Aristotle, On the Soul

Note:  This is the only place where the text of Thomas Taylor’s translation of Aristotle’s treatise “On the Soul” can be found.  It is being published by Mr. William C. Michael for students of the Classical Liberal Arts Academy.

Aristotle, On the Soul. Book I, Chapter 1

Since we apprehend that knowledge is in the number of things beautiful and honorable, but one kind of knowledge more than another, either according to accuracy, or because it belongs to things more excellent and admirable, on account of both these, the history of the soul may be reasonably ranked among things of the first importance. But the knowledge of it appears likewise greatly to contribute to all truth, and especially to nature, for it is, as it were, the principle of animals. We seek, however, to contemplate and know the nature and essence of it; and afterwards, such particulars as are accidental to it; of which some appear to be the peculiar passions of the soul, but others to be common, and inherent in animals, on account of soul. It is, however, entirely and in every respect one of the most difficult things, to obtain a certain credibility concerning it; for, since the inquiry is also common to many other things, I mean the inquiry concerning essence, and what a thing is, perhaps it may appear to someone, that there is a certain method in all those things of which we are desirous to know the essence, just as there is a certain method, namely, demonstration of peculiarities according to accident. Hence this method must be investigated. But if there is not one certain common method concerning what a thing is, the discussion will become still more difficult; for it will be requisite to assume what the mode is about each particular. When, however, it shall be apparent, whether there is a certain demonstration, or division, or some other method, this discussion will still be attended with many doubts and perplexities concerning the particulars from which it is necessary to investigate; for there are different principles of different things, as of numbers and planes. But, in the first place, perhaps, it is necessary to determine in what genus of things the soul is, and what it is; I mean, whether it is this particular thing and essence, or quality, or quantity, or some other of the distinct categories. And further still, whether it is in the number of things which are in capacity, or rather is a certain entelecheia; for there is no small difference between the two. It must also be considered, whether it is partible, or impartible; and whether every soul is of the same species, or not. But if every soul is not of the same species, whether they differ in species or genus; for now those who speak and investigate concerning the soul, appear to consider the human soul alone. We must, however, be cautious, lest we should be ignorant whether there is one definition of it, as of animal, or whether each has a different definition, as is the case with horse, dog, man, and God. But animal, which is universal, is either nothing, or posterior; and, in a similar manner, though something else which is common should be predicated. Again, if there are not many souls, but parts of the soul, it must be considered whether it is necessary to investigate, first, the whole soul, or its parts. It is also difficult to determine which of these parts naturally differ from each other; and whether it is necessary first to investigate the parts, or the works of the parts; as, for instance, whether we should first investigate intellection or intellect, sensation or that which is sensitive. And in a similar manner in other things. But if it is necessary first to investigate the works of the parts, again someone may doubt, whether the opposites of these ought to be first investigated, as, for instance, a sensible prior to the sensitive, and the intelligible prior to the intellective. It seems, however, that not only to know what a thing is, is useful to the contemplation of the causes of those things which happen to essences per se; as, in mathematics, to know what a right, and what an inflected line are, or what a line and a superficies are, contributes to the perceiving to how many right angles the angles of a triangle are equal; but, on the contrary, accidents greatly contribute to the knowledge of what a thing is. For, when we are able to assign concerning accidents conformably to appearances, either concerning all, or concerning most accidents, then also we are able to say something most appropriately concerning essence; for the principle of all demonstration is, what a thing is. Hence, from those definitions, from which it does not happen that accidents are known, and from which it is not even easy to conjecture concerning them, it is evident that all such are dialectically and vainly adduced. It is also dubious with respect to the passions of the soul, whether all of them are common to those that have a soul, or whether someone is the peculiarity of the soul itself; for to assume this, is indeed necessary, but not easy. Most of the passions, however, appear neither to suffer, nor to do anything without the body; such, for instance, as to be angry, to be confident, to desire, and, in short, to perceive. But intellection seems to be especially the peculiarity of the soul. If, however, this is a certain fantasy, or not without fantasy, neither can this be without body. If, therefore, some one of the operations or passions of the soul is peculiar, the soul may be separated from the body; but if no one of its operations or passions is peculiar, it will not be separable; just as to a right line, so far as it is a right line, many things are accidental, as to touch a brazen sphere in a point, yet the right line, when separate, does not touch this, for it is inseparable, since it is always in conjunction with a certain body. All the passions of the soul, likewise, appear to subsist in conjunction with the body, namely, anger, mildness, fear, pity, confidence; and besides these, joy, love, and hatred. For the body suffers something together with these; of which this is an indication, that sometimes, from the recurrence of strong and evident passions, we are neither excited to anger or fear; but sometimes we are moved by small and obscure passions, when the body swells through venereal desire, and subsists in the same manner as when the soul is angry. Again, this is still more evident; for when nothing terrible happens, some are affected in the same manner as those that are afraid. But if this be the case, it is evident that the passions are also material reasons. Hence the definitions also are things of this kind. Thus, for instance, to be angry is a certain motion of this body, or part, or power, from this, and for the sake of this. And, on this account, it is the business of the physiologist to make soul the subject of his contemplation, either every soul, or a soul of this kind. The physiologist, however, and he who is skilled in dialectic, will define differently each of these; as for instance, what anger is; for the latter will define it to be the appetite of inflicting reciprocal molestation, or something of this kind; but the former, the fervor of blood or heat about the heart. But of these, the one assigns matter, and the other, form and reason; for reason is the form of a thing. It is necessary, however, that this should be in a certain matter, if it will be. Thus, with respect to a house, one definition of it will be, that it is a covering which prevents corruption from wind, rain, and heat; another will assert it to be stones, tiles, and wood; and another says it is the form in these stones, tiles, and wood for the sake of these things. Which, therefore, of these is the physiological definition? Is it that which is conversant with matter, but is ignorant of reason; or that which is conversant with reason only; or rather, that which consists from both? But of these definitions what is each? Shall we not say, that the physiological definition is that which is conversant with the passive qualities of matter which are not separable, and so far as they are not separable? But the physiologist is conversant with all such things as are the works and passive qualities of the body, and a matter of such a kind; and with those things which are not of this kind, some other character is conversant. And about some things, indeed, the artist, if it should so happen, is conversant; as for instance, the carpenter, or the physician. But about things which are not separate, yet so far as they are not the passive qualities of a body of this kind, and so far as they subsist from abstraction, the mathematician is conversant; and they are contemplated by the first philosopher, so far as they are separate. Let us return, however, whence we have digressed. We have said, then, that the passions of the soul, anger and fear, etc., are inseparable from the natural matter of animals, so far as they are such, and not in the same manner as a line and as a superficies.

