument, therefore, of this kind is especially acute, which produces a conclusion equal to the interrogatories. But that syllogistic
argument is in the second degree acute, which consists from all similar assumptions. For this in a similar manner causes it to be dubious, which of the interrogatories is to be subverted. But this is difficult; for a subversion is to be made; but what is to be subverted, is immanifest. Of contentious arguments, however, that is the most acute, in which it is not at first immediately manifest, whether the conclusion is syllogistic, or not; and whether the solution is from the false, or from division. But that is, in the second place, acute, which must evidently be solved through division or ablation; but in which it is not apparent through the ablation or division of what interrogatory it must be solved; or, indeed, whether this ablation or division is from the conclusion, or from some one of the interrogatories. Sometimes, therefore, the argument when it does not conclude is stupid, viz. if the assumptions are very incredible, or false; but sometimes it ought not to be despised. For when some one of such like interrogatives is deficient, the syllogism about which and through which the argument is employed, and which neither assumes this, nor concludes, is stupid. But when the interrogation is deficient which may be externally assumed, the argument is by no means to be despised; but in this case, the argument is, indeed, good, but the interrogator has not well interrogated. As, however, the solution at one time pertains to the argument; at another to the interrogator and the interrogation; and sometimes to neither of these; in a similar manner also, it is possible to interrogate and conclude, against the thesis, against the answerer, and against the time, when the solution requires more time than the present opportunity permits, to dispute against it.

Aristotle, Sophistical Elenchi. Book II, Chapter 19

From how many, and what kind of particulars, therefore, paralogisms are produced by those who dispute, and how we should demonstrate what is false, and make him with whom we dispute to assert paradoxes; and, farther still, from what things a solecism is produced, how interrogation is to be made, and what the order is of interrogations; and in addition to this, to what all such arguments are useful, and concerning every answer simply, and how arguments and syllogisms are to be solved; concerning all these particulars, let thus much have been said by us. If now remains that, recollecting what was proposed in the beginning, we should say a few things concerning it, and add an end to what has been said. Our design, then, was to discover a certain power syllogistic about a proposed problem, from things which are in the highest degree probable. For this is the employment of dialectic per se, and also of the peirastic art. But since there is also added to this on account of its proximity to the sophistic art, that a man may not only make trial dialectically, but as one endued with knowledge; on this account we not only suppose what has been said, to be the employment of this treatise, viz. to be able to assume an argument, but
likewise, that sustaining the argument, we may defend the thesis, in a similar manner, through the most probable assertions. We have also assigned the cause of this. For on this account likewise, Socrates interrogated, but did not answer; for he acknowledged that he knew nothing. It has moreover been shown in the former treatise, with reference to how many problems, and from what kind, and what number of assurnptions this will be, and whence we may be supplied with an abundance of them. Again, it has also been shown how interrogation must be made, or how every interrogation must be arranged, and likewise concerning the answers and solutions of things pertaining to syllogisms. Such other particulars also have been rendered manifest, as belong to the method of disputations. In addition to these things likewise, we have discussed paralogisms, as we have before observed. It is evident, therefore, that our proposed design has sufficiently obtained its end.

It is necessary, however, that we should not be ignorant of that which happens concerning this treatise. For, with respect to all discoveries, some things being assumed from others, and at first laboriously invented, are afterwards partially increased, by those who receive them. But others, being discovered from the begivning, at first are wont to receive but a small increase, yet become much more useful, by the increase which they afterwards receive from others. For the beginning of every thing, is perhaps, as it is said, the greatest part of the whole; and, on this account, is also the most difficult. For that is most difficult to be seen which excels in power in proportion to its diminution in magnitude. But this being discovered, it is more easy to add and co-increase that which remains; which also happens to take place in political discussions; and nearly in all other arts. For those who discovered principles, made but a very small progress; but those who are now celebrated, receiving from many, as it were, collecting partially from succession, have thus produced an increase; Tisias, indeed, after the first authors but Thrasymachus after Tisias, Theodorus after him, and many others, have abundantly contributed in a partial degree. Hence, it is not at all wonderful that the art contains a certain multitude of precepts. Dialectic, however, has not been partly cultivated, and partly not by others prior to us, but it has been entirely neglected. For the doctrine of those who employed themselves about contentious arguments with a view to gain, was similar to the doctrine of Gorgias. For some gave their disciples rhetorical, but others interrogative discourses to learn, into which they thought their conversation with each other would frequently fall. Hence, they rapidly, indeed, instructed their disciples, but without art; since they apprehended that they should teach them properly by delivering not art, but what is effected by art; just as if some one professing to deliver the science by which the feet may not be injured, should afterwards not teach the shoemakers art, and whence security for the feet may be obtained, but should exhibit many kinds of all-various shoes. For he, indeed, would afford assistance, so far as pertains to use, but would not unfold the
art of making shoes.((The last lines are illegible in our copy of Taylor’s text, but have been reconstructed.)) And concerning rhetorical discourses, indeed, many and ancient assertions are extant; but concerning the art of syllogizing, we received nothing at all from the ancients; but exercising ourselves in investigation, we have laboured time in the recovcry of it. If, therefore, it shall appear to you, having seen these our writings, that this method derived from such things from the beginning, has not been unfolded sufficiently when compared with other treatises, which have been increased it will remain for all you, or for those who read  this work to forgive what is omitted in this method, and to be very thankful for the discoveries which it contains.

THE END