Aristotle, On the Soul. Book I, Chapter 2

It is necessary, however, that those who speculate concerning the soul, should, at the same time, doubting about things with which it is requisite to abound, comprehend, as they proceed, the opinions of those ancients who have enunciated anything concerning it, in order that we may assume what has been well said, and avoid anything that has not been well said. But the principle of the investigation will be, first, to propose those things which especially appear to be present with the soul, according to nature. That which is animated, therefore, especially appears to differ from that which is inanimate in two things, namely, in motion and sensation; nearly, also, we have received these two particulars concerning the soul from the ancients; for some of them say, that the soul is, especially and primarily, that which moves. But being of opinion, that a thing which is not itself moved, cannot move another thing, they thus apprehend the soul to be something which is moved. Hence Democritus, indeed, says, that it is a certain fire and heat; for, since there are infinite figures and atoms, he says, that those which are spherical are fire and soul; such as are the particles in the air, called motes, which appear in the rays of the sun, emitted through windows, the all-various mixture of the seeds of which he asserts to be the elements of the whole of nature. Similar to these, also, are the assertions of Leucippus. But they say, that of these atoms, the spherical are the sole, because such figures are in the most eminent degree able to pervade through the universe, and to move other things, being themselves moved; for they were of opinion, that the soul is that which imparts motion to animals. Hence they asserted, that respiration is the boundary of living. For that which surrounds, compressing bodies, and extruding figures, which, because they are never at rest, impart motion to animals, aid is produced externally, others such like particulars entering during respiration. For these prevent the secretion of things inherent in animals, that which collects, and that which compresses, at one and the same time, impeding. They add, that animals live as long as they are able to do this. It seems, also, that what is said by the Pythagoreans, has the same meaning; for some of them say, that soul is the motes in the air; but others, that it is that which moves these. We have spoken, however, concerning these things, because these atoms appear to be continually moved, though there should be a perfect tranquillity in the air. Consonant to this doctrine, likewise, is the opinion of those who say that soul is that which moves itself; for all these seem to have thought, that motion is most appropriate to soul; and that everything else is moved through soul, but that soul is moved by itself, because nothing is seen to move, which is not also itself moved. In a similar manner, likewise, Anaxagoras says, that soul is that which moves; and any other who may have asserted that intellect moves the universe. For he was not entirely of the same opinion as Democritus; since he asserts, that soul and intellect are simply the same; because that which is apparent is true. Hence, according to him, Homer saying well, when he says that

“Hector lay of mind devoid.”

He does not, therefore, use intellect as a certain power which is conversant with truth; but he says that soul and intellect are the same. These things, however, are discussed less clearly by Anaxagoras; for, in many places, he says, that intellect is the cause of that which subsists beautifully, and with rectitude, but elsewhere he says, that intellect is the same with soul; for, according to him, it is inherent in all animals, the large and the small, the honorable and the ignoble. The intellect, however, which is so-called, according to prudence, does not appear to be similarly present with all animals, nor, indeed, with all men. Those, therefore, who directed their attention to the motion of that which is animated, conceived soul to be that which is, in the highest degree, motive. But those who surveyed the knowledge and sensation of beings, these said, that soul is principles; some, indeed, making many principles; but others this one principle. Thus, Empedocles composes soul from all the elements, and asserts, that each of these is soul; for he says,

“Water through water, earth through earth we see,
Aether divine through aether we perceive,
Devouring deadly fire, through fire we view,
Strife through pernicious strife, and love through love.”

After the same manner, also, Plato, in the Timaeus, produces soul from the elements; for the similar is known by the similar; and things are from principles. Thus, too, in what is said in the treatise concerning Philosophy, it is asserted, that animal itself is from the idea of one, and the first length, breadth, and depth; and that other things subsist after a similar manner. And again, in another way, that intellect, indeed, is unity; but science too (for it subsists in one way with reference to one thing); opinion the number of a superficies; and sense the number of a solid: for numbers were said to be forms themselves, and the principles of beings; and they consist from the elements. But with respect to things, some of them are judged of by intellect, and others by science; some by opinion, and others by sense. But these numbers are the forms of things. Since, however, soul appears to be motive and gnostic, hence some forming a conjunction from both of these have enunciated soul to be number moving itself. But they disagree concerning the principles what, and how many, they are. And those who make corporeal especially differ from those who make incorporeal principles; but those who mingle, and enunciate that principles are from both, differ from both these. They, likewise, dissent concerning the multitude of principles; for some say, that there is one; but others, that there are many principles. Consequent to these things, also, they define the soul; for they thought, not unreasonably, that a thing which is naturally motive should be ranked among the first of things. Hence, it appeared to some that soul is fire; for this is the most attenuated, and most incorporeal of the elements; and farther still, it is moved, and primarily moves other things. Democritus, however, spoke more elegantly when enunciating why it is each of these; for he says, that soul and intellect are the same; that soul consists from first and indivisible bodies; and that it is motive on account of the smallness of the parts from which it is composed, and its figure. But he says, that the most easily movable of all figures is the spherical figure; and that of this kind are intellect and fire. Anaxagoras, however, seems to say, that soul and intellect are different from each other, as we have already observed; but he uses both as naturally one; except that he admits intellect to be especially the principle of all things. He says, therefore, that intellect is, among beings, the only thing that is simple, unmingled, and pure. But he attributes both knowledge and motive power to the same principle; asserting that intellect moves the universe. Thales also appears, from what is related of him, to have thought that soul was something motive, since he says that the magnet has a soul, because it moves iron. But Diogenes, as also some others said, that soul is air; conceiving this to be the most attenuated, and the principle of all things; and that, on this account, soul knows and moves, so far as it is the first, and, from this, knows the rest of things; but that so far as it is most attenuated, it is motive. Heraclitus, likewise says, that soul is a principle; since, according to him, it is an exhalation, from which other things consist; for, he says, it is most incorporeal and always flowing; but that which is moved, is known by that which is moved. Both he, however, and many others, thought, that beings are in motion. Similar to these, also, Alcmaeon appears to have entertained an opinion concerning the soul; for he says, it is immortal, because it resembles the immortals; that this pertains to the soul, as being always moved; and that all divine natures, the moon, the sun, the stars, and the whole heaven, are continually and always moved. But of those who are more importunate, some, as Hippo, have asserted that the soul is water; and they appear to have been led to this opinion from generative seed, because this is universally moist. For Hippo reprehends those who say that the soul is blood, because generative seed is not blood; and this is the first soul. Others again, as Critias, said, that the soul is blood; apprehending that sensation is most appropriate to the soul, and that this is present with the soul through the nature of blood. For all the elements have had a patron except the earth; but no one has asserted that the soul is earth, unless some one should have said, that it is composed from all the elements, or is all the elements. All, however, defined the soul by three things, as I may say, namely, by motion, sense, and the incorporeal; but each of these is referred to principles. Hence, those who define it by knowledge, make it to be either an element, or from the elements, their assertions being mutually similar, one person excepted; for they say, that the similar is known by the similar; for, since the soul knows all things, they composed it from all principles. Those, therefore, who say that there is one certain cause, and one element, admit that the soul is one thing, such, for instance, as fire or air; but those who assert that there are many principles, also say, that the soul is many things. But Anaxagoras, alone, says, that intellect is impassive, and has nothing in common with anything else. Being a thing of this kind, however, how it knows, and from what cause, neither he says, nor is it evident from what has been said. But such as introduced contraries and principles, also constitute the soul from contraries; while others assume one of the contraries, such as the hot, or the cold, or something else of this kind, and, in a similar manner, admit the soul to be some one of these. Hence, also, they follow names; some asserting that the soul is heat, and that, on this account ζην to live is denominated from ζεειν, to burn; but others asserting that the soul is denominated the cold, on account of respiration and refrigeration. Such, therefore, are the assertions which are delivered concerning the soul, and such the causes through which they are made.

Aristotle, On the Soul. Book I, Chapter 3

In the first place, however, we must direct our attention to motion; for, perhaps, it is not only false, that the essence of motion is such as those asserted to be, who say that the soul is that which moves itself, or which is able to move; but it is one of the things impossible, that motion should be inherent in the soul. That it is not, therefore, necessary that a thing which moves should also be itself moved, has been said before. But everything which is moved, is moved in a twofold respect; for it is either moved by another thing, or by itself. But we say, that it is moved by another thing, when it is moved in consequence of being situated in that which is moved; as is the case with navigators, since they are not similarly moved with the ship’s; where the ship is moved by itself, but the navigators, because they are in that which is moved. This, however, is evident in parts; for walking is the proper motion of the feet; and this is, also, the motion of men; but then this proper motion is not present with navigators. Since, therefore, a thing is said to be moved in a twofold respect, let us now consider, with respect to the soul, whether it is moved by itself, and participates of motion. But since there are four motions, namely, lation, alliation (or change in quality), diminution, and increase, it will either be moved by one, or by more than one, or by all these motions. If, however, it is moved not from accident, motion will be naturally present with it. But, if this be the case, place, also, will be present with it; for all the above mentioned motions are in place. If, however, the essence of the soul is to move itself, to be moved will not be present with it from accident, as it is to that which is white, or to that which is of three cubits; for these, also, are moved, but from accident; since that in which they are inherent, namely, body, is moved; and, on this account, it is not the place of them. But there will be a place of the soul, if it naturally participates of motion. Farther still, if it is naturally, it may also be violently moved; and if violently, likewise naturally. And the like also takes place with respect to rest; for a thing naturally rests in that to which it is naturally moved; and, in a similar manner, a thing violently rests in that to which it is violently moved. Of what kind, however, the violent motions and rests of the soul will be, it is not easy for those to assign, who are willing to devise them. Again, if the soul is moved upward, it will be fire; but if downward, earth; for these are the motions of these bodies. There is, likewise, the same reasoning concerning the intermediate bodies. Farther still, since the soul is seen to move the body, it is reasonable that the body should be moved with the same motions with which the soul is moved. But if this be the case, it will be true to say conversely, that the soul is moved with the same motion with which the body is moved; so that the soul will be changed conformably to the body, either wholly, or by a transition, according to parts. If, however, this is possible, it may, also, having departed from the body, again enter into it; and to this, it will be consequent that dead animals may rise again to life. But with the motion, which is from accident, it may also be moved by another thing; for an animal may be violently impelled. It is not necessary, however, that a thing which is essentially moved by itself, should be moved by something else, except from accident; as neither is it necessary, that what is essentially good, or good through itself, should be good on account of something else, or for the sake of another thing. It may, however, be said, that the soul is especially moved by sensibles, if it is moved; but, if it moves itself, it will also be moved. Hence, if all motion is a removal of that which is moved, from its condition, so far as it is moved, the soul, also, will recede from its essence, if it does not move itself from accident; but the motion of its essence is essential. Some, however, say, that the soul moves the body in which it is contained, in the same manner as it moves itself; and this Democritus says, speaking similarly to Philip the comedian. For Philip says, that Daedalus made a moving wooden Venus, by the infusion of quicksilver. In a similar manner, also, Democritus speaks; for he says, that indivisible spheres, in consequence of being naturally adapted never to stop, at the same time draw and move every body. We, however, ask whether this very thing makes body to be at rest? But how it effects this is difficult, or even impossible to say. In short, the soul does not thus appear to move the animal; but through a certain pre-election and intelligence. After the same manner, also, Timaeus physiologizes, that the soul moves the body; for in consequence of being moved itself, it also moves the body, because it is connected with it. For, being constituted from the elements, and being divided according to harmonic numbers, in order that it may possess sense, and a connascent harmony, and that the universe may be moved according to concordant relations, he bends its rectilinear progression into a circle. Dividing, also, one circle into two doubly connected, again he divides the one into seven circles, as if the lations of the heaven were the motions of the soul. In the first place, therefore, it is not well to say that the soul is a magnitude; for it is evident that Timaeus is of opinion that the soul of the universe is such a nature, as that which is called intellect; since it is not such a thing as the sensitive, nor as the desiderative nature; because the motions of these is not circulation. But intellect is 1, and continued in the same manner as intelligence, and intelligence in the same manner as intellectual conceptions. These, however, are one, in consequence of being successive, in the same manner as number, and not as magnitude; because neither is intellect thus continued; but it is either impartible or it is not something continued like magnitude. For how, if it were magnitude, could it understand with any one of its parts; I say, of its parts, either according to magnitude or according to a point, if it is necessary, to call this, also, a part. If, therefore, it understands according to a point, but these are infinite, it is evident that it will never pass through all of them. But if according to magnitude, it will frequently or infinitely understand the same thing period it appears, however, that it is capable of understanding it once. But if it is sufficient to touch with any one of its parts, why is it necessary that it should be moved in a circle, or, in short, that it should have magnitude? And if it is necessary that, touching with the whole circle, it should understand, what is the contact which is with the parts? Farther still, how will it understand the partible by the impartible, and the impartible by the partible? It is necessary, however, that intellect should be this circle; for the motion of intellect is intelligence; and of a circle, circulation. If, therefore, intelligence is circulation, intellect, also, will be that circle, of which such a circulation is intelligence. Hence, it will always understand a certain thing; for it is necessary that it should, since the circulation is eternal; for of effective or practical intellections, there are boundaries, since all of them are for the sake of something else. But contemplative intellections are similarly terminated with reasons; and every reason is either definition or demonstration. But demonstrations both proceed from a principle, and have, in a certain respect, an end, namely, syllogism, were the conclusion, and if they are not bounded, yet they are not again inflected to the principle; but always assuming the middle and extreme, they proceed in a right line. Circulation, however, is again inflected to the beginning; but all definitions are finite. Again, if the same circulation is made frequently, it will be requisite often to understand the same thing. Farther still, intelligence is rather similar to a certain rest and station, than to motion. And after the same manner syllogism; moreover, neither is that blessed which is not easy, but violent; but if motion is not the essence of intelligence it will be moved contrary to nature. It is, also, laborious to be mingled with body, not being able to be liberated from it; and besides this, it is to be avoided; since it is better to intellect not to subsist in conjunction with body, as we are accustomed to say, and which is, also, the opinion of many. The cause, likewise, is it manifest why the heaven is moved in a circle; for neither is the essence of soul the cause of being moved in a circle, but it is thus moved from accident; nor is the body the cause, but soul is rather the cause of the motion of the body. Nor, indeed, as it is said, that the soul is thus moved, because it is better; though it is requisite that God should, on this account, make soul to be moved in a circle, because it is better for it to be moved than to be permanent; and to be thus moved, then in a different manner. Since, however, a speculation of this kind is more adapted to other discussions, we shall at present dismiss it. But that absurdity happens to this assertion, and to most of the assertions about the soul; for they can join and place the soul in body, at the same time assigning no cause why, and in what manner the body subsisting, this is affected. Though, indeed, this will appear to be necessary; for, in consequence of the communion of the soul with body, the one acts, but the other suffers; and the one is moved, but the other moves. No one of these things, however, is present with casual particulars, in their communion with each other. But they only endeavor to say what kind of thing the soul is; and determine nothing farther about the body which receives the soul; as if it were possible, according to the Pythagoric fables, for any soul to enter into any body; for everything appears to have its peculiar form and morphe. They speak, however, just as if someone should say, that the carpenters art enters into pipes; for it is necessary, indeed, that art should use instruments, but the soul the body.

Aristotle, On the Soul. Book I, Chapter 4

Another opinion, also, is delivered concerning the soul, which is plausible to the many, and is, in no respect, inferior to those that have been enumerated, and which, in common discussions, is critically examined, as it were, by corrective arguments. For some assert, that the soul is a certain harmony; Since harmony is a certain mixture and composition of contraries; and the body is composed from contraries. Harmony, however, is a certain ratio or composition of things which are mingled; But it is not possible that the soul can be either of these. Farther still, to move is not the province of harmony: but all, as I may say, especially ascribe this to the soul. It more accords, however, with health to say, it is a harmony, and, in short, with the corporeal virtues, than with the soul. But this will be more evident, if someone endeavors to explain the passions and works of the soul by a certain harmony; For the adaptation will be difficult. Again, if we speak of harmony, looking to two things, the most principal harmony is in those magnitudes which have motion and position, when they are so co-adapted, as to admit nothing of a kindred nature; but the harmony next to this, is the ratio of the things mingled. In neither way, therefore, is it reasonable to admit that the soul is harmony. But the composition of the parts of the body is very easily confuted; For there are many compositions of the parts, and in many ways. Of what, therefore, or in what manner, is it requisite to conceive that intellect, or the sensitive, or the oretic power, is the composition? In a similar manner, also, it is absurd that the soul should be the ratio of the mixture; for the mixture of the elements has not the same ratio, according to which there is flesh, and according to which there is bone. It will happen, therefore, that the same animal will have many souls, and through the whole body; if all the parts, indeed, are from the mingled elements; but the ratio of the mixture is harmony and soul. Some one, also, may require this of Empedocles: for he says, that each of the parts is in a certain ratio. Whether, therefore, is the sole a ratio, or rather, being something else, does it accede to the members? Again, whether it’s friendship the cause of any kind of mixture, or of that mixture which is according to ratio? And with respect to mixture itself, whether is it a ratio, or something different from ratio? These things, therefore, are attended with such like doubts. But if the soul is different from the mixture, why, together with the essence of flesh, and the other parts of the animal, is it subverted? And, in addition to these things, unless each of the parts has a soul, if soul is not the ratio of the mixture, what is it which is corrupted on the departure of the soul? That the soul, therefore, cannot be harmony, nor moved in a circle, is evident from what has been said. It may, however, as we have observed, be moved from accident and move itself. Thus, for instance, that may be moved in which the soul subsists, and this may be moved by the soul; but it is not possible, that it can be moved in any other manner according to place.

Aristotle, On the Soul. Book I, Chapter 5